ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY ★ GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SCIENCE ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY

THE IMPACTS OF STATE TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES ON BORDER REGIONS: A READING THROUGH CROSS BORDER CO-OPERATION

Ph.D. THESIS

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SEPTEMBER 2014

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İSTANBUL TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ ★ FEN BİLİMLERİ ENSTİTÜSÜ

SINIR BÖLGELERİNDE YÖNETİM SÜREÇLERİNİN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ: SINIR ÖTESİ İŞBİRLİKLERİ ÜZERİNDEN BİR OKUMA

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EYLÜL 2014

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Date of Submission : 30 July 2014
Date of Defence : 16 September 2014

To Leyla and Mehtap,

FOREWORD

Well, here it is…

Hundreds of pages, documenting the results of a long journey... And what a journey it was!
A couple of times I've imagined this moment: me, writing this foreword as the final words of the dissertation, with the company of a glass (or bottle) of wine. What a relaxing moment it should be?
Apparently, it isn't. There is some other work to do tomorrow. I need to wake up early and prepare myself for the next tasks. Now, writing these words, I am dreaming of a last cigarette before going to bed, as the full stop of present work. This is not the end of the journey but may be the memoir of a small part of it. There are still many miles to go. But this work will keep my initial questions, the answers that I've found to them and the memories of the search. I believe they will shed light on my way as long as the journey continues. Off course I am not going to read the book over and over again. This is not a hitchhiker's guide. But at least I have found some material for publishing and some clues for future work.
I can say that the spirit of this study lies in its social constructionist approach. Scales, borders, regions… Every human made phenomenon is socially constructed. So am I, and this work is a part of the social construction of me. Since social construction is a process necessitating human interactions, at this point I've to say thanks to the people who have contributed to my construction.
Indeed they are so many. Perhaps I should start with my advisor Gülden Erkut who starting from my first proposal believed that it's going to work. Without her support and encouragement I think it would be impossible for me to transcend the boundaries of urban and regional planning and swim in the waters of various other disciplines. Also many thanks to the core members of my jury, Fatma Ünsal and Şence Türk whose advises removed a lot of barriers in front of my way. My colleagues in the ITU Urban and Regional Planning department, especially my office mates and friends from the Assistant Solidarity are also on the list. After all, life is not a PhD. There is joy, struggle and… (well, I have to think on this issue a little bit).
Moving from Istanbul to Nijmegen for 6 months, I thank to Henk Van Houtum, Olivier Kramsch, other border scholars and colleagues from the GPM department of Radboud University. Their company opened up my mind.
There are also some organizations that I officially have to thank: Radboud University Nijmegen- Centre for Border Research, they welcomed me in Netherlands and provided me a comfortable and productive academic environment for research and writing. TÜBİTAK- Science Fellowships and Grant Programmes Department, they provided the generous funding for my research in Nijmegen, Holland. And the ITU-Scientific Research Support Department, they provided funding for the field study and technical materials.
Thanks to Amanda Jessen who did the proof reading of the dissertation. She did a great job and made the dissertation understandable. There are still some mind confusing paragraphs written in sleepless nights or hangover mornings.

Unfortunately neither Amanda, nor I can change them (time constrains), but they are mostly harmless.
There are many other people to thank, even though I can't count them one by one. For example, those guys, whose work I've used (or exploited) extensively. They are shortly called "the literature" and some of their names can be found in the reference list at the end of the study. Each of their books or works provided me not only a couple of sentences in the dissertation but also great enthusiasm for the work I do. Not to mention other fellows working in cafes, bars, university services etc. I am well aware that this study rises on the social division of labour that enables me to spend several years of my life on it, while those people's share in the division is put as a burden on their shoulders to ensure the reproduction of the current social structure.
One particular boy, Berkin Elvan who died 15 years old, on March 11th, 2014 after staying 9 months in coma due a tear gas bullet hit to his head, while I was in Holland for the single purpose of finishing my thesis, deserves particular, symbolic thanks in the name of all. I couldn't avoid falling in despair while people attending to his funeral were brutally attacked by the police and I was staying comfortable, far away from trouble. The only way for an excuse seemed to me to stuck myself in the writing and perceive it as a kind of duty against those sacrificing their time, physical and psychological wellbeing for a certain understanding of "good" that we all share, but still cannot define.

Well, here I am.
At home, together with the woman I love and our daughter. Remembering the words of an old, wise lady: "the true journey is return" and to go one step further you need always coming home.

June 2014 Ervin SEZGIN
Istanbul- Nijmegen

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABEM : The EU Coordination Centre (Avrupa Birliği Eşgüdüm Merkezi)
AEBR : Association of European Border Regions
AKP : Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
ANAP : Anavatan Partisi
CBC : Cross Border Cooperation
CFP : Call for Profects
CHP : Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
CEE : Central and Eastern Europe
CEEC : Central and Eastern European Countries
CFCU : The Central Finance and Contracts Unit
CTI : Chamber of Trade and Industry
EC : European Commission
ERDF : European Regional Development Fund
EU : European Union
FRONTEX : The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU
G-8 : Group of Eight
G-20 : Group of Twenty
GDP : Gross Domestic Product
IMF : International Monetary Fund
IPA : Instrument for Pre- Accession Assistance
JTS : Joint Technical Secretariat
MEB : Ministry of Education (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı)
MNC : Multi- National Corporation
NA : National Agency (Ulusal Ajans)
NAFTA : North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NUTS : Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
OECD : The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPP : Public Private Partnership
PRAG : Procurement and Grants for European Union External Actions
RDA : Regional Development Agency
SNA : Social Network Analysis
SPO : State Planning Organization
UN : United Nations
UNDP : United Nations Development Programme
USA : United States of America
USSR : United Soviet Socialist Republic
WB : World Bank
WTO : World Trade Organization
WW1 : World War 1
WW2 : World War 2

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THE IMPACTS OF STATE TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES ON BORDER REGIONS: A READING THROUGH CROSS BORDER CO-OPERATION

SUMMARY

This study aims to conceptualize cross-border cooperation (CBC) as a field of the politics of scale and to indicate the transformative dynamics within it that are shaped by local, national and supranational institutions.

The politics of scale approach is a part of the state-rescaling theory, the main research topic of which is the transformation of the nation state. It is argued that several social, economic and political dynamics, such as globalization and the current phase of global capitalism, necessitate a transformation within the state structure. This transformation includes the invention and rediscovery of new scales such as the supranational and the regional scales, and the new forms of governance established by their involvement. While some aspects of the state-rescaling theory conceptualize the transformation of the nation state as a shift of its power upwards to the supranational scale and downwards towards the regional scale, the politics of scale approach argues that rescaling should be understood as negotiation and confrontation processes between actors who represent their scalar interests. Hence, these actors collide in specific policy fields, and both shape and are shaped by them.

Cross border cooperation emerges as one of these policy fields over which a reading of these transformation processes becomes possible. However, such a reading cannot be completed without exploring the roles and positions of institutions involved in the politics of scale. New institutionalism theory provides an explanatory tool for understanding institutions and institutional structure. Looking from sociological, historical or rational choice perspectives, new institutionalists argue that institutions are a medium of social change and its reproduction. Through, laws, practices and narratives, institutions reproduce a given structure that is historically shaped by social dynamics. However, they also act as agents that are capable of transforming it.

To understand the institutional dynamics of CBC from this perspective, this study uses two major methods, institutional ethnography and interpretative geography. While the first method enables a comprehensive understanding of the institutional structure of CBC in the Edirne-Kırklareli border region of Turkey, the latter allows an exploration of the institutional actors' perceptions of CBC.

The study uses 50 semi-structured interviews conducted between May and October, 2013 with provincial and district governors, mayors and municipal clerks, civil society actors in the Edirne-Kırklareli border region and officials from the Ministry of Development and Ministry of EU affairs. Through these interviews, the perceptions of actors representing institutions from various scales are examined to interpret the transformation of the nation state and this transformation's effect on border regions.

The findings of the study concentrate on three major fields where the institutionalization of CBC can be observed as a part of the politics of scale. First, the role of provincial and district governors is of crucial importance. As the representatives of the central government, governors aim to spread CBC in the

region, making it a part of state policy. However, they also perform a gate keeping role, selectively allowing some actors to participate in CBC and blocking others from doing so at the same time. Second, CBC in the Edirne-Kırklareli border region strongly depends on specific individuals who are referred to in the literature as institutional entrepreneurs. These people, without enjoying any personal benefit, support CBC as a "project" that promotes regional development and the improvement of social welfare in the region. Hence, while they contribute to the institutionalization of CBC as a part of existing social and political structure, they also behave as agents who transform the local institutional setting through CBC. Finally, CBC, together with regional development agencies' and other institutions' funds for regional development, contributes to the implementation of new regionalist policies and creates a new way of doing business that can be defined as project-based development. Project-based development is one of the processes of the transformation of the nation state as these projects are used to substitute Keynesian welfare redistribution mechanisms.

SINIR BÖLGELERİNDE YÖNETİM SÜREÇLERİNİN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ: SINIR ÖTESİ İŞBİRLİKLERİ ÜZERİNDEN BİR OKUMA

ÖZET

Küreselleşme süreci yirmi yılı aşkın bir süredir insan topluluklarının hayatını etkilemektedir. Ekonomik, sosyal ve politik hayatta hissedilebilir bir dönüşümün yaşandığı bu süreçte, mal, hizmet ve insanların hareketliliği en önemli unsuru teşkil etmekte ve bu hareketlerin önünde birer engel olarak görülen sınırların, geçirgenliğini arttırarak aşılmasını da beraberinde getirmektedir. Bu bağlamda yeni sosyal ve politik gelişmeler ve yenilikler sürekli olarak zuhur etmekte, kimilerinin etkileri neredeyse günlük olarak izlenebilirken, kimileri de uzun vadede kendilerini göstermektedir. Süregiden destekleyici ve karşı çıkan tartışmaları ile birlikte, bu gelişmeler politik yapıların mekânsal örgütlenmelerini de etkilemektedir. Bir taraftan, küresel düzeyde, genellikle hareketliliği arttırmak ve ulus ötesi sermayeyi çekmek için, devletler birlikler oluştururken, diğer taraftan da ulus altı düzeyde, bölgeler, yönetişimi ulus devletlerden daha etkin olarak yürütme iddiası ile yeni politik aktörler olarak ortaya çıkmakta ve küresel sermayeyi çekmek için ulus devletler ile rekabet etmektedir. Bu bölgeler arasında sınır bölgelerinde bulunanlar, değişen politik koşullar ve taşıdıkları tarihsel anlamlar nedeni ile özel bir ilgiyi hak etmektedir. Sınır bölgeleri, akademik yazında, küreselleşme süreci ile birlikte uluslararası ve kültürler arası ilişkiler, ekonomik gelişme, mekânsal planlama ve sınır ötesi ilişkiler konularında yeni fırsatlar sunan olgular olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Sınır bölgelerine atfedilen bu önem, sadece akımlara bağlı, fonksiyonel bir değişimle ilgili değildir. Bu süreçlerin getirdiği, yönetsel alanda yaşanan yapısal dönüşüm de burada belirgin önem taşımakta ve üzerinde araştırma yapılması gereken bir konuyu teşkil etmektedir. Genel hatları ile devletin dönüşüm süreci olarak kavramsallaştırılan bu süreçte, Avrupa Birliği, NAFTA, ASEAN ya da MERCOSUR gibi ulus üstü yapılar yeni ortaya çıkan yönetim biçimlerinin küresel halkasını oluştururken, yerelde örgütlenmiş sivil toplum kuruluşları, yerel yönetimler, merkezi idarenin taşra teşkilatları ve yerel sermaye de yönetişim kavramı etrafında yerel halkayı oluşturmaktadır. Ulus devlet ise bu iki katman arasında bir ara birim oluşturmakta ve küreselleşme sürecinde geçirdiği değişim tartışmalara konu olmaktadır. Bir tarafta ulus devlette bu iki halkaya doğru güç devri ile birlikte bir tasfiye süreci yaşandığı iddia edilirken, diğer tarafta da yeni kurumsal araçlar geliştirerek devletin küreselleşme sürecine adapte olduğu ve şekil değiştirdiği, fakat öznitelik olarak aynı kaldığı karşı argümanı durmaktadır.

Genel olarak sınır bölgeleri, söz konusu küresel dönüşüm süreci içinde uluslararası ve kültürler arası etkileşimin üst düzeyde var olduğu alanlar olarak kabul görmektedir. Bariyerden köprüye geçiş metaforu ile simgeleştirilen bu süreçte süregiden kavramsal tartışmalar yukarıda tarif edilen çerçeveye dayandırılmakta ve pratikteki karşılığını sınır ötesi işbirliği (SÖİ) programlarında bulmaktadır. Oluşturulmaları ve uygulanmalarında liderliğini AB'nin yaptığı, fakat dünyanın farklı yerlerinde de kabul gören ve Türkiye'de de hızla artan bir uygulama alanı

bulan bu programlara farklı kademelerdeki (küresel, ulusal ve yerel) aktörler dahil olmakta, etkileşime geçmekte ve yeniden şekillenen bir güç dengesini sınır bölgeleri özelinde oluşturmaktadır. Bu nedenle SÖİ programlarının incelenmesi, yerel ekonomik kalkınma, AB bütünleşme süreci gibi başka pek çok konunun yanında yönetim aktörlerinin küreselleşme sürecinde kendini yeniden konumlandırması ve bu alanda yerel yönetişim unsurlarının artan öneminin tespit edilmesi açısından önem taşımaktadır. İşbu çalışma konunun bu son kısmına dikkat çekerek, Türkiye'nin AB ile komşulukta olduğu sınır bölgelerinde küreselleşme süreçlerine bağlı olarak ortaya çıkan yerel, ulusal ve küresel aktörleri belirlemeyi, tarihsel süreç içinde konumlandırmayı ve AB üyelik sürecinin özellikle sınır bölgelerinde, kurumsal yapıya ve yönetim süreçlerine getirmekte olduğu dönüşümü ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır.

Çalışma, üç temel kuramsal yaklaşımı, kavramsal arka planı açıklamak için kullanmaktadır: devletin yeniden ölçeklendirilmesi (state rescaling), yeni kurumsalcılık (new institutionalism) ve bölgelerin kurumsallaşması (institutionalization of regions). Devletin yeniden ölçeklendirilmesi kuramı, ulus devletin, küreselleşmenin de etkisi ile dönüşüme uğraması ve ulus üstü ve ulus altı ölçeklerde yeni yönetişim araçları ile kendini yeniden üretmesini konu edinmektedir. Söz konusu dönüşüm dikey ve yatay üç aktarımı mekanizmaları ile ve yapısalcı bir bakış açısı ile açıklandığı gibi, toplumsal yapımcılık (social constructivism) perspektifi ile ölçek siyaseti olarak da kavramsallaştırılabilmektedir. Bu sonuncusu, farklı ölçeklerdeki çıkarları ve güç ilişkilerini temsil eden aktörlerin, belirli politika alanlarında etkileşime girerek, toplumsal yapının bu ölçeklerde hem yeniden üretilmesini hem de dönüştürülmesini sağladığını iddia etmektedir. Çalışma bu savdan hareketle sınır ötesi işbirliğini bir ölçek siyaseti alanı olarak tanımlamaya ve ulus üstü, ulusal ve ulus altı (bölgesel) ölçeklerin bu alandaki dönüşümünü irdelemeyi hedeflemektedir.

Farklı ölçekleri temsil eden aktörler belirli bir güce sahip kişiler olabilecekleri gibi, ağırlıklı olarak bu ölçeklerdeki güç ilişkilerinin cisimleşmiş hali olarak ifade edilen kurumlardan oluşmaktadır. Kurumlar ise sadece belirli kuruluşları değil, yasa ve kanunlar, gelenekler, toplumsal ilişki biçimleri ve söylemleri de içerecek şekilde tanımlanmaktadır. Yeni kurumsalcılık kuramı kabaca kurumların toplumsal yapının oluşmasında, yeniden üretilmesinde ve dönüşmesinde belirleyici olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Kurumlar toplumsal ilişkilerin birer ürünü olarak, toplumsal dinamikler tarafından kısıtlanmaktadırlar, fakat aynı zamanda girişimci bir rol üstlenerek toplumsal yapının dönüşmesinde de rol oynamaktadırlar. Yeni kurumsalcılık kuramı üç farklı perspektiften (tarihsel kurumsalcılık, toplumsal kurumsalcılık ve ussal seçim kurumsalcılığı) bakarak yasa ve kanunlar, toplumsal pratikler ve anlatılar (narrative) aracılığı ile kurumların dönüştürücü rolünü ve kısıtlanmışlığını açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Ölçek siyaseti yürüten aktörlerin etkileşim türlerinin (yasa, pratik ve anlatılar) içinde bulundukları toplumsal koşulların bağlamı içinde ele alınması önem taşımaktadır. Bu bakımdan sınır ötesi işbirliğini, bir ölçek siyaseti alanı olarak tanımlamak açısından yeni kurumsalcı öğretinin kurum tanımı açıklayıcı özelliktedir.

Son olarak Ansi Paasi tarafından geliştirilen bölgelerin kurumsallaşması kuramı, eş zamanlı olarak yürüyen 4 farklı sürecin ulus altı bölgelerin kurumsallaşması açısından önem taşıdığını iddia etmektedir. Bunlar bölgenin mekânsal olarak tanımlanması, bölgesel kurumların oluşturulması, bölgenin sembolik çerçevesinin tanımlanması ve bölgenin toplumsal bilinçte oluşturulması olarak tarif edilmektedir. Bu dört süreç ya da katman, farklı ölçeklerde gelişen toplumsal, ekonomik ve politik

dinamiklerin yerel dinamikler ile karşılaşmasını ve etkileşime geçerek bölgelerin oluşma sürecini belirlemesini açıklamak amacı ile kullanılmaktadır. Bölgelerin kurumsallaşması kuramı farklı ölçeklerin yerel üzerindeki etkilerini ortaya koyması, dolayısı ile ölçek siyaseti ve yeni kurumsalcılık kuramlarında bulunan toplumsal yapımcı bakış açısı ile örtüşmekte ve sorunsalı bölgesel ölçeğe indirerek mekansal etkilerini de incelemeye olanak tanımaktadır. Sınır ötesi işbirliğinin özünde sınır bölgeleri için geliştirilmiş, mekansal boyutu tanımlı ve baskın olan bir politika aracı olması sebebi ile kurumsallaşma süreci, kimi noktaları ile bölgelerin kurumsallaşması aşamaları ile örtüşmektedir. Bu bakımdan, son kuramsal bakış açısı ölçek siyaseti yaklaşımını tamamlayıcı ve destekleyici bir rol üstlenmektedir.

Sınır ötesi işbirliklerini bir ölçek siyaseti alanı olarak tanımlayıp, bunun dönüştürücü etkilerini kurumlar üzerinden okumaya çalışmak iki faklı tür yorumlamayı (ve okumayı) mümkün kılacak bir yönetimi gerektirmektedir. İlkin farklı kurumların birbirileri ile ilişkilerini ve oluşturdukları kurumsal yapıyı tanımlamak gerekmektedir. Bu amaçla kurumsal etnografya (institutional ethnography) olarak adlandırılan yöntem kullanılmıştır. İkinci olarak ise kurumsal aktörlerin içlerinde bulundukları toplumsal ve kurumsal yapıyı nasıl yorumladıklarının, dolayısı ile onun dönüştürülmesi ya da yeniden üretilmesi konularında kendilerini nasıl konumlandırdıklarının ortaya konulması gerekmektedir. Bu amaç için ise yorumlayıcı coğrafya (interpretative geography) yöntemi kullanılmıştır.

Çalışmanın amacı doğrultusunda Türkiye'nin AB ile komşuluk ilişkisinde bulunduğu Edirne ve Kırklareli illerinde sınır ötesi işbirliği süreçlerine dahil olan yönetişim aktörlerinin ve tarihsel süreç içinde gelişimlerinin belirlenmesi ve etkinliklerinin ölçülerek küreselleşmeye bağlı olarak ortaya çıkan yeni yönetişim sisteminde konumlandırılmaları hedeflenmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, bu iki ilden oluşan sınır bölgesinde ve Ankara'da bakanlıklar düzeyinde sınır ötesi işbirliğine katılan ya da sınır ötesi işbirliği politikalarının belirlenmesinde söz sahibi olan kurumlar ile yarı yapılandırılmış mülakatlar yapılması yoluna gidilmiştir. Valilikler, kaymakamlıklar, belediyeler, sivil toplum kuruluşları, kalkınma bakanlığı ve AB bakanlığı temsilcilerinden oluşan görüşmeciler ile sınır ötesi işbirliğine olan yaklaşımları ve genel olarak sınır ötesi işbirliği konusundaki algılarını anlamak üzere gerçekleştirilen mülakatlar 30dk- 2 saat aralığında değişen farklı sürelerde yapılmıştır. Ayrıca sınır ötesi işbirliğini tanımlayan AB ve ulusal mevzuatlar da taranarak çalışmaya dahil edilmiştir.

Saha çalışmasının bulguları ışığında, üç temel sonuç ortaya çıkmıştır. İlkin merkezi hükümet kaymakamlıklar nezdinde Edirne ve Kırklareli'nde sınır ötesi işbirliğinin gelişmesi ve yayılması konusunda tayin edici bir rol üstlenmektedir. Bu rol bir taraftan sınır ötesi işbirliğinin bir devlet politikası olarak benimsendiğini gösterirken (bakanlık yetkilileri ile yapılan görüşmeler de bu bulguyu desteklemektedir), diğer taraftan devletin AB ile sınır bölgeleri arasında kurulan bir ilişki biçimi olan sınır ötesi işbirliğine doğrudan müdahale ettiğine de işaret etmektedir. İkinci olarak bölgede sınır ötesi işbirliğinin gelişiminin kişilere bağımlı bir seyir izlediği ortaya konulmuştur. Literatürde kurumsal girişimci (institutional entrepreneur) olarak tanımlanan bu kişiler kendi çıkarlarından bağımsız olarak, sınır ötesi işbirliğini bölgesel kalkınmayı ve toplumsal refahı arttıracak bir "proje" olarak değerlendirmekte ve bölgede yaygınlaşması için çaba sarf etmektedir. Son olarak kullanımı gittikçe yaygınlaşan bölgesel kalkınma ajansı ve diğer kurumların bölgesel kalkınma fonları ile birlikte değerlendirildiğinde, sınır ötesi işbirliği ve beraberinde gelen proje bazlı kalkınma anlayışının bölgede gittikçe yaygınlaştığı ve benimsendiği ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu anlayışın yerleşmesinin ise geleneksel Keynesçi refah devleti

modelinin, yeni bölgeci, neoliberal bir yaklaşım ile ikame edilmesine yönelik bir dönüşüme işaret ettiği iddia edilmektedir.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

As the societies and the economies of the world become more interconnected and interdependent, the basic political and economic unit for the organization of societies, the nation state, is facing challenges from above and below. That the global flows of capital, people, goods and information are beyond the power of any one individual state to control opens the gates for the development of global institutions that hold a part of the sovereign power of the nation states but that also extends the limits of sovereignty beyond a traditional understanding. From below, citizen demands for democracy seek governance by the closest administrative level, as opposed to a distant centre. Moreover, sub-national administrative units such as metropolitan regions have emerged as quasi-autonomous actors competing worldwide for promoting themselves as new economic or financial centres providing peak opportunities for highly skilled human capital and multinational corporations (MNCs). In the European context, the European Union (EU) may be a source of challenges coming from both directions.

"Promoting economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity among member states" is one of the basic objectives of the EU (EU, 2010). It is also recognized that the context in which the EU functions runs parallel to globalization dynamics that aim to reduce the barriers in front of the free movement of capital, goods, services and people (EU, 2010). This policy statement requires the involvement of the EU as a supranational entity as well as sub-national regions in governance processes. Although domestic policies of member states are an integral part of both EU policies and globalization dynamics, they are no longer under the sole authority of the nation states but, instead, are shared with the executive and legislative institutions of the EU, a dynamic tried to be captured by the term multi-level governance. The most significant indicator of this transformation is observed in the regional policies of the EU: a supranational initiative targeting the sub-national level.

Cross Border Cooperation is one tool used to achieve the above-mentioned objectives. CBC targets border regions, which are a specific type of sub-national unit, and has been used to support: investment in cross-border infrastructure; the development of particular sectors; environmental protection measures; hazard mitigation; and European integration through social cohesion and increased interaction across borders. By continuously developing instruments such as INTERREG, the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and EuropeAid, CBC has transcended the borders of the European Union and spread across the whole world. In that respect, the question of the location of "Europe's borders" been interrogated by various scholars (Rumford, 2008). The "borders of Europe" in that respect do not only point to the physical demarcation of a territory but also to a cognitive process (Balibar, 1998) reflecting the above-mentioned challenges to the nation state.

As a programmatic instrument, CBC has created its own institutions on different scales, which has resulted in a process of adjustment for existing institutions at the national and local levels. At the EU level, CBC is strongly related to regional policies that aim to reduce disparities and achieve cohesion between regions (Mengi, 2007). Hence, they are also a part of the Territorial Agenda of the EU that supports the decentralisation of state power to the sub-national levels. With that perspective, EU institutions established to support and manage CBC represent a shift of state power upwards and towards the supranational level as well as downwards towards the regional/local level. In the Turkish context -- and, at the national level -- central institutions are responsible for the allocation of EU funds according to previously defined priorities. These central institutions perform a gate keeping role for these funds, a practice that is supported by the EU to prevent corruption and establish coordination between various institutions. The local branches of central government institutions are potential beneficiaries of the EU's CBC funds as well. Hence together with the gate-keeping role of resources, central governments also perform an entrepreneurial function for local development by competing for these funds. At the local level, various actors -- ranging from municipalities to municipal unions, NGO's and business organizations -- not only function as potential beneficiaries but also as stakeholders in governance processes by either establishing their own institutions or contributing to the changing institutional structure of CBC. In sum, together with the

dynamics of globalization and the politics of Europeanization that promote continental integration and the competitiveness of regions on a global scale, CBC is changing the institutional context of border regions. While this process reflects the tension between various scales of government, it also has a significant impact on the governance structure of regions and nation states.

The tension between governmental scales is a subject of the state rescaling theory, which suggests that a shift of scale in the functioning of global capitalism also requires a shift in the organisational structure of the state and its institutions. That shift, according to Brenner et al. (2003), can be traced to spatial organizations of the state institutions. Among these spatial organisations, regions emerge as critical actors both at national and international levels. In addition, the impacts of CBC on governance structures correspond to the growing literature on governance, employing concepts such as multi-level governance, local governance and meta-governance (Xu and Yeh, 2011) and suggesting that the declining Keynesian Welfare State and the neo-liberal economic agenda together put regions in a position where they need to compete as global actors to attract capital. As part of this, regions need to reshape their governance structures by including actors from various scales as well as a broad range of social institutions. Such an approach goes hand-in-hand with the new regionalism theory. The institutional structure, which affects the governance process in a multi-scalar manner and is shaped by CBC, is also a subject of analysis within the new institutional theory, which posits that institutions are phenomena composed by different social dynamics and power struggles (Putnam, 1993) with the ability to influence or change a given institutional structure.

Apart from the obvious contention that "CBC happens in border regions", the particular importance of border regions is rooted in: historical conditions, which resulted in underdevelopment at the hands of Cold War-related, military constraints; geographical location, where these regions sit physically at the intersection and dividing lines of political borders; and, social dynamics of bordering that simultaneously require an openness to the traditional 'other' and encourage integration and social reconstruction of borders (Martinez, 1994). Therefore, it could be argued that border regions are among the most affected areas in terms of globalization-related, political and economic dynamics. As the flows of people, goods, services and capital continue to accelerate, border regions function less as

barriers to trade and more as facilitators of it; in other words, these regions enjoy easier access to cross-border markets and find the opportunity to realize their cross-border potential. However they also become playfields of governmental institutions on different scales, including supranational, national and local levels. Indeed, due their strategic, geographic location, border regions serve as laboratories for new modes of governance. The well-known examples of Euregios on the one hand represent a model for cross-border governance, where regions of at least two different countries find common ways to resolve common problems (Van der Veen and Boot, 1995). On the other hand – and, to a much broader extend – border regions became play fields where different governmental processes intermingle, and several actors from different levels are involved. Especially the existence of the EU at the regional level provides an easily observable state-rescaling process.

1.2 Purpose of Thesis

In this context, the institutionalization process and governance of CBC emerges as the focus of this study, the main purpose of which is two-fold: to explain the transformation of border regions through the global dynamics that necessitate CBC and to trace the links between CBC institutions and the governance structure established by them. The study aims: (1) to delineate the institutional structure within a border region that is related to CBC; (2) to analyze the governance networks between these institutions, in terms of power relations and multi-scalar mobility, and (3) to link through analysis this institutional structure with a broader multi-level governance structure, constituted by border regions, the Turkish state and the EU.

State-space theory establishes links between the nation state and its constitutive territory by operating on the basic hypothesis that space is a constitutive element of social and political dynamics and struggles that give nation states their structure. State-rescaling theory, which can be nested under the state-space paradigm, suggests that with the emergence of a global economy led by MNCs and new strategies for regulation of the global realm, a re-conceptualization of the state and its territorial organization requires consideration. Indeed, the emergence of global institutions, the rise of regional or urban centres and the invention of new governance-related concepts that identify the links between them is part and parcel of the processes of state-rescaling. The debate on the role of the state in that process is two-fold; on the

one hand, it is argued that a hollowing out of state sovereignty has occurred as a result of the increasing level of power shared by the global and local actors. On the other hand, the opposite argument argues that despite the emergence of new governance actors on multiple scales, it is still the nation states that hold political power, which points to a phenomenon of reordering, rather than hollowing out. The role of the nation state in CBC processes will be interrogated with the purpose of establishing significant evidence backing either one or the other contention.

This study argues that CBC reflects the state-rescaling theory with most of its aspects, not only because of the three main scales (supranational, national and regional) involved in the process, but also because of regulative dynamics that mainly have been shaped by the EU and respective nation states. The study investigates CBC as a process taking part on the regional level, but that also transcends that particular scale and accounts for the wider dynamics of state restructuring. In that respect, the analysis follows MacLeod's (1999, p.248) advise that "not only do the changing structures of the EU have implications for localities and regions, but research projects conducted on those localities and regions of Europe can, in themselves, provide useful information on the structuration of the emerging European Union".

By establishing an approach that can be called 'the institutionalization of CBC' the study aims to indicate the roles and respective positions of these three scales in CBC processes and practices and transpose it onto a reading of state-rescaling in progress. To that end, a new institutionalist perspective has been adopted that perceives organizations, laws and regulations, informal practices and codes of conduct and social groups as equally weighted elements of institutional structures that have the power to affect each other in a dialectic manner. Therefore, conceptualizing CBC as an institutionalization process would require the involvement of actors on various scales to interact through various means.

In discussing the relationship between globalization and neoliberalism it is stated that while the former points to particular innovations that make the world more interdependent and interconnected, the latter is much more related to the dynamics of capitalism. Moreover, it is argued that there is a clear relationship between those two in terms of the exploitation of the consequences of globalization by neoliberalism. Whether it be the case of flight prices that stay as an obstacle for some to be

interconnected (Inge and Rosaldo, 2002) or the spread of football culture and Bossa Nova from the favelas of Brazil across the globe while the inhabitants could rarely abandon their places to head to downtown (Massey, 1991) neoliberalism distributes resources and welfare unevenly across space. This leads Massey (1991) to argue that time-space compression cannot be understood without including money as a variable. But even money (capital) is not enough. There are social and cultural factors that influence the mobility of people, which informs their experience of globalization. For instance, the ability of a woman to walk along the street in darkness, or to travel across the world alone is strongly dependent on gender-based perceptions and biases all over the world (Massey, 1991). One of the aims of this study is to explain CBC from a similar perspective and to ask how dynamics of globalization and neoliberalism, together with other political, cultural and social factors, have influenced CBC practices in the Edirne- Kırklareli border region.

1.3 Scope of the Study

In line with Johnson et al. (2011), one of the arguments of this thesis is, that "state borders are related in complex ways to local, regional, state-bound and supranational processes". Without underestimating the everyday practices that socially construct borders, the main interest of this research is in outlining the roles, institutions related to CBC perform in the complexity of border regions and how these roles and institutions relate to state restructuring processes. The purpose of the thesis is to briefly problematize the process of cross border cooperation in general, and the EU IPA-CBC programme between Bulgaria and Turkey in particular, as an institutionalization process that reflects the inter-scalar dynamics and tensions between local and national actors on the Turkish side of the border. Thus the main objective of the study is to posit the link between CBC and the transformation of the state structure in the course of globalization. This will be done through exploring in detail the institutional framework of CBC in the EU and Turkey in order to develop an understanding of the issue through a focus on the institutions and institutional practices related to CBC. The European and Turkish legal frameworks within which CBC operates and the codes of conduct created through informal interactions, established networks and hierarchical relations will be conceptualized with a new institutionalist perspective in order to identify and understand the role of actors (e.g.

the EU, the Turkish Central State and the local) on each scale as well as the particular governance structure shaped by CBC.

Within this background the study will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature review of state-space and state rescaling theories, and review the debate on the constitutive role of space in the structure of the modern state. In addition, chapter 2 explains the transformation of state structure as dependent on globalization dynamics. Following that explanation, two emerging scales -- the global scale and the regional/local scale -- will be evaluated in detail. This chapter ends with the exploration of the subnational level (with a focus on regions) by using both the new regionalism theory and the critiques of it.

The 3rd chapter takes a closer look to the EU as a supranational institution; the Republic of Turkey as a nation state that is experiencing a structural transformation in its process towards the EU memberships; and to the EU and Turkish regional policies which overlap from some aspects and contradict from others. In the absence of the regional scale in the Turkish administrative system these policies are argued to be a part of the structural transformation of the Turkish nation state, in which the local (regional), national and supranational levels are involved in "politics of scale". The chapter concludes with the conceptualization of CBC as a tool for investigating these dynamics empirically.

Chapter Four offers a theoretical discussion that is the heart of this study's original contribution. The analysis relies mainly on two different theoretical approaches. On the one hand, the literature on border regions and state-space are used to define the territorial aspect of the institutionalization of CBC. Paasi's (1986 and 1996) institutionalization of regions approach and Blatter's (2003 and 2004) study on cross border governance institutions, together with others (Perkman, 1999; Church and Reid, 1999; Arts, Lagendijk and Van Houtum, 2009, Putnam, 1993), will be used for that purpose. On the other hand, the new institutional theory provides a wider perspective for the interpretation of actors and institutions of different scales, not only on a territorial basis but also in terms of inter-scalar interaction and the impact of actors from different scales on each other. The works of March and Olsen (1984), Hall and Taylor (1996), Amin and Thrift (1994), Amin (1999), North (1990) and Lowndes and Roberts (2013), among others, are resources that will be used for the literature review of new institutionalism.

The aim of bringing these two approaches together is to problematize CBC as a spatial strategy for the restructuring of political power on the afore-mentioned scales. Since, in the Turkish-EU context, CBC is a relatively new phenomenon (with a history of less than 20 years), the institutionalization of CBC is still a work in progress that can be observed in the introduction of new laws and legislation, establishment of new regional and local organizations and an emerging social group (among regional elites) with informal and formal networks and codes of conduct. It is argued that the position of actors from these three different scales (but mainly from the national and regional scales) can be understood by looking to the different layers of that institutionalization process.

Chapter five empirically investigates the IPA- CBC programme of the EU taking place between Turkish and Bulgarian border regions from above mentioned perspective. The effects of CBC on the Turkish part of the border region are explored through semi structured interviews done with public and municipality officials and civil society actors involved in CBC.

Chapter Six concludes the study with a discussion of the institutional structure of CBC in Turkey with respect to multi-level governance and state rescaling theories. By using the identified institutional structure of CBC, supranational, national and regional interactions and interdependencies are questioned and interpreted in terms of state rescaling and multi-level governance.

1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses

1. Is there an independent institutional context that promotes CBC, but does not impinge on local and national organizational structure?

H1: CBC processes unavoidably impinge on local and national institutional settings. The pre-established institutional structure impinges on cross-border cooperation and institutional settings as well.

HA1: There is no interrelation between two institutional structures.

2. If the institutional structure of CBC is accepted to be dependent on national and supranational dynamics, what are the main points (themes, topics) of intervention of these two scales?

3. From the EU perspective, what are the basic motivations for CBC in terms of achieving its policy goals (regional policies, decentralization, regional/ local governance etc.)?

4. Do institutions established for CBC impinge on national, institutional structure or attempt to modify it in order to achieve these goals? If so, in what ways does this occur?

H2: Through institutions established for CBC, the EU impinges on the national institutional structure and forces it towards decentralization.

HA2: Even though CBC institutions find a place in the national institutional setting, they do not have a significant impact on the state structure. Instead, they are located among other institutions, within a hierarchical order.

5. From the nation state point of view, do the uses of CBC signify a tendency towards decentralization, and thus, a significant change in the state structure, especially in highly centralized states such as Turkey?

H3: In accordance with EU policies, nation states follow a decentralization path that includes transfer of power to the local authorities.

HA3: Although nation states contribute to the creation of a suitable environment for CBC, they do not allow this to be transformed into a decentralization process and tend to keep state power highly centralized.

6. From the perspective of the local/regional scale, is involvement with CBC considered a tool to be used for regional development, improvement of local democracy and governance and cross-border integration?

H4: Local and regional actors use CBC as a resource for acquiring more autonomy in both local and international contexts.

HA4: Although CBC provides limited autonomy for regions, this is mainly due to national and supranational policies and regulations. Regional/local actors are mainly powerless and passive in this process.

7. If there is a conflict of interest between two main actors (e.g. the EU and the nation state), could the conflict be traced to the CBC practices and institutions in border regions?

H5: A possible tension between the nation state and the EU in the tendency towards decentralization could be traced to CBC practices and institutions in border regions, because the CBC process itself represents a conflict of interest between these actors.

HA5: Even though a tension between two actors exists, it could not be traced to CBC practices and institutions in border regions, because the CBC process is independent from these dynamics.

8. Assuming that H4 is verified, how can such a tension be interpreted in terms of state rescaling, and what could be its impact on state structure from a local and regional governance point of view?

1.5 Methodology

In terms of methodology, the primary tools utilized include mapping out the institutions related to CBC in a given border region, and identifying the institutional dynamics that emerge between regional, national and supranational scales (i.e. tracing the interdependencies and interconnections of actors from the central, local and the supranational scales) through in-depth interviews and analysis of legal documents.

With a particular focus on institutions, semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with regional and national actors affiliated with their respective institutions. Forty-nine interviews were conducted in Edirne, Kırklareli and Ankara provinces. In Edirne and Kırklareli, provincial and district governors, mayors, political party representatives, official authorities responsible for CBC and representatives of civil society were interviewed. In Ankara, officials from the Ministry of the EU Affairs, Ministry of Development and a private consultancy firm involved in project writing were interviewed. The list of interlocutors is presented in Table 1.1. During the in-depth interviews, questions related to inter-organizational relations, internal organizational structures, informal networks shaped by CBC and central-local relations were asked. Each interview lasted between 30-120 minutes, depending on the willingness of the interlocutor to respond.

Table 1.1 : List of Interlocutors.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS:		**NGO's:**
NATIONAL:		***PROFFESIONAL AND VOCATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:***
1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Edirne Province Representative)		*1*. Edirne Chamber of Trade and Industry (Head of the the EU and projects office)
2. Ministry of the EU Affairs (Coordinator of the CBC programme under the Department of Financial Cooperation)		*2*. Kirklareli Chamber of Trade and Industry (Secretary General)
3. Ministry of Development (Head of the EU economic and social cohesion department)		*3*. Uzunkopru District (Edirne) Chamber of Trade and Industry (Head of the the EU and projects office)
		4. Cooperative of Milk Producers (Uzunkopru, Edirne, President)
LOCAL:		*5*. Kirklareli Chamber of Agriculture (President)
1. Edirne Governorship		*6*. Edirne Chamber of Certified Public Accountants
a. Vice Governor		*7*. Cooperative of Milk Producers (Edirne, President)
b. Sub-Director of Divison for Disasters (Ender OZDEN-Project Entrepreneur)		*8*. Babaeski Commodity Exchange (Babaeski, Kirklareli, CBC project responsible)
2. ABEM (the EU coordination centre) [mixed structure: responsible to the governor of Edirne, the ministry of the EU		
3. Kirklareli Governorship		***PUBLIC BENEFIT NGO'S:***
a. Vice Governor		*1*. DEKAD (Association for Development of Demirkoy) (Demirkoy, Kirklareli, President)
b. Head of the the EU and projects office		
4. Ministry of Education Edirne Province Directorate		*2*. DAYKO (Foundation for Protection of Natural Life) (Demirkoy, Kirklareli, Head of the Demirkoy Office)
5. Uzunkopru District (Edirne)		*3*. Association of Young Businessmen in Edirne
a. Governor		*4*. Luleburgaz Businessmen Association (Luleburgaz, Kirklareli)
b. Head of the the EU and projects office		*5*. EDROM (Union of Roma Organizations in Edirne) (Edirne, President)
6. Ministry of Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock (Director of Uzunkopru District Office)		*6*. Kirklareli Association of Disabled People (KIrklareli, Province President)
7. Meric District Governor (Edirne)		
8. Kesan District Governor (Edirne)		**SCHOOLS:**
9. Demirkoy District Governor (Kirklareli)		*1*. Muzaffer Atasay Highschool (Uzunkopru, Edirne, Director)
10. Luleburgaz District Governor (Kirklareli)		*2*. Luleburgaz Technical and Vocational Highschool (Luleburgaz, Kirklareli, Director)
11. Babaeski District Governor (Kirklareli)		
12. Trakya Regional Development Agency (Mixed structure, but mainly responsible to the ministry of development)		**CONSULTANCY FIRMS:**
a. Edirne Investment Support Office (Head of the Office)		*1*. Progem Consultancy (Ankara, Project Manager)
b. Kirklareli Investment Support Office (Head of the Office)		
		MUNICIPAL/ GOVERNMENTAL UNIONS:
MUNICIPALITIES:		*1*. Union of Meric Municipalities (Edirne, Secretary General)
1. Edirne Municipality (Vice Mayor)		*2*. Trakyakent (Union of Municipalities of East- West Thrace) (Tekirdag, Secretary General)
2. Kirklareli Municipality		*3*. Trakab (Trakya Development Union) (Edirne, Secretary General)
a. Town Klerk		
b. Head of the the EU and projects office		**POLITICAL PARTIES**
3. Suloglu Municipality (Edirne, Mayor)		*1*. AKP (Ruling Party) (Head of the Provincial Office in Edirne)
4. Uzunkopru Municipality (Edirne, Mayor)		*2*. CHP (Main Opposition Party) (Head of the Provincial Office in Edirne)
5. Kesan Municipality (Edirne)		*3*. CHP (Main Opposition Party) (Head of the Provincial Office in Kirklareli)
a. Mayor		
b. Projects Responsible		
6. Kircasalih Municipality (Uzunkopru, Edirne, Vice Mayor)		
7. Demirkoy Municipality (Kirklareli, Mayor)		
8. Kofcaz Municipality (Kirklareli, Mayor)		
9. Vize Municipalty (Kirklareli, Head of the the EU and projects office)		
10. Babaeski Municipality (Kirklareli, Town Klerk)		
11. Luleburgaz Municipality (Kirklareli)		
a. Mayor		
b. Vice Mayor		
c. Head of the the EU and projects office		

The general approach of the study is to conduct qualitative research in order to "understand processes, experiences and meanings people assign to things" with a social constructivist perspective, the basic idea of which is

> that the social world is actively constructed by interactions, that those interactions usually invoke symbols that are important to those interacting (e.g. language, cultural symbols like a flag), and that a key goal of the social sciences is to understand how people construct and make sense of the world they live in and of the other people in it. (Kalof et al, 2008, p.80, see also Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, pp.12-13).

In that sense, this study understands the social structure in question not as the result of a cause and effect relationship but as "constructed through an ongoing process of meaning making that occurs within and across individuals" (Donmoyer, 2012, p.662).

However, the study acknowledges that individuals are not detached from their own context (i.e. the already established structure). Their actions are limited and oriented to a set of limited choices by the social structure in question. This proposition leads to a dialectical understanding of the structure and agency of individuals wherein "social structures are... both constituted by human practices, and yet at the same time they are the very medium of this constitution" (Thrift, cited in MacLeod, 1999).

Reflection and interpretation are two distinct parts of the reading task for the study. The former is a metaphorical border-drawing or limit-setting process in which all actors are positioned to give form to the symbolic territory of CBC. Since the institutions are already established and the interconnections and interdependencies between them are at play, this is an analytical investigation of the given structure. In that respect this is an "institutional ethnography" study that aims to discover "the social rather than theorizing it, beginning with actual people, their doings, and how their doings are coordinated" to formulate an institutional regime (Smith, 2008, p. 433). The key aspect of institutional ethnography is to adopt and inductive approach and to start its reasoning with field study without being preoccupied with a theoretical understanding of the issue. However, a problem arises just in the beginning as there does not exist an unbiased research, especially because one cannot separate the researcher from her/his setting and the biases that go along with it (Peshkin, 2000).

Second, the research method adopted also relates the research to interpretive geography, which aims to "describe the lived experiences of individuals from their own viewpoints and to understand how people 'interpret' their experiences" (Koffe et al., 2008, p.80). Hence, social reality is inextricably linked with the interpretations

of the interlocutors. The interpretations of interlocutors are based on three interconnected 'scenes': the semantic scene, which is concerned with the daily interactions, traditions and social practices that give individuals and societies the meaning and reason of understanding things and events; the socio-spatial scene, which is related to the socio-spatial organization of institutions and reflects institutionalised social practices; and the socio-historical scene, which is concerned with the historical roots of institutions and social practices (Pile, 1991). The researcher's duty is to recognize the effects of these scenes and depict the social reality she/he investigates as a construction of actors and their subjective scenes.

Paasi (1996) argues that an interpretative geography approach that simply conducts a field study and maps the "interpreted" social structure would be "thin" because the objects of research do not always establish links between their daily practices and understandings of social life, and their wider social structure. Therefore the researcher should be able to go one step further and establish a thick description "in which the researcher has to query the 'self-evidence' and to put its content into a frame constituted by continually changing social, historical and spatial contexts. This also renders it possible to conceptualize the results into broader frames" (Paasi, 1996, p.212).

The methodological approach of this study runs parallel to Paasi's (1996) understanding of interpretative geography and aims to establish links between interlocutors' interpretations of the institutional structure of CBC and the broader dynamics that have contributed to its emergence and institutionalization. These broader dynamics are related to globalization, state rescaling and multi-level governance. While interlocutors cannot be expected to establish links with these theoretical approaches and their social reality, their interpretations enable the researcher to describe the effects of these broad dynamics on local, social and institutional structures. Such a thick conceptualization of interpretative geography and institutional ethnography provides at least four opportunities for analysis and the discussion of results. First, the institutional structure of CBC as a newly emerging phenomenon that has economic, political and social implications on society can be mapped. Second, following the arguments of new institutionalism theory suggesting that institutions are in a dialectical relationship with their social and institutional structures and mutually transform each other, CBC can be conceptualized as a

construction of institutions acting in accordance with broader social dynamics, and at the same time, transform their structure. Third, the inductive logic of the institutional ethnography approach provides the opportunity either to challenge or confirm the assumptions of proposed theories. Fourth, the 'unbiased researcher' problem can, to a certain extent be resolved in this way, since the 'thick' conceptualization of interpretative geography transforms the researcher from a documentarian into an interpreter of interpretations. Hence, the researcher is performing an interpretation similar to that of interlocutors, which unavoidably will be filtered through the three scenes proposed by Pile (1991).

1.6 A Conceptual Clarification

To begin, several concepts that form the sum total of long debates and various social practices are used in this study. They are common terms, the use of which has almost been naturalized and the meaning of which has been taken for granted. The more extensively they are used, however, the more their meaning weakens, leaving those concepts as "empty signifiers". Hence, the use of these terms without question can turn into a trap that leads towards repeating the already established theories and points of view, as well as the reproduction of their emptiness. As Gunder (2010) argues, the repetition of such terms leads to the establishment of an ideology in terms of a commonly established good, which does not necessitate a thinking and critiquing process but simply relies on its recognized roots in the social consciousness. In the context of spatial planning, he points to the term "sustainability" as an example, which according to him has been established in such a way. According to him, "sustainability" is now a term that does not refer to a particular base of knowledge, but is just a truth in and of itself, where obeisance is perceived as mandatory. This could be corroborated by the fact that "sustainability" is increasingly used in economic terms, indicating the ability of an actor to sustain its growth or that planners perpetually refer to it in order to be politically correct, even though they do not apply the principles of sustainability in their personal lives. Sparke (2002) refers to that process as "naturalization" in two senses. First, in parallel with Gunder (2010), he argues that the understanding of particular terms has been internalized by their users, and second, that by establishing a mental and linguistic connection with concepts derived from earth sciences and biology, the uncritical application of these

terms is consolidated. Sparke (2002) points to the concept of "natural region" in the context of cross border regionalism, where the "natural" boundaries of a particular region are used to legitimize its existence, which exceeds the nation state boundaries (another concept taken for granted, [see Agnew, 1994]) that divide it into pieces.

In the case of this study there are at least four concepts that have to be clarified from the beginning: capitalism, globalization, neoliberalism and governance. These terms are used extensively in the academic literature as well as daily communication and it is often the case that they point to different perspectives or even different conceptualizations of social reality. Keeping in mind that it is difficult to label any of these usages as "wrong", the aim is to de- naturalize these terms by identifying the contexts from which they have emerged and are being used, and to clarify their usage in this study.

Capitalism: "an economic and political system in which a country's trade and industry are controlled by private owners for profit, rather than by the state" is the definition of the Oxford Online Dictionary (Capitalism, n.d.) for the term. The International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (Brun, 2008) argues that it is a social system "dominated by the economic relations, particularly market relations" (p.437). The Encyclopedia of Political Economy (Schutz, 1999) calls it simply a "market system" which requires two conditions: the vast majority of means of production must be privately owned, i.e. "the legal rights to their use, profit and disposal [to be] in the hands of private individuals or corporations" (p.68) and the production must be done by the wage labour, under the control of the owners of the means of production. As a requirement of economic and market relations, private property stands at the centre of these relations, and in that respect, it is "elaborately developed and well secured" (Brun, 2008, p.437) by various means. Harvey (1982, p.6) states that the two components essential to capitalism are money as the medium for comparing and exchanging the values and goods produced, and the existence of continuous commodity production. Ron McChesney (2007) in the Encyclopedia of Environment and Society, states that capitalism could also be described as a philosophy, the main tenets of which are

> …individual rights over social rights; the right to purchase, own, and sell private property, including real estate; the use of price as a mechanism that guides the demand and supply of goods and services; the reward to entrepreneurs by the earning of profits derived from business

> operations; and the retention of capital gains resulting from the selling of privately owned assets. (McChesney, 2007, p.202).

The history of capitalism is argued to have started with the industrial revolution (McChesney, 2007; Purdy, 2005), which emanated from the destruction of the previous social system of feudalism. Although the concept of market existed long before that time, it is argued that together with capitalism it gained a central and constitutive role. According to Marx and Engels (2000) the establishment of capitalism as a system stemmed from the growing demands of the market that could no longer be accommodated under feudalism. It is only under the capitalist condition that social relations and statues are contingent on market based relations. The market is also argued to "increasingly provide the framework for the determination of social status and social roles; [and] the time, space, and function of every other aspect of the culture" (Brun, 2008, p.437). In that respect capitalism is not only a social, economic or political system and a philosophy, but it also signifies a particular phase in human history (Bruff, 2011), where a large part of social interactions are shaped by and are based on transactions and interactions that occur in the market.

The historical conditions that premised capitalism were nested in the technological developments of the industrial revolution. The ability to produce a large quantity of products allowed an amount of surplus value to be accumulated that far exceeded the accumulation levels realized in previous epochs. That surplus value, which is basically the remainder of the total value when the value of the labour power produced by the workers and the initial capital invested for the production is compensated, accumulates in the hands of the capitalist class and from a Marxist point of view, has to be reinvested in production processes in order to ensure its sustainability in a world of competition. In Marx's terms, cited in Harvey, "accumulation for the sake of accumulation, production in the sake of production" is an internal mechanism of capitalism (Harvey, 1982, p.29, see also Luxemburg, 1972). Consequently reinvestment in production leads to more production and to the necessity to expand the market all over the globe (Marx and Engels, 2000; Luxemburg, 1972). Derived from that explanation, capitalism could be defined initially as an economic system based on continuous and expanding production and capital accumulation in a free market.

Society under capitalism is divided into two main social classes, capitalists and the proletariat (Marx and Engels, 2000). The capitalist class is the social group of society that "controls the means of production, the production process and the disposition of the final product" and a capitalist is an "economic agent who puts money and use values into circulation in order to make more money". The proletariat on the other hand possesses nothing but its labour and "sells [it] as a commodity [in the market] in return for the wages" (Harvey, 1982, pp.21-22; Bruff, 2011). These two classes are depicted as hostile to each other and locked in a continuous struggle (Marx and Engels, 2000). The struggle arises from the internal bargaining relation between them based on the basic exchange they perform: wage for the labour power of the proletariat. In order to make more profit, capitalists seek to increase the working time of the workers and the quantity produced during that time, (i.e. the exploitation of the labour); on the other hand, the proletariat as the seller of her/ his labour seeks a normal work day, for its reproduction (Harvey, 1982). Variations of that struggle arise and give the capitalist society its shape. As Harvey (1982, p.27) puts it "…the relationship between capital and labour becomes hegemonic and dominant within a social formation in the sense that the whole structure and direction dances mainly to their tune. And at this point we are justified in calling such a society a capitalist society". From that definition second aspect of capitalism becomes clear through arguing that it is a system of social and political relations that are built on the economic structure of capital accumulation and dominated by the variations of class struggle. As a social and political system, capitalism, although not directly representing them, is also associated with the ideas of liberalism that together with a free market, presuppose individual freedoms such as expression of thought. Closely related to this, liberalism offers the protection of these freedoms by demanding less meddling with individual social and economic rights (Hayek, 1998).

According to Thrift (2005) contemporary capitalism should be understood not as a simple grid of power relations, (i.e. class struggle), but rather as "an impulse without determinate goals, a functioning which stamps particular forms of conduct on human multiplicity" or as "a series of relations of relation instituted over time through different organizations of time–space" (p.1). That view leads Thrift to understand capitalism as a zeitgeist behind the existing social relations wherein even capitalists are not aware of or intentional about their own contributions.

Buzan and Lawson (2014) point to modernism as a possible zeitgeist of capitalism. Modernism according to them is "a configuration of industrial capitalism, rational–bureaucratic states and new ideologies of progress. This configuration prompted a global transformation that, in turn, enabled the 'rise of the West' and the construction of a highly unequal global political economy" (p.71). For the purpose of this study, it is not the basic definitions described above, but the extended elaborations on capitalism such as those of Buzan and Lawson (2014), that are of particular importance. They include state- capitalism relations or the so called capitalist state; the impact of capitalism in the international relations or the global order; geographic impacts of capitalism and varieties in capitalism as a system of social relations.

First, the emergence of the modern state and its relation with capitalism needs to be clarified. One and a half centuries ago Marx and Engels (2000) pointed to that relation by arguing that political centralization should accompany the centralization of production, since capitalism required "one nation, one government, one code of laws, one notational class interest, one frontier, and one customs tariff" instead of the "independent but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments and systems of taxation". Consequently they argue, "the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (Marx and Engels, 2000, pp.5-6). These propositions suggest that the established economic relations of labour exploitation for capital accumulation and the functioning of a free market were secured by a political structure that could be called the capitalist state. During the 20th century the polarization of the world into two main blocs, the socialist bloc leaded by the USSR and a western alliance as pioneer of the free market economy and democracy (i.e. capitalism) in opposition to it, is a reflection of that history of capitalism. The ideas of capitalism and anti-capitalism became so dominant at that time that almost every country in the world positioned itself according to its relation with capitalism.

Hence, the nature of the capitalist state is based on the protection of a free market economy in order to ensure its full functionality. In that respect, a capitalist state does not necessarily take the side of the capitalist class and/or act as a capitalist itself. Rather, it ensures the correct working of the capitalist economic system. The position of the state between the rival two classes and the method of regulation of the capitalist social structure can vary greatly, depending primarily on the power

relations of those two social classes within a given state. Buzan and Lawson (2014), distinguish between four types of capitalist states, which they divide into two groups. The first group is called democratic capitalism, the varieties of which are liberal democratic capitalism and social democratic capitalism. The commonality between these two types is their respective stress on democracy as a means for exercising individual rights. They differ, however, on the role of state intervention in the marketplace. While liberal democratic capitalism argues for strict separation between the state and the market and advocates that the market would achieve equilibrium on its own, social democratic capitalism suggests more state intervention in order to ensure social cohesion and equity within a capitalist framework. The second group is called authoritarian capitalism, the varieties of which are competitive authoritarian capitalism and state bureaucratic capitalism (for a similar classification, see also Arts and Gelissen, 2002). Both of these are regimes under strict state control. Competitive authoritarian capitalism not only regulates the economy but also allows for intervention in order to guarantee an outcome; in a state bureaucratic capitalist state, the economy is under full control of the state, but still abides by the principles of capital accumulation.

Second, international relations have been shaped extensively by the economic and political dynamics of capitalism. Two major approaches from that point of view should be identified. The first arises from the internal dynamics of capital accumulation and is economic in origin. Accordingly, the constant need to produce and accumulate requires a continuous expansion of the market towards a non-capitalist world. As Rosa Luxemburg (1972, p.59) puts it, "Capitalist production … must develop right from the start an exchange relationship between capitalist production and the non-capitalist milieu, where capital not only finds the possibility of realizing surplus value in hard cash for further capitalization, but also receives various commodities to extend production, and finally wins new proletarianized labour forces by disintegrating the non-capitalist forms of production." As a result, the state began to take a capitalist shape all over the world; a global division of labour emerged and world countries became integrated in terms of commercial and financial exchanges (Robinson, 2011). The nature of that condition leads to the second approach to understanding capitalism in international relations, namely the uneven, exploitative character of the relationship between early capitalist countries

mainly in Western Europe and America, and late capitalist countries (i.e. former colonies, former socialist and third world countries). As Buzan and Lawson (2014) argue, the historical development process of capitalism has established and integrated a deeply divided international system. While on the one hand states became more interconnected, especially in terms of economic transactions, on the other hand, the so called 'core' states, namely Britain, France, Germany and the United States of America (USA), become the hegemonic powers of the world with the ability to control a large share of the production and accumulation of capital.

Third, annihilating space by time, (i.e. diminishing the boundaries in front of product and capital flows), as it is argued above, is an essential dynamic of capitalism, which stems from its need to expand and deepen the market and continue to accumulate capital. This necessitates massive investments in transport and communication infrastructure, which actually means "[embedding capital] in space as landed capital, as capital fixed in the land, creating a 'second nature' and a geographically organized resource structure that more and more inhibits the trajectory of capitalist development" (Harvey, 2000, p.59). Exploitation of natural resources and the organization of production and its political control are closely related with that 'second nature', in a way that establishes a super structure over it. The result of this is a dialectical relationship between capitalism and the geography it creates. While on the one hand, especially in urban areas, capitalism shapes the spatial organization of human societies, on the other hand, the circumstances of capital accumulation are also shaped by that spatial organization (Harvey, 1989).

Fourth, in regard to the representations of capitalism in different parts of the world, different practices and understandings of capitalism have emerged, to name a few, global capitalism (Robinson, 2011), responsible capitalism (Miliband, 2012) or welfare state capitalism (Arts and Gelissen, 2002). These understandings have further extended the elaboration of capitalism as the economic, social, political and philosophical logic of the contemporary world, and furthermore, have created space for interpreting capitalism beyond the single dichotomy of capitalists and the proletariat.

The arguments of Thrift (2005) and Beckert (2013) should also been mentioned for extending the discussion. Thrift (2005) argues that capitalism is an ongoing process, always able to adapt and mutate according to the circumstances of changing

conditions. From this analysis, capitalism is not perceived as the hegemonic paradigm that shapes the social structure, but rather a strategy that is employed to mould to changing social and political conditions. Beckert's analysis (2013) indicates four operative mechanisms of capitalism, which are creativity or innovation, credit, commodification and competition. Through innovation, new products are perpetually supplied to the market, generating new needs and markets. Credits provide the large amounts of capital needed for production processes but are not hold by the capitalists at that moment. Commodification is the transformation of any kind of goods and services into tradable products, which then become subjects of capitalist relations. Finally, competition motivates both capitalists and the proletariat to participate in capitalist production processes without leaving room for the pursuit of personal desires, since not participating in production processes and competition means perishing in the market in the long-term. These four mechanisms ensure the sustainability of capitalism as a global system.

Having explained capitalism and the capitalist state, it is possible to address how the term 'capitalist' is understood and used in the remainder of the study. This term refers to the state of being part or a subject of capitalism as explained above. The term 'capitalist relations' for example refers to the social practices that intentionally or not, serve the production and reproduction of a capitalist economy.

Globalization has been defined by various disciplines, which include political science, sociology, anthropology, economics and geography. Although each perspective takes its own background as a departure point, the final destination they reach is more or less similar: that globalization defines a particular transformation of material conditions of human life and social structures -- and the organizations that derive from them – through the "annihilation of space by time" (a term originally coined by Marx) or by generating a "time- space distanciation" or "time- space compression" (Harvey, 2000; Hsu, 2010; Inda and Rosaldo, 2002; Massey 1991) through increased mobility. As Harvey puts it, it is now a "key word for organizing our thoughts as to how the world works" (Harvey, 2000, p.53). Moreover the characteristics of that phenomenon are not abstract criteria observable through scientific research but also function as new paradigms and practices embedded in the daily life of any individual (for various examples see Inda and Rosaldo, 2002; Massey 1991). As one of the Czech journal Respect's stories covers (Vrankova,

2010) “a growing number of Europeans enjoy parallel lives - living in Prague and working in Paris or living in Vienna while having a girlfriend in Stockholm. [A phenomenon] [k]nown as having “multiple habitats”. Individuals are not only beginning to transcend frequently the traditional physical boundaries of their locales, but as in the case of a Turkish researcher analysing a paper written in Czech Republic while living in the Netherlands, those boundaries have been made porous virtually without any significant physical movement. Hence, as a starting point, it could be argued that space takes a constitutive role in understanding globalization in terms of transcending both physical distances and social and political boundaries drawn to define nation states and other territorial organizations. As a consequence, societies and people have become more interdependent and interconnected on a global scale, no matter the distance between them (Hsu, 2010; Warf, 2006).

The most common and the shortest definition of globalization is similar to the one found in Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought (Scruton, 2007, p.277): “The process whereby barriers to trade, to the movement of populations, to the spread of information, disinformation, lies, truths and enquiries, to scientific knowledge and mass produced ignorance – in short anything produced by or embodied in people – are rapidly being broken down”. This definition is not inaccurate, but it oversimplifies the myriad experiences through which the effects of globalization can be felt. Therefore it seems necessary to go one step further in defining globalization.

Beckfield and Brady (2008) propose a five dimensional analysis of globalization: economic, political, cultural, social and environmental. Their division offers a basis for evaluation, although the categories used are still narrowly defined. First, they propose the idea of economic globalization, which stands for the multi-nationalization of corporations in terms of selling their products worldwide, buying local firms and opening offices in various countries.

Historically, the birth of capitalism in the 16th century and the international mercantilism and colonialism practices lasting until the 20th century are considered to be a part of the early stages of globalization (Robins, 2005; Warf, 2006; Teubner 1997). However, the process of globalization has been accelerated from the 1970s onwards by the following factors: the increasing influence of international public and private organizations over society and the states; the proliferation of an

unprecedented amount of international trade; the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates; and the transition from an international to a global economy (Amin and Thrift, 1994; Beckfield and Brady, 2008). That historical link between capitalism and globalization has led some scholars to understand globalization as a part or process of capitalism: "[globalisation is a] qualitatively new epoch in the ongoing evolution of world capitalism, characterized above all by the rise of truly transnational capital and the integration (or re-articulation) of most countries in the world into a new global production and financial system" (Robinson, 2011, p.350; see also Harvey, 2000). In that background, Robins (2005) describes the globalization of the economy using a broader perspective not limited to the emergence of multinational corporations (MNC's), but one that describes a shift from a world economy that has its roots in "economic and imperial expansionism" wherein "multinational corporations operate across a number of national economies" to a global economy that works "in real time on planetary basis", and where "the integrity and autonomy" of national economies is eroded (p.591). Another aspect of economic globalization comes from the consumer side, where it is argued that people are now able to consume a variety of products that a couple of years before were only available in the locale where they were produced (e.g. exotic fruits such as kiwi, mango or avocado traditionally available in tropical climates are now available all over the world) (Hsu, 2010).

Second, political globalization, refers to the establishment of inter-governmental or inter-nongovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Union (EU), the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Underpinning this term is the increased international interconnection and interdependency of bureaucrats, elected officials, activists and other political bodies (Beckfield and Brady, 2008). In general, political processes are thought to follow economic ones. As the economy becomes integrated and globalized, the scale to regulate it has to shift and territorial organization of political organizations has to be rearranged (Harvey, 2000), which leads to the emergence of multinational and global political organizations. These organizations, together with MNCs, increasingly take part in the regulation of global flows, which is an activity previously relegated to the nation state. Two consequences then emerge that highlight the characteristics of political globalization. First, as explained above,

political power is shared among nation states and various global actors leading to a networked rather than hierarchical global political structure dominated by the nation states (Beckfield and Brady, 2008). Second, as the power of the nation state is diluted, the hegemony of particular nation states, particularly the United States, is weakened, leaving more room for third world countries to penetrate the global economy, a process that Harvey (2000, p.65) calls "geopolitical democratization".

One view on globalization is that its existence is naturally connected to the nation state, since without the idea of nation state, "internationalism" would be impossible. Warf (2006) criticises this view for being too narrow, since according to him there is evidence for what he calls "pre-modern globalization". Although limited; economic, social and political interaction on a global scale is known to have existed for centuries (such as the habit of drinking two exotic products -- coffee and tea -- in Europe), globalization in the present study is associated with neither of those ideas. Instead, in parallel with those who state that globalization has roots in the 1970s, this study refers to globalization as a newer phenomenon than the nation state. The consequences of that preference are two-fold. First, this study presumes that globalization is related to technological developments that have caused or at least have contributed to a paradigm shift in economic, social and political structures. This is a feature that the concept of pre-modern globalization does not maintain. Second, the emergence of globalization corresponds to an era where the idea of the nation state was almost unquestionably accepted by scholars and political elites, where the capitalist version of nation-states functioned as the building blocks of the world order. As a protagonist of a new paradigm, globalization challenges that old paradigm, but there are certainly some aspects that have been inherited from the old one, since the dynamics in and between nation states were influential in the establishment of the preconditions for the emergence of globalization. This aspect of globalization will be explored in more detail in the following chapters, as it constitutes one of the key arguments of the present study.

Third, cultural globalization according Beckfield and Brady (2008) is the spread of ideas, products, practices and symbols across national boundaries through the mediation of "major world religions, media conglomerates, MNCs and international tourism" (p.333). For Hsu (2010) this process actually transforms the perception of culture as a place-bound phenomenon and "recasts the frames of analysis" on a

global scale. Globalized culture no longer belongs in a fixed spatiality but flows across borders, spreading among societies. The cultural aspect of globalization on the one hand is closely tied with its correspondent economic and political dimensions since it is related to the ways people live their daily lives, but on the other hand, it is not totally economy and politics dependent, since it is directly concerned with the issue of identity and its formation through individual perceptions. As exemplified by Hsu (2010), it is impossible to explain some globally transmitted identities solely with economics and politics.

Two contrasting but not mutually exclusive arguments exist to explain the globalization of culture (Inda and Rosaldo, 2002). First, the cultural imperialism approach suggests that a massive amount of knowledge and commodities flow from the capitalist, Western world to Third World countries, causing homogenization and commodification of indigenous cultures around the globe. Globalization has enabled the eating of McDonalds, the drinking of Coke and the wearing of Levis all around the world, and as a result, there is little room for local cultures to thrive. The Hollywood film industry and global mass media in the form of broadcasting agencies such as CNN and BBC have contributed to that process as well by producing and spreading the source codes of global capitalism. On the other hand, those who disagree argue that even though the flow of culture comes from the West, the way in which it is perceived depends on the path-dependent cultures of localities on the receiving end. In other words, there will always be something local and unique that will remain despite the imposition of a more hegemonic cultural power. A second counter- argument to cultural imperialism suggests that while the effect of western capitalist culture cannot be denied, cultural flows are not unidirectional but, in fact, reciprocal. How else could one explain the increasing popularity of R&B, salsa and samba music or of Chinese, Vietnamese, Mexican and Indian cuisine in the western world? Moreover, the increasing number of immigrants in western societies has opened another path for the integration of Third World cultural elements in the West. Finally, a third argument stresses that globalization has caused an increase in interactions not only between Western societies and the Third World, but globally. Therefore the “cultural imperialism” argument falls short in explaining cultural relations between, for example, India and China, Hong Kong and Taiwan or South Africa and Brazil (Inda and Rosaldo, 2002).

The fourth aspect of globalization posited by Beckfield and Brady (2008) is social globalization, which refers to the social relationships that are created by "mobile individuals" with particular emphasis on migration. A more comprehensive explanation is offered by Hsu (2010), who refers to Giddens' concept of "time-space distanciation", which signifies a process "through which locales are determined by distant events and decisions and vice versa" (p.206). Although, again, this is not a totally new concept brought on by globalization, but rather a distinctive characteristic of modernity, Giddens' argument is that globalization signifies a radicalization of such concepts, not a departure from them. Time-space distanciation suggests that worldwide relationships have been intensified to such an extent that they link very distant localities and create an environment where one locality may impact another despite the vast distance between them (Hsu, 2010).

The fifth aspect of globalization can be observed in the environmental arena. Examples of the environmental transcendence of physical boundaries include: global climate change, ozone depletion and acid rains and the international fight against environmental degradation (Beckfield and Brady, 2008). This aspect is related to the previous four aspects, as environmental problems are related to increasing CO2 emissions as a result of increased mobility and economic development. In addition, the fight against degradation involves global political regulation (political globalization), social networking of activists and scientists (social globalization) and organized and increased awareness of global environmental problems (cultural globalization).

For Robins (2005), globalization was made possible through a technological breakthrough: the establishment of world-wide information and communication networks. "The development of international communication infrastructure (radio, satellites, intercontinental telecommunication cables) and the rapid expansion of communication technologies (internet, cell phones, television)" (Beckfield and Brady, 2008, p.333) are components of that breakthrough and have allowed "corporate and financial interests to operate on a twenty four hours basis across the planet" (Robins, 2005, p.592). In terms of physical mobility, Harvey (2000) references innovations such as "turnpikes, canals, railroads, electric power, automobiles and jet transport" that have liberated the movement of people and commodities. Again, instead of the technological innovations that also prior to

globalization have changed the conditions of human societies, the unprecedented pace of technological renewal and its enormous spread across the globe is of particular importance for globalization (Harvey, 2000).

Finally, two counter-globalization arguments should be acknowledged to complete the task of defining globalization; both of these arguments are cited in Hsu (2010). The first argument belongs to John Ralston Soul, who insists that globalization is an out-dated concept given the current revival of nationalism, the changes in geopolitics and religious transformations point out to other geographic references than the globe. Justin Rosenberg offers a second argument, which states that globalization is not theoretically well-equipped to offer a comprehensive historical analysis as opposed to more complete theories from Marx and Weber. So, although globalization can provide a compelling research topic, the concept itself does not work as a theory for understanding complex historical transformations.

It is no doubt that globalization signifies a technological breakthrough that continues to transform existing economic, social and political interactions, in a way similar to capitalism in the 18th century. In this sense, it is fair to ask if globalization is a force that could radically transform social structures, if it represents another watershed moment in the history of humanity. At least in the current phase of globalization, this is not the case, argues Harvey (2000). Because the basic premises of capitalism (i.e. capital accumulation and class relations) continues to prevail:

> So has there been a qualitative transformation wrought on the basis of these quantitative shifts? My own answer is a qualified 'yes' to that question immediately accompanied by the assertion that there has not been any fundamental revolution in the mode of production and its associated social relations and that if there is real qualitative trend it is towards the reassertion of early 19th century capitalist values coupled with a 21st century penchant for pulling everyone (and everything that can be exchanged) into the orbit of capital while rendering large segments of the world's population permanently redundant in the basic dynamics of capital accumulation. (Harvey, 2000, p.68)

On the other hand, as it has been discussed above, globalization simply cannot be reduced to either a set of innovations or an upper echelon of capitalism. While, for example, Fordism is associated with an innovative mode of production related to capitalism, so is Post-Fordism associated with globalization. Thus, globalization itself is not an innovation. Similarly, if it is not transforming capitalist relations, it cannot be argued to be a totally new system or structure. Moreover, emerging global

anti-capitalist movements and unions are also associated with globalization and do not allow it to be a solely capitalist entity. Also, it cannot be argued for example that there are concepts such as 'the globalist mode of production' or 'globalist state'. Rather globalization-related concepts emerge as global cities (not states), global society or global economy, all of which point to the ability of these entities to reach and influence each other and their counterparts in other distant parts of the world, as well as the ability to create interconnections and interdependencies between previously fragmented and differentiated entities. Therefore, perhaps the most proper way to perceive and use this term is to refer to its interconnected and interdependent qualities. To make a more concrete definition, globalization is a process that describes the state of becoming economically, socially and politically more interconnected and interdependent than ever, not only at the global level but also on a local scale.

Derived from that definition, the term 'dynamics of globalization' refers to the whole set of innovations and practices that help or force people, economies and societies to become more interdependent and interconnected. In that sense, the concepts related to time and space and their compression and distanciation can be considered as dynamics of globalization.

Neoliberalism: The term "Washington Consensus" refers to the national, multinational or global institutions (e.g. the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), US State Treasury, and think tanks) whose headquarters are based in Washington DC and the economic policies generated with their initiative and having spread initially in the Latin America, and later, the Middle East and parts of Africa in the 1980s for restoration of their deprived economies. The term was coined by John Williamson, who later said that his intention in using the term was not to point to the global economic and political consequences of these policies that are now commonly referred to as "neoliberalism" or "market fundamentalism", but to point out that these policies originated in Washington-based institutions rather than through international debate, and for the purpose of signifying "the lowest common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989" (Williamson, 1999). This "lowest common denominator" contains 10 major components: (1) reducing fiscal deficits to a manageable level and applying measures for financial discipline; (2)

reducing public expenditures; (3) increasing tax incomes by broadening the tax base but keeping the marginal tax at moderate levels; (4) leaving interest rate to be determined by the market but always to be kept positive; (5) leaving the exchange rates to the market in order to achieve a competitive exchange rate; (6) import liberalization through abandoning domestic industry protection; (7) allowing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to flow into the country; (8) privatization; (9) deregulation of the markets in terms of applying less control and fewer restrictions for the establishment of firms, flow of FDI, price controls, import barriers etc.; and (10) ensuring and protecting property rights (Williamson, 1990). Although Williamson (1999) rejects the use of the term Washington Consensus as a placeholder for neoliberalism, there is a general agreement that these 10 components are part and parcel of neoliberalism as it is understood today.

General characteristics of neoliberalism include: the replacement of state controlled monetary policies and the deregulation of the economic space for maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms; state intervention for commodification of public services such as education, health and social security; adopting a new logic of capital-labour relations based on deunionization, flexible work and deregulated working conditions; the disorganization of once organized economies (Robinson 2011); and increasing financialization of capital (Baccaro and Howell, 2011; Harvey, 2007). For Baccaro and Howell (2011) neoliberalism represents a strategy of macro-economic reforms for achieving and ensuring the above-mentioned ends. Neoliberalism is also considered a political project (Jessop, 2013) or a theory of political-economic practices (Harvey, 2007) that support the reorganization of capital accumulation and the expansion and deepening of the market across the globe. In other words, it is a project that is reasoned by an economic rationale but that could hardly be disassociated from politics (Jessop, 2013).

The oil crisis of the 1970s, which originated in the USA and other Western capitalist economies, ultimately spreading around the world, is argued to be the event that triggered the invention and implementation of neoliberal policies, summarised by the "Washington Consensus". However the fact that it has been intensely used as a strategy in countries and governments with different characteristics such as UK under both Thatcher and Labour governments, in China, Sweden or India leads scholars to comment that it is a strategy of capitalists rather than of a particular

government (Harvey, 2007). It is argued that during the crisis, the need to expand the market; increase the profit rates that had dropped due to rising costs; and decrease the turnover time of capital investment were the three dynamics that pushed capitalist interests within the global political and economic structure towards neo-liberalisation.

The first of these dynamics, expanding the market, has been taken to mean the integration of Third World countries, such as those of Latin America, into the broader world economy. A primary tool for this process includes violence, such as the 1971 coupe-de-etat in Chile and the financial pressure established by international lending institutions to indebted countries. As Harvey (2007) argues, after the crisis of the 1970s, debt-seeking countries were vast and institutions promoting neoliberalism such as the IMF or the World Bank could pursue neoliberal policies freely under the rules of the Washington Consensus. Another aspect of market expansion, this time applied to all countries was the commodification of public services such as education, health, social security and military, which were previously under the monopoly of the state. Privatization of these facilities became a norm of the free market rule (Robinson, 2011; Picciotto, 2010; Harvey, 2007).

The existence of the socialist bloc opposed to the capitalist world leveraged the position of the working class against capitalist interests and forced the states to adopt welfare policies that enabled a relatively more equal redistribution of wealth under the so-called Keynesian welfare state (Harvey, 2007). In times of economic crisis, this was increasingly perceived as a burden on capitalists and the state (O'Flynn, 2012). Together with the accelerating pressure on the state to step away from regulation of the markets, firms began to seek alternative ways to reduce production costs, the most prominent of which was flexible working or the so called post-Fordist production. Contrary to the production line model of Fordism, which aimed to complete the whole process of production within the same plant, flexible production was based on splitting the production process into pieces and outsourcing each part to different subcontracting firms. The well-known result of that process was the emergence of a global division of labour, in which industrial production moved from Keynesian welfare states towards Third World countries where labour wages and production costs were considerably cheaper. In contrast, advanced

capitalist countries oriented themselves towards production of advanced technology and services.

The last dynamic, the tendency towards decreasing the turnover time of capital, ended with the financialization of capital, a key aspect of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2000). The turnover time in industrial production varies greatly according to sector - specific components and physical infrastructure, but by no means it can reach to the turnover time of financial sector, and this is why finance has become the dominant mode of capital accumulation. The dominance of financial capital is not the single financial feature of neoliberalism. In fact it is also accompanied by the deregulation of the global financial market, mainly by abandoning the global financial system regulated by Bretton Woods institutions and the USA hegemony, a step that also signifies a shift from the industrialization-oriented development approach to poverty alleviation and significant reduction in welfare policies (Boas and McNeill, 2004). Through these steps, the global economy has become decentralized, deregulated and offers greater room for financial activities. The abandonment of the fixed exchange rate system in 1973 by the United States is regarded as a critical turn in the shift towards neoliberalism (Robinson, 2011). From that point on, the deregulation of the global economic sphere and the global spread of transnational financial capital began to accelerate. The deregulation of the financial realm has been made possible by the development of telecommunication technologies, which Harvey (2000) calls "dematerialized cyberspace", a good that enables financial transactions to occur instantly at the global level. With such a trajectory, neoliberalism, as a political strategy is considered to have failed in restoring capital accumulation processes and promoting growth, but has served, instead, to concentrate capital and power among an elite, upper-class (Harvey, 2007; O'Flynn, 2012). The explanation for this failure can be traced to its relationship with capitalism. In contrast to its literal meaning, neoliberalism is not based on liberal values, such as regard for a free market, private property and possessive individualism (O'Flynn, 2012), which are also among the core values of capitalism. On the contrary, state or local government intervention became a regular practice in ensuring the survival of neoliberalism (Harvey, 1989, 2000, 2207; Hilgers, 2012). Hilgers argues that the primary motivation of any state is growth, and growth can be ensured by regulating the markets. For Picciotto (2010) state intervention is of crucial importance to neoliberalism as a provider for

infrastructural services, subsidies and monetary lending, as it was in the case of the global financial crisis of 2008 when global financial corporations were bailed out of bankruptcy through state intervention, particularly in the United States and Great Britain. As a result, not the free market as a whole, but only one part of it has benefitted from neoliberalism, resulting in a high concentration of capital and power in a limited number of corporations (Harvey, 2007).

Apart from the concentration of capital, these three dynamics that generally describe neoliberalism have generated political and geographic consequences that are of particular importance to this study. First, it is generally accepted that neoliberalism is primarily a US strategy and part of American hegemony. However, there is also the contention it is not exclusive to the US, but as discussed above, a strategy embraced by other states. (Jessop, 2013; Harvey, 2007). After the fall of the Iron Curtain and with the integration of former Soviet bloc countries into the capitalist world, 'There Is No Alternative' (TINA) became the motto of neoliberal expansion, presenting the free market economy and capitalist system as the single rational way forward for human societies. As a result, privatization of public services, financialization of capital, the introduction of a flexible mode of production and outsourcing became regular practices that have reshaped the economic and political environment of states and regions. A second political consequence of neoliberalism is the increasing intervention and influence of capital, especially MNCs on national and local governments, as well as supranational institutions. Whether in the shape of policy lobbying or public private partnerships (PPPs), the influence and penetration of capital have transformed the traditional understanding of public service provision from a public sector job to a branch of the market subject to competition.

Second, in terms of geography, globalization is argued to have produced "uneven temporal and geographical development" (Harvey, 2000, p.60), or as Massey (1991, p.25) calls it, a "power geometry of time-space compression". This is a discriminatory practice that increases the mobility, integration and interaction of some social groups, but is restrictive to others (see also Inda and Rosaldo, 2002). As discussed above, globalization in this study is understood as a process related to global integration and interaction without reference to capital accumulation. On the other hand, this approach does not reject these arguments, but relocates them under the geographical consequences of neoliberalism. Hence, the discriminatory practice

of neoliberalism is argued to be its first geographical aspect, as it allows the management or exploitation of spatial boundedness or unboundedness of different social groups. Second, in terms of political geography, neoliberalism is related to the rise and management of different scales together with the nation state. At the global scale, global economic and political institutions spread and regulate neoliberal practices in a way that is beyond the control of any nation state and sometimes even intrudes on national sovereignty. On the other hand, at the sub-national level, metropolitan regions are emerging as the new geographical units of neoliberalism (Harvey, 1989; Robins, 2005). Hence, neoliberal practices are intensely produced and reproduced and can be easily observed at the local and regional levels.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the diffusion of neoliberalism is strongly related to globalization as technological developments in information and communication have enabled financial transactions to be completed more easily across the globe, and developments in transportation technologies lead the way towards the global division of labour and flexible production. Due to increased mobility of any kind, capital left its attachment to the nation states and has increasingly globalized to "search out around the world the most favourable conditions for different phases of globalized production, including the cheapest labour, the most favourable institutional environment (e.g. low taxes) and regulatory conditions (e.g. lax environmental and labour laws), a stable social environment" (Robinson, 2011, p.354).

Looking at the literature on globalization and neoliberalism, there are many overlapping arguments that may be confusing to the reader. The global division of labour and financialization of capital, for example, are by and large recognized to be part of both of these processes. One can easily conclude that they are elements of the same phenomenon or that they can be used interchangeably. It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss in-depth the differences and ontological roots of these terms. For the purposes of efficiency and clarity, a differentiation is made between these concepts in terms of functionality. In that respect, globalization refers to the innovations and dynamics that have caused the world to become culturally, economically, politically and geographically more interdependent and interconnected. On the other hand, neoliberalism in that respect points to the use of these practices, either intentionally or not, for the reproduction of global capitalism. Or, it could be argued that while globalization represents a theory for understanding

the effects of a particular technological progress on human societies, neoliberalism refers to a strategy used by a particular class of society to maintain its interests.

Governance: In 1996 after analysing various usages of governance, Rhodes (1996, p.653 and 660) concludes, "unfortunately, even the most cursory inspection reveals that governance has several distinct meanings. … It would seem that governance has too many meanings to be useful". In 2014, 18 years after that initial observation, the usage and meaning of governance is much more complex than to be defined in a single way. Nonetheless, governance has become a "buzzword" (Jessop, 1998) for the management of political and economic realities.

As a general and simple definition, governance refers to the coordination of interdependent activities (Jessop, 1998). This definition has two implications. First any kind of activity could be within the range of governance, including corporate management, commons and global social movements (Trieb et al, 2005). Second, the government of the state and any other administrative territory is subordinated by the term "governance" but not vice versa. The state, together with private and volunteer organizations, is argued to be one of the actors in governance processes. The boundary between them is significantly blurred and non-state actors possess a relative autonomy outside of the state (Rhodes, 1996).

Governance as coordination includes three key components: accountability, effectiveness and transparency, (Robinson, 2005) and requires the coordination, guidance and surveillance of involved actors (Trieb et al, 2005), hence it is a multilateral, but not unidirectional, process. Although these three components easily can be associated with democracy, governance on its own does not have to be always democratic (Fukuyama, 2013).

Various modes of governance exist and have been classified by different typologies, which are useful to this study. Focusing on these various modes of governance rather than using a general definition offers a more explanatory approach to conceptualizing governance. For that purpose seven different modes of governance used in this study will be briefly defined.

Meta-governance: This term refers to the organizational logic behind governance. Jessop (1998) refers to meta-governance as "the organization of self-organization". It describes the mechanisms that enable collective learning and development of

strategic visions. Its constitutive logic suggests a common background for target - setting and strategy development among governance actors, but meta-governance itself does not include a strategy-setting agenda. The term also implies a network-based, self-governance approach, where institutional practices and processes, together with involved actors (meta-governors), are shaped by their own internal dynamics (Thuesen, 2013). Porras- Gomez (2014, p.177) points to another approach of meta-governance, namely "the government of governance". Here he puts stress on the control mechanisms of meta-governance and argues that it can be conceptualised as a "process by which a governmental entity participates in, steers or controls governance networks (and not government or markets), no matter the scale at which these operate, to advance general-interest policy goals". A synthesis of these two ideas is offered by Jessop (2003, p.194), who argues that meta-governance refers to "the role of political authorities (at national and other levels) in directly and/ or indirectly organizing the self- organization of inter-organizational partnerships and networks and inter-systemic" relations.

Network governance: Network governance strongly resembles the logic of meta-governance. Its constitutive logic, according to Kohler- Koch (1999), is that politics should be about problem-solving, and problem-solving mechanisms are generated through governing practices of "highly organised social subsystems", (i.e. networks of institutions) (p.25). The governing practices in network governance have four characteristics: the roles the state undertakes are transformed from being regulative to being mediative and activative; the rules of behaviour are shaped by collective action and are based on negotiation; the boundaries between private and public are blurred, generating distinct patterns of interaction; and the level of political action has shifted towards local scale in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity for generating cooperation for problem solving (Kohler- Koch, 1999). The difference between meta-governance and network governance is that while the first focuses on the constituting logic of governance mechanisms, the latter focuses on the outcomes of governance networks. Or, to put it in different terms, while meta-governance is not related to strategy formulation, the very purpose of a network-based, governance structure is to implement strategy.

Good Governance: The termed is coined by the World Bank and is defined as "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a county's economic and

social resources for development. Good governance, for the World Bank, is synonymous with sound development management" (WB, 1992). In that respect, governance is understood as a function of the state with the clear goal of development. The presumptions are that efficient functioning of a free market is necessary for development, and the state's role is to regulate the market through laws and regulations for reducing the transaction costs of involved firms (WB, 1992). The term is widely used by other global and regional development institutions in the same manner. To achieve good governance, the state should exhibit several characteristics that also function as indicators of good governance. These include: public sector management, where the aim is to increase the efficiency of public institutions by measuring and steering performance; accountability, defined as government and public sector employees being responsible for their actions; ensuring the rule of law and providing a legal framework to ensure effective market functionality; transparency in terms of providing information to market actors under equal opportunity; and participation in terms of allowing market actors to take part in decision-making processes (IFAD, 1999).

Good governance is thought to express a neoliberal logic, partly because its creator, the World Bank, a Bretton Woods institution established by Western capitalist economies to regulate the global market and to provide financial support to countries eager to develop under free market conditions. However, it is argued, when distributing loans to borrower nations, the World Bank does not strictly adhere to good governance criteria, and instead, under the logic of neoliberalism, forces borrower states to open their internal markets to Foreign Direct Investment; much of this, it is argued, comes at a cost to local capitalists. Under these conditions, good governance criteria such as transparency and accountability are not demanded from borrowing countries, which in some cases could help support repressive regimes (Taylor, 2004; Boas and McNeill, 2004).

Global governance: Finkelstein (1995, p.367) defines global governance as "governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers. Global governance is doing internationally what governments do at home". Since a concept like "world government" does not exist, according to Offe (2009), the term governance is employed to denote the interactions and interdependencies between various institutions operating at the global level. Although the definition of

Finkelstein sounds as excluding the nation states, indeed they have a significant influence on global governance issues (Sparke, 2013). Global institutions such as the Group of Eight (G-8), the Group of 20 (G-20), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for example, are influential or perhaps hegemonic in global politics and economics but they still represent the unique interests of their member states. The power relations between member states in global institutions are influential as well, as in the case of the US and Mexico with respect to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, on a wider scale, global institutions and global governance have a larger perspective than international relations. In a globalized world, global governance through global institutions stands for the management of interdependencies, interconnections and cross-boundary issues and problems in the fields of economics, politics, civil society and environment on a global large scale. While on the one hand, global political and economic institutions such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), World Trade Organization (WTO), WB, IMF and OECD can propagate and defend a particular ideology; on the other hand institutions such as the UN and the EU can provide a space for negotiation and reaching common goods and goals. The EU, together with other similar institutions such as NAFTA, ASEAN and MERCOSUR at the same time represents a different group of global organizations: regional organizations. Each organization is established to deal with governance issues in a particular region of the world; however, as they establish relations between themselves and third parties, they also participate in the processes of global governance. Finally, civil society organizations such as the International Labour Organization, Amnesty International, Journalists without Frontiers and environmental organizations such as Green Peace and the World Wildlife Foundation represent an antipode for global economic and political organizations. Through them interactions and interdependencies between civil society members are established, and actions with social and environmental focal points are coordinated to influence national, regional and global policy.

Local governance: This term is usually taken for granted and over it several debates and arguments have been developed around issues such as decentralization and local governance (Faguet, 2014), participation, democracy and local governance (Blair, 2000), social inclusion and local governance (Andrew and Doloreux, 2012),

neoliberalism and local governance (Geddes, 2011) etc. Depending on the point of view, these approaches deal with different governance approaches such as good governance, multi-level governance or network governance on a subnational administrative scale. Here, governance is understood either as a transformation of local government mechanisms to include different actors from civil society and business circles or self-organized management mechanisms employed in the pursuit of non-governmental outcomes such as governance of the commons or pursuing environmental protection initiatives. Increasingly inter-local cooperation among local authorities is also placed within the scope of local governance (Benton, 2013). The term "local" refers to subnational administrative units and, depending on the relevant scale, it can also be known as urban governance, metropolitan governance or regional governance.

Multi-level governance/ multi-scalar governance: This term points to governance structures and practices that include actors from different administrative scales and/or policy fields. Initially it was used to refer to EU governance practices, where supranational as well as subnational institutions were involved in governance processes together with nation states. In the European context, multi-level governance "capture[s] a series of changes in statehood resulting from the emergence of complex multilevel decision-making processes" (Eizaguirre et al, 2012, p.2012). In more concrete terms, multi-level decision making refers to the large variety of local governance structures and the myriad links, networks and types of interactions they establish with national and supranational institutions. The stress on multi-level governance is located in its heterarchical and polycentric structure where the hierarchical order between geographic scales is replaced with a network type structure of various interconnections and interdependencies (Stephenson, 2013).

Finally, a couple of words should be said about critical approaches to governance. Jessop (1998) argues that the emergence and intensified use of governance corresponds to an era when the Keynesian welfare state retreated from the Schumpeterian workfare state. Consequently, legislative, bureaucratic and administrative techniques under the control of the nation state and market mechanisms were replaced with "inter-firm networks, public-private partnerships, and a multilateral and heterarchic negotiated economy" (Jessop, 1998, p.35). In reviewing public private partnerships, Harvey (1989) establishes a link between

neoliberalism and governance. For Harvey (1989), public private partnerships represent an exact form of switching from managerialism to entrepreneurialism on an urban scale. Hence these types of governance organizations are neoliberal in the sense that they have emerged after the retreat of the welfare state; serve to market the city and enhance competitiveness; are speculative by nature as opposed to rationally planned and coordinated development; and focus on investment and economic development of place instead of improving the general conditions of the territory in question (Harvey, 1989). Hence according to both of these scholars, governance-related concepts underscore a shift in political and social structure towards neoliberalism.

Offe (2009), remarks that the terms "globalization" and "governance" have common linguistic and semantic properties. First, both of them are nouns and they do not have a verb form. Second, and related to the first, they are concepts without a subject. Consequently, someone or some entity that holds their responsibility could not be identified in a way for example capitalists are responsible for consequences of capitalism. Third, there is no opposite term for either of them. These linguistic features, according to Offe (2009), can be transferred to an ideological context, in which governance, for example, can be understood as a self-evident, holistic concept which is present everywhere and covers everyone, so that the necessity for its opposite becomes unnecessary. Although it is in the air, can be realized, practiced or managed, it cannot be controlled, since it is not an object of any subject. This inquiry enables Offe (2009) to name three criticisms of governance. First, governance remains blurred without a clear-cut definition. Its meaning and content change depending on the subject studied, the purpose for which it is used and the goals it intends to achieve. Second, because of this opaqueness, the term is used in a euphemist way, which enables the discussion of particular strategies (e.g. neoliberalism) in a positive light. Third, with constant focus on negotiation, governance neglects power struggles among actors that are determined outside the negotiation table and within the dynamics of a wider social structure.

This relatively long, but still inadequate analysis, of these four terms indicates that they appear as components of the zeitgeist or the leitmotif of the historical period when cross border cooperation (CBC) takes place and this study is prepared. Indeed this study is about a relatively new subject, namely cross-border cooperation, which

is a result of political, social and economic dynamics that are related to all four terms. It seems impossible to make an explanation and analysis of CBC without recognizing it as a form of governance (whether multi-level or local) resulting from local and global interdependencies and interconnections. At the same time, although there is no doubt that CBC takes place among subnational administrative units of capitalist states, whether it is capitalist or neoliberal in nature is a subject of discussion. Although such a discussion is not the intention of this study, it should be acknowledged that without recognizing the capitalist and neoliberal dynamics functioning behind the institutions related to CBC, any theoretical explanation would remain inadequate.

The point of explaining these terms at great length is to depict the leitmotif of the study and to remove them from buzzword contexts by clarifying their usage in the following chapters. By clarifying their usage, the goal is to avoid any misunderstanding resulting from their use in both scholarly literature and daily communication as all-inclusive terms, which in some cases are employed to refer to contradicting meanings and in the others as scapegoats to blame for.

2. STATE, SPACE AND SCALE IN A CHANGING WORLD

The starting argument of the study is that the social, political and economic means for production, reproduction and use of political power are undergoing significant changes that also reflect onto the spatial organization of the state. Within that transformation process, three main scales, namely the national, the supra- national and the sub- national (regional or local) scales (and, different modes of interaction between them) are emerging. Specifically, it is argued that the latter scales are "hollowing out" (Rhodes, 1994; Dulupçu, 2005; MacLeod, 1999) the former scales, and a new global division of power is emerging due to and in accordance with the current stage of capitalism, which stems from the "rescaling" (Bayırbağ, 2013; Brenner, 1998) of state power with a shift upwards and/or downwards. Together with these three scales, perhaps tens of other intermediary scales also exist in continuous interaction, interdependently transforming the existing structure through the politics of scale (Swyngedouw, 1997). A core thrust of this study's argument is geographic in nature; that is, first each scale represents a territorial unit over space (Delaney, 2009); second the organization of space is a manifestation of the political and social division of power over space, (Paasi, 1996); and third a shift of power among scales that (re)defines interactions and divisions of power between scales will reflect onto the spatial organization of societies (Delaney and Leitner, 1997). Having defined these basic assumptions, this chapter aims to achieve three objectives in the following order:

1. Since the core of this study's argument is geographic, first it is necessary to define the relationship between the nation state (the central scale) and space. For that purpose the literature developed around the state/space theory will be presented and discussed in detail.
2. The causes of transformation will be explored to develop an understanding of the dynamics behind the rise of new scales and power relations. These causes are located in economic, social and political dynamics that are mainly associated with capitalism and globalization.

3. Finally, the two remaining scales (the supranational and the sub-national) will be explored in detail with relation to the central scale, the nation state.

These three objectives, along with subsequent sub-chapters, aim to illustrate a part of the context and background of the study as well as to problematize the "region" as a part of the emerging, global, inter-scalar structure of the division of power and governance.

2.1 The State

The theory of the state is vast and as old as civic human history. It is far beyond the scope of this study to explore the origins of state and the development of theories explaining it. Neither is the aim to present the thousands of years-old history of state, which has taken different forms across space and time. Rather, the study will focus on the modern territorial state, the origin of which dates to the Westphalia Treaty of 1648, signed by the major empires and small states of 17th century Europe. With the treaty, the political power of the Holy Roman Empire was limited in favour of nearly four hundred autonomous estates in the continent. The resulting duality of power became the source of the modern nation state (Maynes and Weitz, 2001).

Social contract theory, the roots of which originate in the writings of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau, assumes the emergence of the state as a result of a tacit social contract wherein citizens cede some of their individual rights to a collective, authoritative entity in order to rebuff the "state of nature", the initial anarchic condition in which individuals possess their full rights without guarantee of security (Heywood, 1994). Hence, the conceptualization of the state in this context is as a social construction, built on the free will and past experience of individuals. As a social structure, the duties and power of the state are defined by the social dynamics that have brought it into being.

The constitution of the state has also been theorised as a superstructure that emerges from economic relations. From this perspective, the state is a reflection of the economic relations that shape society. In the Western European context, this process takes the form of capitalism. Accordingly the state is the source and method of the domination of one class over another for the purpose of sustaining the established economic structure (Althusser, 1971). As Marx and Engels (2000, p.5) put it, "the

executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie", hence it is a capitalist state that sustains the long term dynamics of capital accumulation, while at times contradicting the short term interests of a particular sect of capitalists. A third approach conceptualises the state as a Leviathan that dominates social relations and stands against individual freedoms. Consequently, private and public spaces are two separate domains, and the state acts to penetrate the private through regulatory measures for the good of the public. In order to understand the state as the latter two theories suggest, it is necessary to separate the state from social dynamics and the constitutive role they play in the establishment of institutions. The state as conceptualized by these approaches becomes a self-evident entity, which holds a significant amount of power that can either be captured in favour of a particular class or defeated to protect individual freedoms.

From this point on, the understanding and definition of state ramifies. In the liberal tradition, the duty of the state is: to ensure the basic rights of its citizens, including the protection of private property; to ensure that the social contracts between citizens are enforced through the provision of the rule of law; and, to provide security for citizens. Beyond that, the economic, social, moral and cultural spheres should be left to the private realm of citizens, free from state intervention. Within this tradition, the state's duties are minimal, limited to performing the role of a night watchman. This, in most cases, refers to social contract theory, which requires the consent of citizens to exchange private liberties for public security. On the opposite pole is the totalitarian conceptualisation of the state in which economic, social and cultural realms are under the complete control of the state. This can be understood in terms of the Leviathan state, as the power of the state cannot be traced to social dynamics, but instead, is self-evident and omnipotent. Three hybrid states exist in the middle of this spectrum: developmental states fall in between these extremes, where the state manipulates the economy in order to generate industrial growth and development.; social democratic states play the role of watchmen of social relations, and ensure that citizens are equally provided with opportunities to succeed; and, finally, the collectivist state is planned and controlled by government and private property is replaced by common property. (Heywood, 2002).

The modern state, no matter how it is conceptualised, has five distinguishable properties (Heywood, 2002): (1) the state is sovereign in exercising power. This power is absolute and unrestricted and is above all other national institutions and groups of society. (2) State institutions are public and enforce collective decisions; (3) the actions of the state are considered legitimate and socially binding by default, since the state acts in the name of the public interest and common good; (4) the state is the dominant social structure that has the right to exercise power in order to enforce its law; and (5) the state is a territorial entity that is sovereign within its defined boundaries. These five features are famously conceptualised by Max Weber's definition of the state: "a compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called state insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claims to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order" (cited in Pierson, 2004, p.6).

An issue as crucial as the origins and duties of the state is the sources of its power and the ways in which it is exercised. Hobbes' argument is that as soon as the state is established through the social contract, it disregards the consent of the people and exercises its power through force (Pierson, 2004). The right to exercise force to maintain authority is also a part of Weber's definition of the state, and this notion has prevailed among modern political science scholars as well (Morris, 2004). However, the monopoly over exercising force is hardly realized in practice since, beginning with the family, schools and even illegal organizations, various non-state entities use violence to maintain control. In other words, the power for control has been sought in other aspects than force by the state.

Althusser (1971) makes a distinction between state power and the (repressive) state apparatus. The former is the power held by state elites from a particular class of society. The latter is the mechanism through which the state exercises its power in terms of applying physical force (e.g. police, military, etc.). The repressive state apparatus is an integral part of the state, which functions more or less in the same way and is independent from the holders of state power. However, according to Althusser, the state employs additional means outside of violence to exercise its power -- the Ideological State Apparatuses, otherwise known as the soft power of the state (Althusser, 1971). Althusser includes religious institutions, educational institutions, the family, legal instruments, the political system, trade unions, the

media and culture as a whole (e.g. literature, arts, sports, etc.) among the expressions of the Ideological State Apparatuses. The distinction between repressive and ideological apparatuses is summarized in three points; first, ideological apparatuses are many instead of one (force); second, while repressive apparatuses belong to the public sphere, ideological apparatuses belong to the private sphere; and third, while repressive apparatuses' primary medium for exercising power is force, ideological apparatuses use ideology to achieve objectives. These ideological state apparatuses are used to legitimize the state's sovereign right over its territory and citizens.

Domination of particular social classes through ideology and ideological apparatuses require the establishment of hegemony in Gramscian terms. Gramsci defines hegemony as "the 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group" (cited in Prono, 2005). Hegemony is established by the acquisition of the consent of subordinated classes through institutions under the control of the dominant class, such as schools and trade unions (the ideological apparatuses of the state in Althusser's terms), and is maintained through force (the repressive state apparatus) and the ideological orientation of intellectuals (Prono, 2005). Here again, state power is conceptualised not as concentrated in the hands of a sovereign but as diffuse within a social structure:

> Gramsci suggests that power is best understood as a relation. The social relations of civil society are also relations of power, so that power is diffused throughout civil society as well as being embodied in the coercive apparatuses of tile state. Gramsci used the term integral state to describe this new conception of the nature of power, which he summed up as 'hegemony armoured by coercion (Simon, 1991, p.31).

Althusser and Gramsci adopted a Marxist point of view and argued that both state apparatuses (force and ideology) basically serve a single purpose: to reproduce the dominant mode of production -- capitalism. Another shared commonality is that, although power is being diffused, it is still controlled by the class that has captured key state institutions.

Althusser's description of the means of exercising state power provides a well-established background for the arguments of Foucault. Similarly, Foucault (1991) argues that power is not concentrated in the hands of the state, but instead circulates in the veins of society, and is exercised through various techniques. Power is nested

in various social institutions, such as family, the body, sexuality, kinship, knowledge, and technology, (Foucault, 2000) and is exercised in a complex way whereby a series of power relations constitute what Foucault calls governmentality:

> the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy and its essential technical means apparatuses of security (Foucault, 1991, p.102).

However Foucault differs from the Marxist tradition by arguing that the state is "no more than a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think" (p.103). Therefore, according to Foucault, attention should be paid not to the state, but to governmentality, which embodies the techniques of government. Elsewhere Foucault (2000, p.123) argues that despite the vast number of institutions and government techniques the state possesses, it is impossible for the state to cover the "whole field of actual power relations" since in actuality, the state operates on the basis of these power relations (that he calls metapower) as a sort of superstructure.

The Althusserian, Foucauldian and Gramscian perspectives on state and power are associated with the social contract theory, not in terms of the exchange of power for security, but in terms of understanding power as a socially constructed phenomenon that has its roots in social practices. Hence, power is not a self-evident and materialized entity, but constantly produced and reproduced in the social realm of individual and institutional interactions.

Returning to the conceptualization of the state, three distinctive features should be added to the definition: the use of legal and bureaucratic means for the regulation of society; its relationship with the nation that has caused the modern-state to be termed "nation state" and the territorial aspect of the state.

Modern states are usually characterized as constitutional states, (i.e. the states in which duties and responsibilities are defined largely through various laws and legislation that also work to limit the authority of powerholders). This limitation symbolizes the contractive logic of the state as the sovereignty of the state is derived from the consent of the people and manifested in written law (Pierson, 2004). Laws are also means of exercising power that Althusser (1971) places under both ideological and repressive state apparatuses. Laws are repressive since they are the

source of using force, and obedience to them is ensured by force, but they are also ideological since they establish and legitimize the given social structure and provide means for production and reproduction of the dominant mode of production. Both of these aspects are subjects of state bureaucracy. State bureaucracy in Weberian terms represents a characteristic of state structure that functions hierarchically with clearly defined rules and procedures These rules and procedures are based on laws, regulations and written documents, and thus rest upon the expert knowledge of bureaucrats, all of which reflects merit based employment in the state. Bureaucrats occupy a position that does not allow them to act impulsively, but as agents of public office. The state as a bureaucratic mechanism is diffused throughout the whole social structure and takes absolute control within the public institutions (Pierson, 2004).

The term "nation state" is almost interchangeably used with the term "state" in scholarly language and politics. This synonymy stems from the dominant modernist logic that associates each territorial government unit with a nation. Two major explanations of this perspective exist: first, states established through wars of independence from empires have identified their new states with the separatist nation; and second through mergers of estates having a common language into a single state, such as the unification of Italy (Penrose, 2009). The terms "United Nations", which is an organization established by sovereign world states, and "international relations", which refers to an academic and policy discipline focused on relationships between states are the most obvious examples of this synonymy. However, behind this synonymous use lays another distinctive characteristic of the modern state: its relationship with nations and the process of nation-building as a reference point to the state.

Ashley's definition for nation is

> a broad community of individuals, whose members consider themselves linked on the basis of shared long-standing cultural practices, ethnicity, history, memories, or traditions, who are typically associated with a specific geographical homeland, and who are predisposed to make political claims of autonomy, sovereignty, or other assertions of rights on the basis of their membership. (Ashley, 2008, p.378).

Although "nation" seems to be a category as natural as the state, it is also a modern creation that is used to justify modern state structure (Ashley, 2008; Penrose, 2009; Paasi 1996). From a historical perspective, a link between nations and states has been

established through the rise of nationalism as a process of locating the source of state power in people instead of an emperor, as exemplified in the French and American revolutions. The ideas of nationalism and national self-determination gained currency in Europe, the Americas during the late 18th and 19th centuries and throughout the anti-colonialist movements of the 20th century in Africa as a legitimizing source of independence (Levin, 2008). However, the superposition of a state with a nation of single ethnic and cultural origin was a rarely observed phenomenon in practice. Hence, a process of nation-building was required to fortify newly established states. Nation-building, according to Ashley (2008), involved the establishment and use of "common symbols such as flags and holidays, common institutions such as public education and national museums, and through activities that cemented the community's boundaries and limits, such as maps and censuses" (p.379). This was a cyclical process in which nationalist ideas fuelled the state, and in return the nation-state produced its own concept of the nation. This nation, however, was not based on religion, ethnicity or any other single reference point, but an amalgamation of symbols that would span and homogenize all diversities in a given society through shared symbols, values, traditions, and myths of origin (Levin, 2008). This amalgamation is reflected in the term "citizen", which covers various nations, religions and other cultural differences under the umbrella of the nation state (Paasi, 1996). So, the identity of the nation is not self-evident, but rather socially and politically constructed.

In most cases, the institutionalization of the nation state through nation-building, according to Penrose (2009), starts with creating the national scale at a territorial level, because as Kaplan (2009, p.248) argues "without territory a political state would be boundless, spaceless, and placeless – it would lose its rationale". A territory with clear-cut boundaries is a feature of the modern nation state. Territory is described as "a bounded, meaningful social space the 'meanings' of which implicate the operation of social relational power. It is, in a sense, an expression of the fusion of meaning, power, and social space" (Delaney, 2009, p. 198). Territory is a geographical expression of power as a social concept, the property of which is not solely ascribed to the state. When individuals or institutions set boundaries and apply specific rules of behaviour to a given space, they establish proper territories. The house, for example, could be considered the territory of a family's domain, in which

the individual relationships between family members set a commonly understood social structure at the micro level. Similarly, commonly accepted codes of conduct and ways of behaviour in places such as national preservation areas, ethnic ghettos or religiously sacred areas typically demonstrate the exercising of power within a place that is limited by visible and invisible boundaries, where the influence of power sharply diminishes beyond them. Territory in this respect is not the source of power, but a definitive component of it. Only through a demarcated territory can the shape and extent of power be understood and articulated. The demonstration of power is conceptualised with the term "territoriality", which refers to "an attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena and relationships by delimiting a geographical area and asserting control over it" (Paasi, 1996, p.68). Sources of control include, "classifying spaces as territories; communicating that a territory exists and where the boundaries are; communicating the conditions for entering or leaving the territory; communicating the consequences for not abiding by the conditions; and following through with the implicit or explicit threats" (Delaney, 2009, p.196). Although bordering a territory is not enough to exercise control over it (as discussed above), it is the primary condition for its definition. State territoriality in a similar way is manifested through: a clear definition of borders; powerful symbols and signs that create the conditions under which people identify themselves as subjects/citizens of the state; and the application of control mechanisms that are deemed legitimate by the inhabitants of the territory in question. Mechanisms of control correspond to the ideological and repressive apparatuses of the state. The symbols are anthems, passports, flags, establishment myths, national festivals and celebrations that repeatedly reproduce the legitimacy of the nation state and naturalize its existence. Finally, borders clearly define the limits of the state and articulate the former two within the defined territory.

A natural consequence of state territoriality is that beyond the borders of state begins the territoriality of another nation state, under more or less similar conditions. Indeed, the modern world is exclusively demarcated by national boundaries, despite the fact that many have been and are currently contested through conflict (Pierson, 2004). This reality creates a system of competing states, and contributes to the naturalization of nation states as sovereign holders of power that have the legitimate right to exercise authority internally and externally. The naturalization process has

reached to such an extent that as Paasi (1996, p.42) argues, it has become, together with the locality, one of the two territorial bases for the production and reproduction of human life.

Taylor (2003) famously has conceptualised the modern state to be a metaphorical container. According to him, a state simultaneously contains power, wealth, social relations and culture. The notion of a power container in Taylor's terms primarily refers to the sovereign power that is recognized by other states, which serves to provide protection against external rivalries. All states are enhanced with this kind of power, and the power relationship between them achieves a level where expansionist ideals are replaced by the notions of defence and security. The state as a wealth container refers to the mercantilist states that emerged during the 16th century, the most prominent example of which is the Netherlands. Those states increased their wealth through commerce instead of expansionist wars, or in terms of Taylor (2003), engaged in economic warfare. A key component of economic warfare is the assumption that total wealth is limited, and economic competition is a zero-sum game. Hence, wealth is considered to be part of the worldwide competition between states. Thirdly, the state as a cultural container refers to the cultural practices that promote nation-building. By establishing a national culture, according to Taylor, nation states were able to unify an entire country under common values. Such values in turn enabled citizens to move from one part of the country to another without feeling isolated and alienated, since the culture of their locality more or less overlapped with more distant parts of the country. Cultural homogenization allowed the massive labour force needed during the heyday of industrialization to be organized through rapid migration from urban to rural areas. Finally, the state as a social container refers to the identification of the state with its society by way of establishing a nation state. The idea of the welfare state, which was established on the grounds that every citizen should enjoy equal social rights, was only possible by transforming the ideas of nationalism into a logic of social inclusion and homogenization. Taylor develops his analogy by pondering whether the container is leaking. Passi (1996, p.40): offers an elaborate answer: while the state remains a power container, it trends towards larger territories as a wealth container and towards smaller ones as a cultural container. In terms of this section of the study, the manner in which the state is conceptualiased is of particular importance. The container

metaphor is strongly related to the territoriality of the state. This analogy considers the state to be a spatial entity that forms and defines itself through ordering the social, economic and political life over space. Or, in other words, political, economic and social practices become meaningful and definable only when they take the shape of their container.

At the end, the simple question of 'what is the state?' still persists without a short and clear answer. For this study, the key component of a definition of the state will be how it is socially constructed. This implies that social practices, which include the abstractions of power struggles as well as solidifications of relationships and daily practices via the institutionalization of them, are reflected in the formation of the state. Therefore, any kind of social interaction that takes place in daily life is an expression and reproduction of the state. People perpetually construct their own states, and institutions filter these practices to solidify them into the set of organizations that constitute the state. But again, a flow from the opposite direction limits and manipulates social practices; this dynamic embodies the concept of hegemony, which describes the expression of power struggles between different classes in society. In this respect, the state is not only a politico-geographical setting in which social interactions occur, but an entity that is "actively produced and reproduced, maybe maintained or transformed, in the struggles of individuals, in their local, day-to-day practices of life and in the collective forms of practice on larger spatial scales" (Paasi, 1996, p.67). Although Paasi has developed this definition for "geography", it is relevant to the definition of the state for the purpose of the present study.

At this stage it is necessary to distinguish between the state and the nation state. The state, as is described above, is an organization that is socially constructed and practiced through daily interactions, institutional dynamics and power relations in society. While on the one hand it reflects all these dynamics, on the other hand, it influences them, and through various instruments and techniques the state provides its own sustainability by reproducing meanings of symbols, ideologies and hegemony. The nation state is a particular form of the state that emerged in the late 16^{th} century and has dominated the global political system throughout the 20^{th} century. The most crucial difference between these two concepts is that while the nation state refers to existing states born out of nationalist movements first in Europe

after in other parts of the world, the state is a more general concept that is not bounded to a particular place (even though a state is not independent and understandable without the territorial dynamics), but a construction of myriad social dynamics.

2.2 State-Space and the Transformation of the Nation State

The territoriality-based definition of the nation state has been challenged, due to its inability to account for the complexity of existing constitutive dynamics that are shaped by power relations, social networks and a variety of actors (Johnson et al, 2011.). In addition, the nation state is only one of many actors that now struggle to gain power and control over myriad flows in a given territory (Agnew, 1994; Johnson et al., 2011; Brenner et al., 2003). Indeed, the objection is not to the spatial aspect of the state, since territoriality is widely accepted as a constitutive dynamic of the nation state -- and the development and implementation of policies is territorial in practice -- (Lagendijk and Boekema, 2009) but to the naturalization of the understanding that territoriality is fixed and subordinate to the nation state. International relations theory is a clear example of this objection. The classic discipline of international relations accepts nation states as natural actors in the world scene, and establishes its explanations, theories and strategies around that assumption. However, as Agnew states, "even when rule is territorial and fixed, territory does not necessarily entail the practices of total mutual exclusion which the dominant understanding of the territorial state attributes to it" (Agnew, 1994, p.54). Practices such as free trade agreements, common markets, military alliances and informal interactions have challenged the territorially fixed sovereignty of the state. Nation states are not self-evident and eternal entities, but relatively new phenomena in human history, being results of various social dynamics that never cease to reproduce or transform the states. John Agnew (1994) referred to this "misunderstanding" as the "territorial trap". The territorial trap arises mainly through the naturalization of the nation state as a self-evident entity. Agnew (1994) argues that there are three sources of the territorial trap: (1) the assumption that the nation state is the sole possessor of power over its territory; (2) that sovereignty is transformed into an individual form in international relations theory, where states act as sole actors competing with each other; and (3) the state precedes society and

serves as a container that shapes it. To avoid falling into the territorial trap, it is necessary to accept that "social, economic and political life cannot be ontologically contained within the territorial boundaries of states" (Agnew, 1994, p.77), and to reconceptualise the state in this way.

For Brenner et al. (2003, p.3), four distinct approaches to analysing state-space relations and the transformation of the state are (1) society and space relations, (2) globalization, (3) the crisis and retreat of the Keynesian welfare state and (4) the new localisms/new regionalisms debates. These four approaches provide both a framework for understanding the spatial organization of the state and an explanation for the transformation of the nation state.

The constitutive role of space in the formation of social relations within the dynamics of capitalism is put at the centre of the "**production of space**" arguments. For Lefebvre space is integral in the dynamics of capitalism, which are produced and reproduced over "appropriate" places. The politics of space have both fragmentation and homogenization effects at the same time. Space is homogenized to provide the sameness and interchangeability of everyday practices such as work, private live and planned leisure. "Homogenous", in this sense, represents an abstraction and designation of space for defined purposes, independent from the characteristics of place. On the other hand space is fragmented by being divided into plots and parcels and become subject to commodification, exchange and capitalist relations. Hierarchy is a third aspect of space politics. From the individual, to the household, the neighbourhood, the city, the nation and finally, the planet, space is hierarchically constructed in all social structures. For Lefebvre the state takes an active role in the fragmentation, homogenization and hierarchization of space. The purpose of this is to provide an appropriate space for each mode of production; aesthetic, social and mental rationales play a role in the process as well. Writing in the late 1970s, Lefebvre argues that the capitalist mode of production has been transformed into a state mode of production over the politics of space. Space enters in the equation in four distinctive ways: it organizes the productive forces (e.g. agglomeration economies); it organizes the relations of production and property by fragmenting the land; it articulates the ideology and instruments of political power as "the basis for rationality"; and it allows for the production, realization and allocation of surplus value. Lefebvre points to the automobile industry to clarify his argument and states

that at the time of his writing, almost 20% of the total production and working population was dedicated to the automobile industry and that particular mode of transportation. Moreover, space was also specifically fragmented and designated in line with the needs of the automobile industry; highways, parking lots, factories, hotels and gas stations were created to promote the reproduction of that particular industry. The state, in cooperation with capitalists, according to Lefebvre takes on this role by supplying the fixed capital in terms of infrastructure and, in some cases, by taking control of energy production to "continu[e] to install a dominant space, extending the space demarcated by motorways, canals and railroads" (Lefebvre, 2003, p.90).

Although capitalism- nation state relations are the dominant factor in the organization of space, the organization of space should not be understood as a unidirectional process wherein capital accumulation activities are the driving force. Rather, space should be understood as "relationally constituted, polyvalent processes embedded in broader sets of social relations" (Jessop et al., 2008, p.390). This process is not independent from capitalist relations; instead, capitalist relations are transposed onto a wider social setting where they are constantly reproduced through various processes of abstraction and materialization. Through the politics of space, however, room is created for the political contestation of various social actors. As Brenner (2000, p.373) cites from Lefebvre "the struggle to gain command and control over social space becomes a central element of daily life". This is an understanding of the **social construction of space**, where day-to-day relations, traditions, myths, symbols and institutional relations deliberately as well as unconsciously take part in the production of space and the organization of social life. As Paasi argues, these social practices

> …provide individuals with continuity and hence join them with common stories, contain a specific perspective on nature, society and human beings, and also guide the individual and collective search for knowledge and collective action. … In this connection consciousness and material practice are inextricably bound to each other. (Paasi, 1996, p.43)

The transformation of the nation state, from this perspective, needs to be understood as a multidirectional and multilateral process, where transformations in the dynamics of capitalism, the administrative and spatial organization of the state and social practices are reflected in each other. The source of change does not emanate from

one, single domain, but is a result of a process of continuous interaction through which transformation is produced by various social processes taking place across all domains.

The **dynamics of globalization**, which have transformed the processes of production, consumption and capital accumulation and increased the level of interdependency and interconnectedness across different political, social and economic actors globally, have triggered a shift in the understanding of the sociospatial organization of the state. At this stage, one additional aspect of globalization, the spatial and territorial aspect, should be included in the definition of globalization provided in Chapter 1. As Held (2002) argues, globalization is best understood as a spatial phenomenon, with the local and the global on opposing ends of the spectrum. Rather than stressing these particular scales as two poles of the new global order, this definition implies that the effects of globalization have transformed the spatial organization of societies from micro to macro levels, disordering the global political structure predicated on nation states. This again implies a two-sided description. While one side focuses on the adjustment of state's spatial organization to the dynamics of capitalism, the other side points to the socially transformative effects of globalization, particularly in urban areas. Important here is attention to the postmodernist condition, which imposes global dynamics on daily life at the local scale through communication technologies, a transformed division of labour, new ways of consumption and production and massive migration.

Harvey (2000, p.57) argues that globalization signals a "profound geographical reorganization of capitalism, making many of the presumptions as regards the 'natural' geographical units within which capitalism's historical trajectory develops less and less meaningful". Brenner (1998) suggests that globalization is another historical phase in which capital accumulation requires a 'denationalized' territorial organization, where scales above and below the nation state are supported for the capitalist organization of space. Harvey and Brenner refer not only to the nation states as the primary scale of operation for capitalist enterprises, but also to different localities where capital is produced and accumulated. In terms of Held's (2002) linear description, this refers to a global as well as scalar division of labour. Globally production processes and the provision of services has spread throughout the world, seeking to both increase the turnover rate of capital accumulation, which has caused

types of production and service provision to migrate from the global West to the East, and to increase specialization in particular places (regions) of the world through the development of agglomeration economies and clusters. The emergence of new global governance institutions to regulate the global division of labour; the increasing importance given by the supranational institutions and national governments to local and regional governance; and a focus on competitiveness has created a scalar division of labour, where regulation of particular capitalist dynamics is assigned to institutions of different scales. While the global scale remains abstract -- in a sense becoming synonymous with being everywhere at the same time -- the local scale has been solidified as the place of production, consumption and capital accumulation that is increasingly shaped by globalization dynamics at the expense of unique conditions of localities; this process has been labelled 'glocalization' (Swyngedouw, 1997; Hsu, 2010; Brenner, 2003b).

One of the impacts of capitalism on space is its tendency to annihilate space by time, which can be understood in terms of globalization to mean the demolition of borders as barriers in front of free movement. Harvey (2000) supports this argument by giving the example that political entities in Europe have been reduced from 500 in 1500 to 23 in 1920. This leads Harvey to the understanding of state formation as a capitalist process of continuous territorialisation, de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation in pursuit of capital accumulation. Hence, one of the impacts of globalization on the state appears to be diminishing, but not eviscerating, the importance of national borders and the function of the nation state itself with the argument that the nation state remains "too small for global problems, and too big for local problems". However, this is not the end of the argument since, with new actors increasingly claiming their share of regulative and executive power, nation states still remain the dominant actors and preferred medium for exercising power. As Sassen (2002, p.105) argues, although a massive deregulation and re-regulation of capitalism at the global level is observable, "much of the institutional apparatuses of the state remain basically unchangeable". Moreover, according to Sassen (2002) the "strategic geography of globalization" remains by and large embedded in national territories, such as global cities and Silicon Valley.

Held (2002) recognizes five "disjunctures" that have characterized the changing relationship between globalization and the nation state. First, the politics defining the

regulations of various policy fields, such as genetics or regulation of internet has escaped the reach of the nation state, requiring the involvement of various actors from different scales. This, according to Held (2002, p.307), symbolizes the end of the "self-determining collectivity" of the nation state. Second, political power is no longer concentrated in the governments of nation states. Instead, states have begun to establish alliances, which themselves have generated political power, which functions through complex networks across various scales. Third, although particular states still prevail as global hegemons holding the power to direct global politics, their methods have changed significantly, and are more oriented towards governance-related approaches. Fourth, the management of the public good has begun to require more coordinated action, paving the way for diversified governance mechanisms and new modes of public involvement. Fifth, the distinction between domestic and foreign politics has become blurred.

The third aspect of the spatial transformation of the state is the **crisis and retreat of the Keynesian welfare state, which** has created room for debate on the relationship between the capitalist mode of production and the nation state as its most appropriate socio-political and spatial organization. Space is considered to be a constitutive dynamic of capital accumulation in terms of the extraction of resources, production of commodities, as well as the reproduction of the social structure, which enables capitalism to function (see Ch.1, Capitalism). To re-quote Harvey, massive investments in transport and communication infrastructure, which actually mean "[embedding capital] in space as landed capital, as capital fixed in the land, creating a 'second nature' and a geographically organized resource structure that more and more inhibits the trajectory of capitalist development" (Harvey, 2000, p.59), establish a solid relationship between capitalism and space. This is a process where the dynamics of capital accumulation fix capital to space, and create a cyclical development pattern where these "spatial fixes" influence processes of capital accumulation. Building on Harvey's arguments, Brenner (1998) suggests that the state has transformed its territorial organization throughout history based on the changing needs of capital accumulation. Beginning with the late 19th century, the nation-state was considered to correspond to the needs of capital accumulation by providing an "institutional-organizational framework and medium" (p.14) for establishing and regulating fixed capital and the "socioeconomic relations of

capitalism". This is why, according to Brenner, the existence of the nation state has been naturalized in the 20th century.

From the 1970s onwards, and in accordance with the dynamics of globalization, two coexisting capitalist dynamics have caused a transformation in the welfarist structure and policies of the state. First as discussed above, the relocation of productive facilities within the global division of labour has required more refined operational scales for capitalism, which in the scalar division of labour overlap with the sub-national, urban scale. Second, the roles of the state have been transformed through this process. Brenner (1998, p.15) argues that the duties of a Keynesian welfare state are to ensure the reproduction of labour power through redistributive welfare policies; to determine industrial location through subsidies and tax incentives; and to promote collective consumption through education, housing, transportation and planning policies. These policies were consistent with the post-war dynamics of capital accumulation, and, in tandem with the counter- balancing effect of the socialist threat, (Harvey, 2007) these policies managed to redistribute the benefits of growth across society and at the nation state level. This process was especially successful in the more developed western countries. The neoliberal turn (see Chapter1, p.15) beginning after the so-called oil crisis of 1970s is also reflected in the territorial organization of the state, which, according to Brenner (1998), signifies a shift from the redistribution of welfare and regulation of production and consumption at the national level towards the promotion of specific localities, such us urban agglomerations, as hubs of global competition with large scale investment projects (e.g. financial centres, waterfront redevelopment projects, conference centres, etc.). Harvey (1989) argues that cities are at the heart of this transformation, as they are changing their way of governance from managerialism (managing the welfare provision and state investments) to entrepreneurialism as a state led project in order to attract global capital.

The fourth and last aspect of the spatial transformation of the state is the emergence or rediscovery of **new types of governance**, regulatory experiments and strategies, which have paved the way for **new localisms and new regionalisms** (Brenner et al., 2003, p.4). New localisms for Brenner and his colleagues are those practices that stress the importance of local initiatives in economic regeneration, political participation and community building. New regionalisms, on the other hand, are

symbolized as new territorial scales of North Atlantic Type Post-Fordist competition. The involvement of non-governmental actors in governance processes through public private partnerships or participatory democracy experiences, and the growth of endogenous resources and competition-based development models, accompanied with increased (mostly fiscal, sometimes administrative) autonomy of sub- national regions, have combined to impact the socio-spatial structure through transforming the traditional hierarchical government approach in such a way as to include multiple scales, actors and networks.

The concept of the nation state is a contestable but still dominant political organization of human societies, spatially organized by the dynamics of capitalism but also subject to the influence of other factors. Among these factors, day-to-day social interactions, institutional practices and historical elements such as traditions are of particular importance. After the 1970s, the territorial organization of state, together with its existential purpose and approach to governance, has been questioned and contested, resulting in a transformation that is still in progress. Three main transformative dynamics include globalization, the retreat of the Keynesian welfare state and the emergence of new modes of governance that bring together institutions from scales above and below the nation state in the form of networks as well as hierarchies. The latter is of particular importance since it indicates not only the causes but also the consequences of the transformation of state structure along with its administrative and territorial organization. The next section of this chapter focuses on state rescaling theory to develop insight into this third aspect.

2.3 State Rescaling

Scale, in essence, is a geographical (spatial) concept that identifies different layers of social organization. Territories, demarcated and placed in a hierarchical order, are categorized under different scales, and nested underneath each other (e.g. national, regional, urban and so forth). Although the definition of scales implies neutrality with regard to the organization of space (since the scales are analytically devised), state-space theory suggests that scale is also a social and political construction, neither neutral nor fixed and natural (Delaney and Leitner, 1997). Instead, scale is a methodological tool for framing social activities, historically built around social, political and economic dynamics (Smith, 2003). Jessop (2005, p.225) points to the

temporal aspects of scale, arguing that "they are linked to specific temporal metrics and inter-temporal linkages, have their own discursive, strategic and material temporalities, as well as their own horizons and expectations". Consequently, the construction and definition of scale is subject to continuous change along the trajectory of its constitutive dynamics.

One of the pillars of rescaling theory is the emerging shifts in the "**scalar division of labour**", which refers to the division of activities between different hierarchies of scale (MacLeod, 1999). The scalar division of labour differs from the spatial division of labour, which divides the same activities among space at the same scale. The regulation of particular activities such as the redistribution of welfare, the coordination of infrastructure investment and management, and the provision of different services are assigned to specific institutions within these scales. In the scalar division of labour (and depending on social and historical conditions), one scale dominates the others in the reproduction of the social system (Jessop, 2005). Brenner (2003) argues that during the course of the 20th century, the nation state was the dominant scale in the organization of the productive activities of capitalism. Regional development and urban governance policies were also led by nation states within the dynamics of capital accumulation and welfare redistribution, leaving to sub-national administrative units a managerial role in the scalar division of labour. This is known as creating "**scalar fixes**" by assigning particular roles to particular scales in capitalist or administrative processes (MacLeod, 1999). These fixed scales are used to define respective scales as the containers of social and economic activities within the scalar division of labour. However, through continuous de- and re-territorialisation processes, scales are rapidly produced at various intermediate levels with respect to the social dynamics taking place around the "**politics of scale**" (Swyngedouw, 1997), causing a process of "**relativization of scales**" (Jessop, 2005). The politics of scale, according to Jonas (1994), originate from the abstraction of scale in the social consciousness as a self-given neutral entity, which hides the well-defined organization of particular scales based on the dynamics of the social structure and the power relations within and between scales. These scales are indeed the places where the politics of scale occur, where "who controls what for which purposes at each scale" becomes important (Swyngedouw, 1997, p. 141). Jones' (1994, p. 258) argument is that domineering institutions aim to control the dominated

by controlling their activities at manageable scales. In addition, the struggles of the subordinated are also reflected in their attempts to transcend the boundaries of scales. As a consequence of the assumption that scales are socially and politically constructed, they can no longer be understood as fixed and territorially and administratively bounded places. Instead, scales proliferate, convolute and overlap with each other to form a complex kind of relationship in which scales are not attached to major, administrative political units such as regions and states, and no single scale (including the nation state) can become dominant. This is a phenomenon conceptualized as the "relativization of scale" (Jessop, 2005, p.227).

State rescaling theory in this respect aims to explain the transformation of state power and its spatial organization with regard to the strategic use of scales for this very purpose. It proposes that the nation state was the most appropriate and, therefore, dominant scale of Fordist capitalism (Swyngedouw, 1997). However, the dynamics of globalization and neoliberalism have transformed the methods of production, consumption and capital accumulation, causing a discrepancy with the spatial organization of the nation state. Three previously discussed trends are of particular importance to this process (Jessop, 2003): (1) the denationalization of the territorial state, (i.e. losing significance as the most appropriate scale for capital accumulation); (2) the shift from government to governance, which transforms the state from the sole sovereign of power to just one of many stakeholders in active in policy formation; and (3) the internationalization of policy regimes, which points to the blurring lines between domestic and international politics. Consequently, the nation state has been "hollowed out", its power shifting upwards and downwards to supranational and subnational political organizations and sideways towards multiple non-governmental actors (Cox, 1998). The state has been challenged from below by the entrepreneurial and competitive pressure of sub-national regions seeking more autonomy, by regionalist or ethnic movements, informal economies, local activists and the increasing number of people who prefer to live and work internationally. From above, supranational integration, transnational capital, global media and the mobility of goods, finance and people are the factors challenging the state (Thomassen, 2005; Bayırbağ, 2013).

State-rescaling scholars commonly begin their analyses with a focus on the 1970s, when the retreat of the Keynesian welfare state at the expense of the Schumpeterian

workfare state and neoliberal policies occurred (Brenner, 1998; Lobao et al., 2009; Brenner et al., 2003). Indeed, the welfare state was only made possible through a combination of the closed economies of nation states and clearly defined citizenship rights. As the neoliberal wave of 1970's targeted welfare regimes, it was also hollowing out one of the establishing components of the nation states. The dynamics of globalization have only contributed to that process by enabling capitalist dynamics to function on different spatial scales.

During the course of the development of state rescaling theory, various approaches have been elaborated, conceptualising both the sources of state power and the understanding of scale in different ways. Three main scales that are considered are the nation state, the supranational and the local, but various other scales such as the body, family and locality could be included as well. The literature on state rescaling in this respect can be grouped under three main categories, which are going to be termed vertical, horizontal and helical approaches.

The vertical approach considers inter-scalar interactions to function in a hierarchical order that nests each scale below the other (Figure 2.1). The purpose can be either "widening and deepening the scalar division of labour" or "building horizontal linkages on the same scale" (Jessop, 2003, p.183). This is a state-centred approach that puts the nation state as the source of other scales at the centre of the paradigm, and traces shifts in power upwards towards supranational regulatory institutions and downwards towards sub-national administrative units (Brenner, 1998). Accordingly, it is the central governments that create these administrative scales "as objects of governance" and task them with specific policies (Perkmann and Sum, 2002, p.11) that articulate state power (Brenner, 1998). The approach towards the state is associated with "state-space in its narrow sense", where Brenner et al. (2003) suggest that it should be understood as the territorial organization of political power. This resembles the second source of the territorial trap of Agnew (1994) where the modern global system is composed of mutually exclusive territorial states.

The transformation of the nation state based model of the global political order is associated with the current state of capitalism and the systematic crises it faces, which are related to its disfunctionality in reproducing itself in the given modes of social, economic and spatial organization. Resolution of these crises has been achieved by restructuring the given order and introducing new instruments for

control. In spatial terms, Bayırbağ (2013) argues that the uneven geography of capital accumulation is of central importance to the reproduction of the current system, and that the theory of state rescaling is useful for explicitly understanding that process. The rescaling of the state, however, should not be understood only in terms of a shift of power from the nation state (the centre) upwards and downwards. Instead it should be examined together with the structural dynamics that necessitate, accompany and result from such a shift. For Bayırbağ (2013), the shift from the Keynesian welfare state to a work fare Schumpeterian state represents such a dynamic for state rescaling. To stress the importance of these structural dynamics, Perkmann and Sum (2002, p.11) make a differentiation between the rescaling of certain processes and horizons of action (economic flows, commodity chains, etc.) and the rescaling of territorial units (formation of new regions), and prefer to call the former rescaling and the latter de- and re- territorialisation. According to them, the invention and reinvention of particular administrative scales is part of a wider transformative process. Nevertheless, both structural transformation and the invention of new scales are two processes that go hand-in-hand to alter the nation state.



Figure 2.1 : 1A: Hierarchical inter- scalar interactions, one country case. 1B: Hierarchical inter- scalar interactions, two countries case.

An example of this argument is found in Brenner's work, where in two different studies he argues that

> …by the mid-1980s most OECD states had substantially re-scaled their internal institutional hierarchies in order to play increasingly entrepreneurial, supply-side roles in financing, constructing and organizing the territorial infrastructures of capital accumulation within their major urban regions. (Brenner, 1998, p.15)

> Within the newly emergent, glocalized configuration of state spatiality, national governments have not simply transferred power downward but have attempted to institutionalize competitive relations between major subnational administrative units as a means to position local and regional economies strategically within supranational circuits of capital. (Brenner, 2003, p.164).

A final and similar point of view is found in Picciotto:

> In the UK, the very machine which was used to push through the drastic restructurings, the strong parliamentary central government, was itself becoming "hollowed out", with the transfer of significant powers upwards to Brussels, and downwards to Edinburgh and Cardiff. (Picciotto, 2010, p.92)

Focusing on the capital accumulation dynamics mentioned above, Brenner (1998) argues that the appropriate scale for capital accumulation has shifted from the nation state level towards the urban level. However, this is not solely an administrative shift of central state responsibilities towards the local or regional levels that MacLeod (1999) argues serve to strengthen the central state authority, but also a qualitative shift and structural transformation of the state. Picciotto's (2010) argument is in a similar vein, that the hierarchical rescaling process is accompanied by a structural transformation of the state seeking to adapt to the changing conditions of capitalism. In this respect, supranational and sub-national scales emerge as a result of the adaptation process, and serve to mediate capital accumulation dynamics throughout.

Tracing the features of structural transformation leads to the dynamics of neoliberalism discussed in Chapter 1. Accordingly, the essential field of transformation is the Keynesian welfare state model enhanced with Fordist capitalism and a relatively strong working class. The welfare states, especially those during the first half of the 20th century in Europe, have employed various policies and territorial interventions for (1) the reproduction of labour power through redistributive social policies, (2) industrial relocation to achieve a balanced and organized territorial development through regulations such as subsidies and tax incentives, and (3) promoting collective consumption for the endless needs of capital accumulation through housing, transportation and spatial planning policies (Brenner, 1998). The Keynesian welfare state takes a neoliberal form, which is no less interventionist, but here, the focus of intervention has shifted from redistribution of created wealth to the regulation and deregulation of the economic sphere in accordance with the changing needs of capital accumulation. Neoliberal state

intervention, according to Brenner (1998, p.15), takes the shape of "public-private partnerships, labour retraining programs, science parks, conference centres, waterfront redevelopment schemes, technology transfer projects, military spending, information sharing, venture capital provision and market research to technopoles programs and enterprise zones", which supports capitalists for the construction and management of the required infrastructure (or, so-called "fixed capital"), but also requires another scale (the urban scale) for implementation.. The mutually dependent relationship between the capitalist mode of production and state organization in an age of globalization requires the organization of production and managerial systems to be held and controlled within a concentrated territory. This will also enable a more precise division of labour both among different sub-national areas and through various scales (MacLeod, 1999). Therefore, the locus of state activity has been rescaled towards the subnational level "as an accumulation strategy through which contemporary neoliberal states are attempting to promote their cities and regions as favorable territorial locations for transnational capital investment". In that respect the urban scale emerges as the new "coordinate of state territorial power … [the] loci of industrial production; centers of command and control over inter-urban, interstate and global circuits of capital; and sites of exchange within local, regional, national and global markets", (Brenner, 1998, p.17) where state administrative divisions overlap with networks of capitalism and become "new state spaces", as Brenner prefers to call them.

Elsewhere, Brenner (2003, pp.143- 144) argues that the concept of urban governance has emerged as part of these dynamics after the 1950s, when the Fordist accumulation regime reached maturity, and as a "state led scale making project...construct[ed] centralized bureaucratic hierarchies, to establish nationally standardised frameworks for capitalist production and collective consumption, to underwrite urban and regional growth, and to alleviate uneven spatial development". For Brenner (2003), during the course of the 1970s and 1980s, redistributive, Keynesian regional policies coordinated at the central level shifted to competitive, entrepreneurial work fare policies under the control of regional governments. During this process, nation states started a restructuring process with the purpose of establishing a new and competitive infrastructure for urban and regional entrepreneurialism. Brenner (2003) identifies five aspects of this restructuring

process in Western Europe, which are worth mentioning here for their descriptive power of structural transformation. First, new revenue-raising powers were granted to regional/local governments in terms of tax rates and fees determination. Second, responsibilities for planning, economic development, and social services were transferred to the local level. Third, national planning systems were redefined with an emphasis on competitiveness and at the expense of Keynesian redistributive approaches. Fourth, place-based institutions and policies such as enterprise zones and urban development corporations were introduced to enhance the endogenous resources of regions and cities. And fifth, the function of local governments was redefined from welfare service delivery to promoting economic development and competitiveness through entrepreneurial agencies.

From this perspective, state rescaling is perceived as a restructuring of nation state power towards the local and through the local to the global. For Brenner (1998) this is what the term "glocalization" corresponds to: a strategy of the capitalist nation state to become global by reorganizing itself along the local.

The hierarchical conceptualization of state rescaling has been criticised for being state-centric, and because of this, not able to grasp intricate relationships with emerging global and local scales. However, as MacLeod (1999, p.234) argues, in the emergent global structure "there appears to be no relatively privileged level in and through which other scales are managed". The absence of a dominant scale, hence a clearly defined hierarchy amnong scales, has brought forward the issues of relativization of scale and the definition of interactions between scales with networks instead of hierarchies. In this respect, a second approach to rescaling has been put forward, in which the notion of hierarchy has been replaced with a horizontal interactions perspective (Figure 2.2). In the horizontal rescaling approach it is assumed that institutions from different scales interact in a non-hierarchical way, or to speak more concretely, although hierarchies, (especially between the national and subnational administrative units) remain, a multi-layered governance structure emerges that adopts a different way of doing business, functioning outside the logic of administrative hierarchies and working with the involvement of actors from civil society and business circles. Jessop (2003, p.184) explains this situation as "building transversal linkages [for] bypassing one or more immediately neighbouring scale(s) to seek closer integration with of various other scales". In contrast with the

hierarchical approach, the horizontal approach does not presume the nation state as the pre-given source of power that is reproduced on other scales.



Figure 2.2 : 2A: Horizontal inter-scalar interactions, one country case. 2B: Horizontal inter- scalar interactions, two countries case.

Brenner et al. (2003) suggest looking at the political economy of scale by referring to the social and economic practices that serve to reproduce capitalism over and through scales. From this perspective, scales do not represent a strict hierarchy but signify a different mode of social interaction at each scale; in other words, shifting scales means also shifting among from one interaction to another, and rescaling means a reorganization of interactions at each particular scale. In addition, the interactions between scales and their territorial organizations are not fixed, timeless entities. For example, for Jessop (2005, p.227), globalization represents a multi-scalar process that emerges from "actions on many scales – which can no longer be seen as nested in a neat hierarchy but which coexist and interpenetrate in tangled and confused ways; [and] tends to develop and deepen the scalar as well as spatial division of labour".

An analytical look at Figure 2.2 reveals a couple of scale interactions, such as those between supranational and local, between two local scales or between local, supranational and national scales. The modes of interactions have a multi-level, networked governance structure where actors from different scales pursue their own interests, interests that are not always in line with either the nation state's or the dynamics of capital accumulation. Cox (1998) argues that during this process, actors from one scale "jump" to other scales to pursue their interests and influence others accordingly. These interactions, as Swyngedouw (1997, p.142) argues, do not privilege one or the other scale, but continuously "change the geometry of social

power by strengthening the power and the control of some while disempowering other" scales.

Both hierarchical and horizontal approaches focus on the inter-scalar interactions between three major scales. Although they differ in conceptualizing these interactions, these approaches agree that these scales are pre-given abstract containers of power engaged in pursuit of unique interests, which are externally assigned to them by wider political, social and economic dynamics.

The third approach to state rescaling proposes that none of these three scales are self-evident entities, but that each scale is politically constructed through social struggles and representational practices. Hence the meaning of each scale is given by the actors taking part in the construction of it. Differing from the previous two approaches, this third approach replaces the rescaling argument with a wider conceptualization of scale by taking under consideration the socio-spatial dynamics that give to particular scales their meanings. Instead of being involved in rescaling discussions and analysing the power shifts between various "containing" scales, it is suggested to look at the "politics of scale" (Swyngedouw, 1997; Jonas, 1994). As MacLeod (1999) emphasizes:

> To this extent, it is useful to comprehend particular scales (such as the urban or regional) as relational, as political constructions, and that, furthermore, any erstwhile geographies of scale are only constitutive and reflective of the political practices of strategic agents, and their own respective scale dependencies... Indeed, to seriously explore these struggles over the scaling of institutions could help us to uncover the social, economic, political, and ideological forces that appear to be constituting specific scales such as the 'region' … and multi-scalar matrices such as Euro-regionalism as the hegemonic scalar fixes of late capitalism. (MacLeod, 1999, p. 248)

In studying the institutionalization of regions, Paasi (1986, p.112) emphasizes that "the distinction between region and place is not based on the scale or areal extent of these spatial units, but instead on their relationship to one's daily life". Massey (1991) also remarks on the difficulty of defining a community by only referring to a fixed space. According to her, a community can no longer be defined as one people bound to a particular place, but the dynamics that establish it should be traced to interactions between various different scales. Indeed, place is only a "unique point of their intersection" (p.28). Therefore, drawing boundaries for the conceptualisation of a place becomes an unnecessary act, since the division between the outside and inside is defined through various other means. This observation leads Massey (1991,

p.28) to conclude that "a more global sense of place" can be established, "which includes a consciousness of its links with the wider world, which integrates in a positive way the global and the local". The perspective of social construction of scales is more or less parallel to Massey and Paasi's understandings, since neither of the above-mentioned scales differ in their size or administratively-defined hierarchies, but to some extent, they produce different layers of social and institutional interaction in the social structure. The redefinition of scale as a social construction also presupposes that scale is not merely perceived as a result of economic dynamics (more precisely capitalist dynamics), but also involves various factors including social and cultural elements, such as identities and traditions (Smith, 2003).

The construction of scale is in fact a political process in which various actors from different scales are involved in the "politics of scale" (Swyngedouw, 1997; Jonas, 1994; Cox, 1998). Cox (1998, p.2) identifies two types of scale politics taking place on two different spatial scales. First, day-to-day practices and regular actions performed by public and private actors essential to the reproduction of the social system occur in the "spaces of dependence". Spaces of dependence are vulnerable to external dynamics that take place on other scales, and public and private actors "organize in order to secure the conditions for the continued existence of their spaces of dependence", which means they engage in the politics of scale. This is a process which, according to Cox (1998), takes place in the "spaces of engagement", the policy fields where interscalar interactions take place. Figure 2.3 roughly depicts this third approach as a process of politics of scale in which actors from different scales are engaged in policy formation processes, which have transformative effects on both the policies and the configuration of power relations between scales.



Figure 2.3 : The construction of scale over institutions and policy fields.

Long (2004) uses the concept of "social interface" to describe a condition, similar to the one described as "the places of engagement". According to him social interface is

> …a critical point of intersection between different social systems, fields or levels of social order where structural discontinuities, based upon differences of normative value and social interest, are most likely to be found. … [Interface] is not simply a linkage mechanism but rather the 'force field' between two organizations… Interfaces typically occur at points where different, and often conflicting, lifeworlds or social fields intersect. More concretely, they characterize social situations (what Giddens calls 'locales') wherein the interactions between actors become oriented around the problem of devising ways of bridging, accommodating to, or struggling against each other's different social and cognitive worlds…(Long, 2004, p.35).

Figure 2.3 has intentionally been left with a single representation of local and national scales. This is not to render the scheme unreadable from the mismatch of several spirals, but to stress its methodological distinction from the previous two figures. In figures 2.1 and 2.2, these three scales were conceptualised in line with the container metaphor of Taylor (2003), and as mutually exclusive containers they were positioned against each other to establish several combinations of interactions. The logic behind figure 2.3 rejects the container metaphor and argues that none of these scales are mutually exclusive or fixed; rather, they intermingle in various ways and share common constitutive social dynamics. As Lagendijk et al. argue:

> [p]olicy domains display their own (relatively) strong discursive and institutional dynamics. This dynamics, in turn, might have a significant influence on (inter)national political discourses and shifts. An area like EU regional policy, for instance, has, over time, developed

> its own realms of discursive development, institution building and political mobilisation, which has, in turn, affected broader discourses on spatial economic development and innovation at a European level. (Lagendijk et al, 2009, p.8)

In this approach, even though both hierarchies and networks are observable in various forms, their practice is exercised in the day-to-day politics of the localities (regions) with strong interdependencies of multiple actors, resulting in the politics of scale. The strongest characteristic of these interactions, borrowing Allen and Cochrane's (2007, p.1170) words, is that "the interdependence of the actors involved makes it difficult for those with formal executive powers to achieve their ends without extensive negotiation in which a range of sources of power may be mobilized by the actors involved".

In this sense, each spiral in the Figure 2.3 represents an abstraction of the particular, socially constructed scale. So, if a fourth or fifth spiral should be added, then they are supposed to represent another scale involved in the process of the construction of scales. If actual nation states, supranational organizations and sub-national regions or localities were to be positioned in the figure, their location would resemble multiple dots on their respective spiral wing. The implications here are twofold: first, the conceptualization of the nation state scale is a common product of practices occurring simultaneously in several countries, around a particular policy field in a way that they globally contribute to the institutionalization of scale in question; second, in a multiplied way, the construction of each scale is affected by the very same dynamics affecting all others. Paasi's (1996) extensive study of the institutionalization of the Vratsila region of Finland concludes with the argument that although the dynamics of institutionalization occur on various scales, it would be wrong to fragment these scales to try to understand them separately. Instead these scales have to be seen in an intricate relationship, in which what happens within one reflects on the other. In this sense, not only scales, but their relationship with space, place and networks should be analysed together using a relational approach that does not privilege one of these concepts over another (Jessop et al, 2008).

Taking the case of cross border cooperation as a policy field, the point of view in the first two figures (Figures 2.1 and 2.2) assumes that CBC is content of the arrows. CBC practices and power relations are transmitted in the direction of the arrows through scales. On the other hand, the approach in Figure 2.3 puts CBC as a policy

domain in the centre of these three scales. Through CBC these three scales cooperate and compete, negotiate and participate in power struggles, and produce, reproduce and transform the specific policy domain according to their ideologies, hegemonic purposes or strategies. While in the approach of the first two figures power is transmitted from one scale to another and constantly reproduced in that process, in the last approach, power is produced as well as reproduced, depending on the social dynamics and politics of scale. For each policy case the politics of scale are socially constructed through the institutions and institutionalization of the policy area at stake.

As a final note, it should be added that a pure analytical distinction between these three understandings of rescaling is impossible to make. Neither can it be neglected that studies used to illustrate each approach reject the others.

2.3.1 Regulating the global

The process of supranationalization, according to Smith (2003), has intensified and become more significant in the years after the 1970s with three particular developments. The first is economic globalization, which has dispersed productive activities around the globe, causing an unprecedented level of international division of labour and massive migration. Second, the cyclical and expanding process of production and capital accumulation has resulted in a massive amount of production, which could not be accommodated by the domestic markets of nation states and, thus, moved to international markets for absorption. Third, the internationalization of production was accompanied by the internationalization of labour, hence massive migration. The result, according to Smith was:

> …the geographical congruence between economic and political functions expressed in the nation-state became more and more tenuous. Nationally established states became less useful and less convenient to internationally mobile capital; were less and less willing to expand regulations or even sustain existing regulations over capital; were less able, and despite shrill national outcries often less interested in, controlling the immigration of cheap foreign labour; and therefore found themselves more and more able to relinquish some of the national state's traditional regulatory role in social reproduction. (Smith, 2003, p.232)

Global governance institutions, supranational organizations and transnational private regulations are the three main categories of actors within the realm of global

regulation that have claimed a share in the "traditional regulatory role in social production".

First, global governance institutions such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO are among many institutions regulating the global economic and political realms. As organizations emerging in different times with different purposes, they embrace the shared goal of economic development and management of the global economy through organizing multilateral international economic arrangements and establishing global formal rules (Boas and McNeill, 2004). Economic and financial organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO are of particular importance as the main regulatory bodies of global capitalism. The first two, the World Bank and the IMF, are relatively older, dating back to the post-World War II Bretton-Woods Agreement. Originally established to finance and support the reconstruction of Western Europe and ensure that European countries stayed within the capitalist system instead of gravitating towards the socialist alternative. After the end of the cold war these institutions now prescribe neoliberal policies globally (Boas and McNeill, 2004, p.210). Concepts such as good governance, participatory development, and empowerment have been invented by these institutions to disseminate the economic and political ideology that they support (Long, 2004). The WTO, on the other hand, was established to provide the legal and institutional foundation of the global trading system; in this respect, the WTO is both a forum for multilateral trade negotiations and a centre for the settlement of disputes (Boas and McNeill, 2004). Taylor (2004, p.125) argues that in reality, these global institutions establish hegemony for the "justification and defence of a particular politico-economic project".

Second, supranational organizations, such as NAFTA, Mercosur, and the EU, constitute another aspect of the transnationalization process. Differing from global regulatory organizations, these groups establish blocs or pacts of nations, usually in the same geographical area and with the purpose to establish an environment for free trade. These types of institutions are considered to be regional institutions since they cover a particular supranational area that is defined as a region in geographic terms. The EU covers the European region, NAFTA the North American, and ASEAN the South East Asian region, for example. Although these supranational organizations show a great variety in "regional" integration, there is no doubt that a large part of

the world interacts with supranational organizations. These organizations, according to Hurrell (2007, p.146), have been established to create a more appropriate scale for the regulation of the global economy, but they also constitute something more than international cooperation, as they represent "a more general idea of interdependence, [in which]… states of a given region are all in the same regional boat ecologically, strategically, economically". While on the one hand they establish necessary institutions for the regulation of the globalized dynamics of production and consumption, on the other hand they also provide standardization for the global market. As Duina (2006, p.248) remarks, by defining standards of products and services, such as 'fresh fish' or 'energy efficiency', these institutions aim to integrate "people from fairly different cultures to participate in a single marketplace".

Third, transnational private regulations are a set of "rules, practices, and processes, created primarily by the private actors, firms, NGO's, independent experts like technical standard setters and epistemic communities, either exercising autonomous regulatory power or implementing delegated power, conferred by international law or by national legislation" (Cafaggi, 2011, pp .21-22). They are necessary due to the shortcomings of nation states' and international treaties' regulatory powers, widely led by private sector bodies, including NGOs, and are called the "global law without a state" (Teubner, 1997, p.4). Indeed they are argued to increase the standards defined by public actors, hence reducing the legitimacy of them in the global realm. Cafaggi (2011) argues that such a global restructuring of regulatory power still continues to show a development tendency that favours western developed countries (and MNCs on which they are based); and occurs at the expense of developing countries of the Global South. Moreover, as global regulation requires a certain economic power to take hold, they also work at the expense of relatively small economies at the local level, since MNCs manage to manipulate or bypass national laws that local firms are obliged to obey (Cafaggi, 2011).

This third type of transnational organizations underlies the networked governance structure, where private actors are deeply involved in defining the new rules of global capitalism and are able to intervene in the realm of nation state sovereignty. The former two on the other hand, exemplify the politics of scale approach, since the role and power of both global governance institutions and supranational organizations are highly dependent on international negotiations between member

states. In this respect, Cox's (1998) argument around spaces of engagement is applicable, where nation-state governments jump scales to protect their spaces of dependence. However, their engagement, as in the case of the World Bank and IMF, can create unintended consequences, such as the strengthening of NGOs as global political actors (Boas and McNeill, 2004).

2.3.2 Regions and state rescaling

Capitalism, according to Harvey (1989), generates its own historical geography that plays the role of both a medium for capitalist relations and an internal element of production and reproduction capitalist relations. Therefore, in a dialectical manner it is the cause and result of capitalist social processes. Although Harvey's analysis is of urbanization as a capitalist process, it can be used as a starting point for exploring the changing role of regions in the context of globalization and state rescaling. Harvey (1989) describes this process as a shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism, where local governments take the position of entrepreneurs who market their cities in order to attract international firms, skilled labour and mediums for financial capital (such as global stock exchanges), and abandon their previous mission of managing centralized, state-led, regional development policies and investments. Harvey (1989) writes about four distinctive options for urban entrepreneurialism. The first is the exploitation of endogenous resources and advantages for the production of goods and services. These can be derived from natural resources or the particular location of the region, but also can be created through large-scale infrastructure investments. In the latter case, they often take the shape of public private partnerships since such an investment can rarely be initiated without government intervention. Another resource in this respect is labour. By transforming the national labour system in to local, where wages more easily can be regulated or by agglomerating skilled labour on a particular issue, labour is transformed into an endogenous resource. The second option for urban entrepreneurialism is to take share from the international division of consumption by redefining the city as "an innovative, exciting, creative, and safe place to live or to visit, to play and consume in" (p.9). The third option for urban entrepreneurialism is to become a hub for global institutions by locating the key command centres or regional centres of global financial and productive firms, governance institutions and information services, including the media. Finally taking share from the redistribution of the central government investments especially in the

fields of military and defence industries emerges as the last option for urban entrepreneurialism. The process that involves these elements is part of the state restructuring process wherein central states abandon their welfare-focused, redistributive functions as well as their roles as the main regulators of economic activity. Ultimately, they highlight their cities as the new loci of capital accumulation in the global arena (Brenner, 1998).

The role of regions is of considerable importance to this process as they emerge as the replacements of the nation state-based organization of capital accumulation. As Amin and Thrift (1994, p.7) argue, the regions are greeted as the new "basic unit[s] of economic, cultural and political organization". Amin and Thrift (1994, pp. 12-13) argue that the local scale takes particular importance in the scalar division of labour, especially when agglomeration economies are considered. According to them face-to-face contacts, social and cultural interactions and innovation are three constitutive parts of agglomeration economies that still require a local place and bound global economies to it.

New regionalism theory has conceptualised the changing role of regions as an academic discipline and normative policy paradigm (Scott, 2009a). As an academic discipline, new regionalism offers a way of conceptualizing the transformation of sub-national regions after the end of 1980s using the dynamics of neoliberalism, globalization and the restructuring of the nation state (Keating, 2003; MacLeod, 2009). Focused on the idea of "regional development" special importance has been given to agglomeration economies, the stimulating role of regions as loci of agglomeration, and the use of endogenous resources to generate development. Regions have re-emerged in academic research, with a "more profound ontological significance as a meso level of analysis within which … the current regime of post Fordist reflexive capitalism" is examined (MacLeod, 2009, p.423). New regionalism is an attempt to put the region in its "right" place, especially in the realm of global economy. As Scott and Storper (2003, p.589) have argued in defence of the importance of regions, they "exist as the keystones of economic organization just as firms, sectors and nations do. Development theory needs to recognize this point and take it into account" (see also Amin and Thrift, 1994, pp. 6-7). The right place from the perspective of new regionalism requires the analysis of regions as quasi-

autonomous geographical entities, having the means and political power to compete globally to sustain regional development.

For Keating (2003), the contradictory logic of globalization is that while it allows firms to release themselves from spatial restrictions and become able to operate globally, paving the way for supranationalism; firms still need space to produce, operate and consume in order to survive. It is precisely this property of MNC's that leads Keating (2003, p.261) to conclude that although firms are becoming more place-independent, particular places, namely subnational regions, have become more dependent on MNCs as a means of economic sustainability. The new regionalist approach states that nation states remain inefficient in attracting firms' place-based activities through traditional investment policies for regional development, which leads regional administrations to rely on endogenous resources (e.g. environment, quality of life or qualified labour), in competition to attract MNCs (Keating, 2003). The inefficiency of the state is exemplified by the arguments that centralized, "blue print and one size fits for all" (Rodriguez- Pose, 2013) planning approaches cannot prevent increasing regional disparities.

In terms of politics and governance, new regionalism argues for minimizing the role of the central state in order to increase the autonomy of regional administrations and diversify the instruments of actors in governance. However, in contrast with "old regionalism", new regionalism does not refer to the tendencies of separatism and full autonomy that reject the supremacy of the nation state, but instead offers "policy changes to enhance the autonomy and stature of the region without destabilizing the state" (Schmitt- Egner, 2002). In this context, Scott (2009a, p. 22) argues that the normative policy field of new regionalism proposes that regions represent a more appropriate "territorial framework for democratic governance, good public management and effective development policies". In close relation with the economic development perspective, the political normative approach claims more autonomy for regional governance to transform regions from administrative units in the territorial organization of state to a broader context in which local stakeholders of governance, such as NGOs, firms, public organizations and social movements, network with their international or national counterparts and attempt to participate in local/regional politics to shape regional development. The normative policy perspective also implies that regions are not only units of capital accumulation,

governance and administrative division, but they are also part and parcel of social processes that reflect wider social dynamics, which socially construct regions as "socio-cultural, historical and (geo)political bases for region building" (Scott, 2009a, p.22; Paasi, 1996). In this respect, the economy is also perceived as "an instituted process", the shape and content of which is derived from local "rules, norms, customs, habits, cultures, conventions, institutions, trust based interactions, and horizontal relations of reciprocity, which are seen to enhance the benefits of investments in physical and human capital" (MacLeod, 2009, p. 425).

MacLeod (2009, p.426) argues that the emphasis of new regionalism on regional autonomy, endogenous growth (with an emphasis on human capital), and the global competition of regions creates "blind spots" in terms of undermining state intervention in the process of global competition between regions. By examining the development of Silicon Valley, MacLeod demonstrates that state military investment has provided significant financial resources for the development of the region. In addition, the human capital educated in the leading universities of the world located in the region has also been made possible through investments from the federal state. Moreover, whatever role the regions undertook globally or within a national context, they are still top-down, administrative, territorial divisions of nation states, and their legal framework is still dependent on national laws (Scott, 2009b, p.251). Therefore, according to Brenner (1998, 1999, 2003b), it is important to understand the emergence of regions as global actors as a part of state transformation processes in accordance with the needs and pressures of global capitalism (see also Dulupçu, 2005; Lagendijk and Boekema, 2009, Scott, 2009b). The "territorial trap" arguments targeting the naturalized understanding of the nation-state (Agnew, 1994) could possibly be applied to new regionalism in terms of conceptualising regions as self-evident containers of social, economic and politic power.

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that regions have become significant actors in national and supranational politics and economics (Scott, 2009b). Similarly, the governance of regions has also been transformed significantly in a way to include multiple actors and scales (Allen and Cochrane, 2007). Scott (2009b) argues that this movement is not unidirectional, since depending on the context it can result either with decentralization or strengthening of state power. Therefore, the role of regions in state rescaling processes should be contextually evaluated, especially by paying

attention to the differences between Western European countries and the US, where the new regionalism theory was developed to explain the recent transformation of regions and developing non-western countries that "imported" these transformations (see also Dulupçu, 2005; Park, 2013). In general, the emergence of regions as global actors can be understood as part of the "relativization of the scale division of labour", (MacLeod, 1999), where activities previously ascribed to nation state institutions were not able to be controlled and exercised efficiently by the central governments.

3. STATE- SPACE ON THE GROUND: A TALE OF THREE SCALES

3.1 The Supranational: The EU

Analogies between the EU and the nation state can be made by referring to the common symbols (e.g. flags, anthems, currencies, and parliaments, etc.) that they share (Archer, 2008). These symbols are used by the EU in the way that they are used by nation states; that is, to legitimize and naturalize a newly established political structure. A straight-forward argument derived from this perspective is that the EU is transforming into a continent-wide, "federalist" state.

Although the EU uses the same symbols as nation states to legitimize its existence as a political scale, a closer look at its institutions reflects a political structure that differs significantly from nation states. This can be described as a multilevel governance system, where EU technocratic bodies, nation state representatives and elected parliamentarians, densely involved in politics of scale, jointly produce the legal and practical frameworks of this supranational scale.

Looking at EU institutions, the mutual political influence of newly established EU institutions and nation states are observable. These politics also affect sub-national regions as a part of the multi-level governance structure in progress.

The Council of the EU is one of the EU's legislative bodies that, works in tandem with the European Parliament. It does not prepare laws but rather approves the laws that are sent by the European Commission or by the European Citizens with a minimum of one million signatures. The Council of the EU is established by the ministers of member countries and is divided into several configurations. Countries are represented in each configuration by relevant ministers (Council of the EU, 2013). The other duties of the Council of the EU include: coordinating member states' policies; developing common foreign and security policies on the basis of strategic guidelines set by the European Council; concluding international agreements; and adopting the budget of the EU together with the European Parliament (Council of the EU, 2013). All configurations of the Council of the EU

are chaired by the Presidency of the Council of the EU, which is rotated every six months to another member country. The only exception is the Foreign Affairs Council, which is chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a post that came into force after the Lisbon Treaty of 2009.

The European Commission (EC) is the legislative and executive body of the EU. The four main duties of the Commission include: proposing new laws; managing the EU's budget and allocating funding; enforcing EU law (together with the Court of Justice); and representing the EU internationally. Commissioners, each from one member state and appointed by their respected governments and approved by national parliaments, perform the executive duties of the commission. Although commissioners are appointed by their respective nation states, they are expected to set aside national priorities and act only in accordance with EU interests.

The Council of Europe is constituted by the heads of government of member countries, the President of the Council and the President of the Commission. It is a relatively new institution of the EU, officially established in December 2009. Its main duty has been defined as "setting the EU's general political direction and priorities, and dealing with complex or sensitive issues that cannot be resolved at a lower level of intergovernmental cooperation" (European Council, 2013a). Making decisions related to the EU's financial resources and their allocation, representing the Union on the world stage, and dealing with complex political issues, including security and military-related issues, are among these duties.

While the Council of the EU and the Council of Europe represent nation state interests and influence on the EU, the European Parliament, as the legislative body of the EU, is constituted by elected parliamentarians from member countries. Parliamentarians elected by national elections are grouped in the EU Parliament not according to their countries but in line with their political alignments. While EU parliamentarians can defend their national interests in parliament, in processes of coalition formation and policy-setting they become part of an EU-wide political process.

The last two annual reports of the Council (European Council, 2012 and European Council, 2013b) give brief information regarding the priority areas of the Council.

The dominant theme of the reports relates to the recent global financial crisis and the measures taken by the Union to overcome it. External relations are also in focus, in accordance with the political conjuncture focusing on the Arab Spring uprisings and the recent transformations within Middle East and North Africa. Reaching a consensus among member states on these issues is also one of the roles the Council undertakes. Although a consensus usually is a prerequisite for decision-making in the Council, the dominance of the 'core' European countries can also be observed in Council practices. In this respect, speeches of the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, reflect some national interests that can hardly be defined as common ideas. Among them, the rationalization of temporary abandonments in the Schengen visa regime, the effective management of internal borders (Van Rompuy, 2011) and the "Europeanization of national policies" (Van Rompuy, 2012) are present.

The multi-level governance structure established by the EU executive and legislative bodies and other European institutions challenge the nation state from many perspectives. The adoption of the Euro as the common currency among a contingent of member states; ensuring the free movement of member states' citizens within the Schengen agreement; the coordination of agricultural policies, the customs union; and regional policies of the EU are among many examples of the challenges facing the notion of the modern nation state. The European Court of Justice, as the judiciary body of the Union, also gives decisions binding nation states and privileges EU law over national laws (Sack, 2012).

Despite the strong influence of the EU on the member and candidate states' political structures, the process of European integration is still considered to be a nation state-led project that pursues the democracy deficits of nation states, especially in terms of integrating people and political institutions (Habermas, 2012). Indeed, the influence of member nation states provides counter-evidence against the hollowing out of the state power in movement towards the supranational scale. MacLeod (1999) points to the gatekeeping role of national governments in the distribution of structural funds and the opportunistic use of them as a substitution for investments on regional development that are cut or redrawn from national budgets. Similarly, the decision-making structure of the EU is dominated by supranational and national institutions while the voice of regional authorities and institutions is excluded (MacLeod 1999).

By including the sub-national scale in the equation, the regional policies of the EU are among the policy fields in which politics of scale are observable. Introducing and supporting "internationally significant" new regional territories (Zimmerbauer, 2013, p. 90) as political actors in the European continent is an important component of the EU vision, intrinsic to the political thoughts and actions of the EC (Deas and Lord, 2006). These regional territories at the EU scale are strongly related to the ideas of the Single Market, which reduces the importance of national borders (and nation states themselves) as barriers; and competitiveness, which puts forward regional territories as the new actors with regard to competition. From these two perspectives, a link between the supranational and sub-national scales has been established that results in a rescaling, if not a hollowing out, of the nation state (MacLeod, 1999; Zimmerbauer, 2013; Dulupçu, 2005).

Structural funds provide financial resources that help to establish a link between supranational EU institutions and the regions (MacLeod, 1999), but also forces nation states for a transformation. Keating (2003) stresses that the EU's regional policies have forced nation states to transform their national administrative structures in order to be able to compete for EU structural funds; because of this, the EU's vision of regionalization has influenced the transformation of nation states.

In general, a two-sided approach is observed in the case of EU regional policies. A strong commitment to the decentralization of state power and more room for regions in the international arena are balanced with central government-oriented implementation and audit control mechanisms. The promotion of the principle of subsidiarity in the European Charter of Local Self Government (Mengi, 2007), the completion of the internal market, reforms of the allocation of the structural funds, the creation of the Committee of Regions and the allowance of some privileged regions to attend the Ministry of Council meetings (Özçelik, 2011) are among the major measures taken for strengthening the role of the regions at the EU level. However, the EU originated reforms and practices are filtered and selectively applied by the national and regional governments depending on political affiliations or already-established socio-economic structures of these regions (Sack, 2012). This argument is also supported by Sassen (2002), who argues that, although a part of nation-states' privileges and duties were transferred to supra or sub-national levels, the main decisive body is still the nation state and its constitutive institutions.

Özçelik (2011), investigating underlying explanations behind the performance of sub-national regions' at the EU level, argues that representation level and efficiency are strongly related to the national context. Again, the allocation procedures of Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) funds were intentionally centralized by the EU in order to mitigate the risk of corruption (Özçelik, 2011). Also, the prevention of political resistance to the enlargement process is a prerogative for favouring the nation state against regions.

The centralization-decentralization dichotomy of the EU's regional policies is accompanied by another dichotomy: the Keynesian, welfare redistribution approach versus Schumpeterian workfare policies.

The regional policies of the EU support a welfare redistribution approach, which favours less-developed regions and seeks to reduce regional disparities. Thus, a rescaled Keynesianism is taking place in the case of the EU. Also, the planning and construction of large-scale infrastructure projects, especially in the field of transportation, is also in line with the Keynesian welfare state approach, since these massive investments for creating spatial fixes of capital are coordinated by a single hand in a centralized manner.

However, it can also be argued that although the redistributive approach of Keynesianism prevails, the method of redistribution has shifted to promote the competition of local actors in the use of the EU funds. The redistribution of welfare is not directly managed by the EU; instead, various local actors are supported in the development of entrepreneurial projects, and compete for funding at the EU level in order to ensure necessary funding for regional development. This in turn leads to the neoliberal practices such as adoption of multi-level and networked governance mechanisms at the local scale, the establishment of enterprises such as PPPs, and the mobilization of endogenous resources to best utilize EU funds for regional development. The establishment of the regional division of countries according to the Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics (NUTS) can also be considered as an attempt to homogenize and fragment the European space in Lefebvrian terms, hence to provide evidence on the neoliberal basis of the EU's perception of subnational regions.

The existence of both tendencies together is also recognized by students of new regionalism (Scott, 2009a; Amin 1999) and pushed them to think about the role of the EU as a supranational scale in a political system dominated by nation states. Amin (1999) for example argues that endogenous growth cannot be ensured by local actors unless they are not supported by macroeconomic policies and wider networks, since the established economic structure based on regional disparities tends to favour developed regions. This is why Amin (1999, p. 376) concludes that the EU should intensify its Keynesian redistributive policies, "decoupled from ideologies", and automatize regional development funds in favour of less developed regions.

3.2 The Nation State Scale: Turkey

The transformation of the Turkish state began after the land reforms of 1858. The Land Code accepted at that date abandoned the established settlement of land as a property of the Ottoman Emperor, who gave a share of the yield in response of cultivation of Empire's Property; and settled the right of private property (İslamoğlu, 2000). The establishment of private property symbolized the state's attempt to strengthen central control over land as a primary economic resource and to increase productivity. It is also seen as an attempt to "modernize" the Ottoman administrative system in accordance with the global trend of developing capitalism.

The roots of the modern Turkish Republic were established on this ground and despite the national independence war given against the Western states; Turkey oriented itself towards Western European capitalism. By the end of World War II, the Turkish state was a NATO member closely allied with the West. From that moment onward, Turkey has been perceived as a modern, secular Muslim country in the eyes of the Western world, one considered to be an ally against the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War and a model for the Islamic countries of the region following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In return, Turkey has accepted the western tradition as an ideal to achieve, and Europeanization has become "the engine of the Turkish Modernization Project" (Dulupçu, 2005).

Starting in the 1950s, the state tradition of modern Turkey has been shaped by systemic crises of capital accumulation that resulted in the restructuring of the state, accompanied by military coups, IMF interventions in local politics and the strengthening of central-state authority (Bayırbağ, 2013).

Bayırbağ (2013) divides the history of state-rescaling in Turkey into four periods. The first one consists of the Keynesian decades of 1960-80. This period began with the military coup on the 27th of May, 1960 and ended with another military coup on September 12, 1980. This period is also known as the "planned period" with respect to the introduction of the first 5-year national development plan by the State Planning Organization (SPO) (Erkut and Sezgin, 2014). The central state was the dominant economic actor during this; the adoption of import-substitution policies was intended to jump-start industrialization and planning was considered a major form of state intervention. State subsidized industrialization contributed both to the creation of a nationalist capitalist class (Dulupçu, 2005) and the exclusion of two particular groups of society: the small-scale industrialists, who were located in the non-metropolitan areas of the country, and the migrants, who moved from rural parts of the country to metropolitan cities looking to shed peasant and farmer identities to become industrial workers, but who ultimately found themselves to be the new urban poor relegated to the fringes of the metropolitan cities (Bayırbağ, 2013). State intervention based on import-substitution industrialization resulted in the creation of a rent that was subject of struggle among Turkish bourgeoisie (Bayırbağ, 2013). Together with the increasing political opposition from the two excluded social classes, the economic crisis brought about the military coup of 1980 and the second period of state rescaling in modern Turkey along with it.

During this second period, the industrial subsidizing policies were abandoned and the first wave of neoliberal policies were introduced with assistance from the IMF, support from military, which had overtaken political power once again, and the implementation of single-party government of the ANAP (the Motherland Party, or Anavatan Partisi). The main strategy of the time was to replace the import substitution policies with strategies to integrate into the global economic market and to seek competitiveness by turning away from subsidies and towards export-oriented firms. In addition, urban agglomerations were promoted as nodes for the accumulation and distribution of financial capital, which was gaining strength ahead of productive capital. The power of the central-state was fortified with the help of the military and those who were excluded during the previous period remained excluded. That period transformed into an era of populist policies and fiscal crises during the transitory third period of 1990s. The third period is characterized by political

instability as a result of the neoliberal policies adopted earlier. This period ended with the AKP (the Justice and Development Party, or Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) coming into power in 2002. This 4th, period according to Bayırbağ (2013), is characterized by a second rise in the implementation of neoliberal policies. During the most recent period, reforms to the constitution and the adoption of many laws were associated with the continuation of the rescaling process of the Turkish state within the larger project of neoliberalization (Bayırbağ, 2013).

In sum, the history of the rescaling of the modern Turkish state, according to Bayırbağ (2013), follows a path that breaks its ties with the Keynesian policies and attaches itself to the global neoliberal agenda. In this process, an Islamic-oriented, charity-based approach was adopted, which has helped to mobilize previously excluded classes of society; specifically, small industrialists from non-metropolitan areas of Turkey and the urban poor to find support for this transformation. This process represents a non-Western context of state rescaling. Park (2013) argues that major differences among state-rescaling practices in industrialized countries of Atlantic Fordism and Third World countries originate from the economic structures of these states. While state rescaling in Western capitalist countries is based on the redistributive Keynesian welfare state and its transformation, it is difficult to argue in the same way for non-Western capitalist states. For late industrialized countries, Keynesian policies and the redistribution of wealth were not the primary concerns of the state. Instead, those states primarily aimed to "maximize the efficiency of resource allocation for national economic growth, [and] have tended to concentrate their resources in strategically selected areas (industrial complexes, growth poles, etc.)" (Park, 2013, p. 1119). Looking from the perspective of developing countries and using a centre-periphery approach, Ercan and Oğuz (2006) build on a similar argument that over- accumulated capital in the centre should be transformed to global capital and flow to periphery countries. For this purpose, especially in the periphery, a structural change needs to be made in order to best accommodate international capital. Newly internationalized capital in the periphery also requires some restructuring in order to compete at the global level, but also to sustain itself at the local level. Hence a mutual restructuring should take place, both in the centre and at the periphery.

Accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey have had significant effects on the Turkish state structure as well (Alpan and Diez, 2014). The term "EU conditionality" is used to explain the impacts of the EU on candidate states. It refers to normative values (the acquis communautaire) as well as the written requirements of the EU (e.g. Copenhagen Criteria and the Accession Partnership Documents) demanded of each candidate country as it seeks membership in the EU (Hughes et al., 2004). These accession criteria necessitate a structural transformation in the candidate states before they can become full members. During the period of accession negotiations, candidate countries are required to complete specific tasks and make certain changes, which are defined in several pertinent negotiation chapters.

In the case of Turkey, the Accession Partnership Document (Council Decision, 18 February 2008) defines 4 priority areas, namely: (1) democracy and the rule of law, (2) human rights and the protection of minorities, (3) regional issues and international obligations, and (4) economic criteria as the bases on which social and political reforms are expected to be made. Among them, the first area of concern regards public administration, which is important in terms of affecting the Turkish administrative system and state structure. Two of the action items listed under this topic are: to "pursue reform of public administration and personnel policy in order to ensure greater efficiency, accountability and transparency" and to "strengthen local administrations by reforming the central administration, devolving powers to local administrations and providing them with adequate resources" (p. L51/6). These items clearly demand that Turkey alter its state structure before becoming an EU member.

In terms of central-local relations, the European Charter of Local Self-Government (Council of Europe, 2010) is one of the key documents that implies conditionality for Turkey to decentralize its centralized state power. The Charter is the "most important European legal instrument for guaranteeing and developing local and regional democracy" (Council of Europe, 2011). Rather than being obligatory, the Charter is accepted as an advisory document that asks for more autonomy for local governments. For many scholars, it has been accepted as a key tool for the improvement of local democracy in Turkey (Keleş, 1995; Mengi, 2007; Inaç and Unal, 2007; Sertesen, 2013). Despite some reservations, the approval of the Charter, with a large majority of the MPs (174 of 183 votes) and with no opposition (Journal

of TBMM Records, 1991), shows a strong commitment to EU accession. However, there is also general agreement that there are more principles than technical obstacles ahead of implementation of the Charter in the local context; in other words, the highly centralized state structure of Turkey and contemporary legal changes were not enough to provide the necessary transformation in that field (Sertesen, 2013; Koyuncu and Sertesen, 2012; Çelik, 2013).

Turkey signed the Charter on November 21, 1988 and ratified it on December 9, 1992 with four years delay and with reservations related to specific paragraphs and articles. Turkey lists reservations related to 9 paragraphs of the Charter (the highest number of reservations among ratifying countries) (Council of Europe, 2011) that include:

> Paragraph 4.6: "Local authorities shall be consulted, insofar as possible, in due time and in an appropriate way in the planning and decision-making processes for all matters which concern them directly;"
>
> Paragraph 6.1: "Without prejudice to more general statutory provisions, local authorities shall be able to determine their own internal administrative structures in order to adapt them to local needs and ensure effective management;"
>
> Paragraph: 7.3: "Any functions and activities which are deemed incompatible with the holding of local elective office shall be determined by statute or fundamental legal principles;"
>
> Paragraph 9.4: "The financial systems on which resources available to local authorities are based shall be of a sufficiently diversified and buoyant nature to enable them to keep pace as far as practically possible with the real evolution of the cost of carrying out their tasks;"
>
> Paragraph 9.6: "Local authorities shall be consulted, in an appropriate manner, on the way in which redistributed resources are to be allocated to them;"
>
> Paragraph 9:7: "As far as possible, grants to local authorities shall not be earmarked for the financing of specific projects. The provision of grants shall not remove the basic freedom of local authorities to exercise policy discretion within their own jurisdiction;"
>
> Paragraph 10.2: "The entitlement of local authorities to belong to an association for the protection and promotion of their common interests and to belong to an international association of local authorities shall be recognised in each state;"
>
> Paragraph 10.3: "Local authorities shall be entitled, under such conditions as may be provided for by the law, to co-operate with their counterparts in other states and;"
>
> Article 11: "Local authorities shall have the right of recourse to a judicial remedy in order to secure free exercise of their powers and respect for such principles of local self-government as are enshrined in the constitution or domestic legislation."

Paragraphs 4.6, 9.4, 9.6, 9.7 and 11 are related to local-central government relations and, more broadly, the authority of the central state over local administrations. The reservation related to paragraph 4.6 is of particular importance, since it defines the conditions of intervention of the central state in local affairs (Council of Europe, 2010).

Koyuncu and Sertesen (2012) argue that the following reforms have been realized in favour of the Charter: (1) increasing size of the municipalities for efficiency purposes; (2) strengthening the decisive mechanisms of local governments; (3) improving the institutional capacities of local governments; (4) allocating new financial regulations and resources to municipalities; (5) giving new responsibilities to municipalities; (6) increasing participation and transparency in local governments; and (7) increasing efficiency.

According to Çelik (2013), the 2005 municipality law (Law Nr. 5393) has also been prepared in consideration of the Charter. However, several legal regulations and implementation practices at the central level indicate that these reforms are technical in nature and central state intervention to the local remains as a general strategy, especially on the issues related with urbanization, management of the urban rent and spatial planning (Erkut and Sezgin, 2014). Among these strategies authorizing the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanism, the Mass Housing Authority (TOKI) and the Privatization High Council for development of spatial plans in the areas they are responsible for; establishment of KÖYDES (Village Infrastructure Support Project) as a financial transfer mechanism that is used by the Unions for Bringing Services to Villages (KHGB), organizations controlled by the central government through the governors and municipal governors at the local scale could be cited (Koyuncu and Sertesen, 2012; Erkut and Sezgin, 2013). Increasing the number of metropolitan municipalities, their jurisdictional areas, and financial resources and responsibilities with the Metropolitan Municipalities Law (Law Nr. 3216) reflects this strategy, too by creating a centralized body of local government that will reduce the number of local actors (Koyuncu and Sertesen, 2012). In a broader historical context, this strategy resembles a path-dependent political tendency in Turkey, according to which central governments tend to both increase the resources and responsibilities of municipalities only when they represent

the same political party and use administrative tutelage control mechanisms as a source of hegemony in other areas (Inaç and Ünal, 2007).

Paragraphs 9.4, 9.6 and 9.7 and Chapter 9 of the Charter relate to the financial resources of local governments. Sertesen (2013) argues that the necessary legal changes are already in place, and technically, there is no present challenge to ratifying Paragraph 9.6 and 9.7. However, according to Çelik (2013), Article 73 of the Turkish Constitution continues to contradict the Charter, since it gives authority to the central state to define local government taxes. Moreover, the allocation of resources, especially for big projects, is still an issue that is centrally controlled despite the provisions to the contrary within Paragraph 9.7 (Erkut and Sezgin, 2014). Among the reasons for strict central control of financial resources tied to local authorities in Turkey, central government distrust of municipalities (Inaç and Ünal, 2007) and using financial resources for rewarding same political party municipalities and punishing opposition party municipalities as an established tradition (Çelik, 2013) could be cited.

Article 10 alludes to the right to establish unions between local governments. Paragraphs 10.2 and 10.3 are related to transnational unions and cooperation. In general reservations on them exist in several countries in conflict with their neighbours (Council of Europe, 2011). Concerns regarding the threats to national unity are also mentioned (The Ministry for EU Affairs, 2011). Although Sister City Agreements and CBC programmes are implemented among local authorities, they ultimately have to be approved by the Ministry of Interior prior to full implementation (Inaç and Ünal, 2007).

The current status of ratified articles and paragraphs is as important to discuss as the status of unratified articles. Çelik's (2013) study gives significant clues regarding how ratified articles were received in Turkey. One of Çelik's (2013) arguments is concerned with Article 3, which defines local autonomy. According to him, although means for representative democracy (e.g. the citizenry law, city councils, and voluntary participation and supervision commissions) have been established, sources for direct democracy (e.g. citizen initiatives, referendums and recall) are missing. Another poor implementation area is election criteria defined by Article 3 of the Charter. In Turkey, although the mayors of municipalities are elected directly, there are two main constraints that compromise the full application of this article. First,

depending on the size of the municipality, it is the legal right of the Minister of Interior or the Governor to appoint a replacement if the post of the mayor is emptied for any reason. Second, according to the Charter, the municipal council (belediye encümeni should be directly elected by the citizens. However, in the Turkish case, the council consists of both elected and appointed members, which is contradictory with the Charter (Çelik, 2013). Indeed, the existence of a dual local government structure, constituted by mayors as the locally elected politicians and governors as appointed officials by the central government itself, is contradictory with the Charter; specifically, with Paragraph 4.4 which states that "[P]owers given to local authorities shall normally be full and exclusive. They may not be undermined or limited by another, central or regional, authority except as provided for by the law" (Council of Europe, 2010). The existence of a parallel local government body prevents the elected local governments from exercising their power "full[y] and exclusively".

The first attempts to reform the administrative structure in Turkey via the Base Law on Public Administration were directly associated with the decentralization of public administration in accordance with the European Charter of Local Self- Government. That first attempt failed after the then president of Turkish Republic vetoed it. The reasons behind the veto stem from perceived inconsistency with the Turkish Constitution, with the charge that the reform initiative attempted to change the established state structure and degraded the central state by putting the local governments in the front line of politics (Mengi, 2007).

The 5-year development plans prepared by the State Planning Organization (The Ministry of Development after 2013) constitute a second case for examining the transformation of the Turkish state structure with regard to EU conditionality. The 7th Five-Year National Development Plan, covering the period between 1996- 2000, corresponds to an era during which attempts by Turkey to join the EU were intensified. Because of this, the necessity to reformulate the division of labour between the central and local governments in a way that delivers the majority of central state duties to local authorities, and gives more financial resources to local administrations, was stressed in the plan (Mengi, 2007). Developing a general framework for public administration reform (p. 130); making changes and amendments to several laws (p. 120); developing law that enables inter-local cooperation (p. 131); and establishing Provincial Local Governments for the purpose

of coordination between different local governance bodies (p. 132) are among the objectives introduced in the plan (SPO, 1995) associated with EU conditionality and the rescaling of the Turkish state. In anticipation of separatist claims, the unitary structure of the state and the dependence of local authority on central authority were also emphasized in this plan (SPO, 1995, p. 130, 174).

The 8th Five-Year Development Plan (SPO, 2000) is the first plan where a whole chapter (Chapter 5) is devoted to EU policies and their impact on Turkey and the plan itself. In Chapter 5, it is stated that the EU accession process will be accepted as the engine of Turkey's move towards globalization, and that all necessary precautions and institutional reforms regarding the EU accession process should be immediately taken. Reform of the public administration system still takes a central place in planning policies (p. 191, see also Mengi, 2007), and emphasis on the unitary structure of the state persists as well (p. 198). However, the stress on the decentralization of the state structure has been reduced and the chapter detailing regional policies (Chapter 7) has been devoted to reducing regional disparities, which is also a part of harmonization with the EU acquis. Two major decisions in the plan include: (1) the use of foreign credits, grants and technical implements should be allowed in accordance with centrally defined regulations (p. 199); and (2) foundations established by public authorities should not be allowed to perform public service activities, and those that are used to allocate public finance for these purposes should be abolished (p. 192). The first stipulation is important to the use of EU structural instruments, and can be perceived as part of conditionality that opens the way for CBC. On the other hand, the latter stipulation is of considerable importance to state-rescaling practices since, as stated by Bayırbağ (2013), these foundations have led to the creation of state tools for implementing Islamic charity policies as a part of state rescaling in Turkey. The debate on the transformation of the state structure could be extended over this argument. The 8th Plan was prepared during the coalition government of secular central and leftist parties and corresponds to the unstable transition period and rise of the Islamic AKP in Bayırbağ's (2013) historical description. Hence the Plan's preparation period reflects traces of strong nationalistic ideology and the desire to maintain control over local politics. In addition, the implementation period corresponds to the first years of the AKP government and the structural rescaling of the Turkish state towards neoliberalization, where publicly

owned foundations take on an important role (Bayırbağ, 2013). As discussed in the following chapters, publicly owned foundations are also of considerable importance for CBC.

The 9th Development Plan itself mirrors the European integration process, since its implementation term was harmonized with the EU agenda and covered the same policy period of 2007-2013 (SPO, 2006). The plan makes a commitment to the EU integration process, calls for urgent regulations in the legal area and adopts a vision that targets reforms with an eye to a post-accession reality (p. 12). Most of the EU negotiation chapters are also chapters within this development plan. The establishment of a legal structure necessary for the use of pre-accession instruments is also among the targets of the plan; however, the stress on decentralization and the need to reform public administration bodies is not central to the plan. Here, the centre of focus is on defining the duties and the division of labour between central and local bodies. This time, the regional/local focus is on the improvement of the institutional capacity of local governments and on the development of measures to improve their performance. Here, the emphasis is on a bottom-up, regional development approach, designed to: increase overall performance (p. 46); maximize the use of indigenous resources for development within relevant regions (p. 46); increase competitiveness (p. 46, p. 91); and establish Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) (p. 47). The establishment of project departments in provinces eligible for EU funding and the increasing of institutional capacity to better absorb funds are also critical components (p. 48). The dominance of the new regionalist perspective in regional policies again are a part of the structural rescaling of the state of Turkey. For the first time, the regional/local scale is conceptualised by the plan as a competitive economic unit, aligning the country's regional policies with the new regionalist theory and a neoliberal agenda (Bayırbağ, 2013; Dulupçu, 2005). However, consideration of the issue from a purely economic perspective and an unwillingness to enhance local authorities with the necessary political power and autonomy to compete reflects traces of a strong central state tradition and supports the arguments of Bayırbağ (2013) that the policymaking power within the Turkish state is concentrated in the hands of the central government, with policy implementation alone left to the local governments.

The 10th Development Plan (Ministry of Development, 2013) prepared for the period of 2014- 2018 is again focused on increasing competitiveness at the regional level and improving the performance of local governments; the plan furthers the new regionalist approach and the structural rescaling process of the nation state adopted in the previous plan. Increasing the number of metropolitan municipalities while decreasing the total number of municipalities and putting metropolitan cities on the front line of national and global competitiveness (p. 13, p. 152); increasing the performance of local administrations and public organizations (p. 26, p. 56); and increasing the efficiency of Regional Development Agencies established during the previous planning period (p. 27, p. 144) are the key strategies of the plan with regard to regional development policies. The decentralization of state power goes almost unmentioned in the 10th Plan, and public administration reform is not mentioned at all, despite it not having been completed during the previous planning period. In contrast, a reorganization and fortification of central state power is observable in policies such as:

- The reorganization of the cabinet - abolishing some ministries and creating new ones for better provision of public services - and improving general performance by adopting strategic planning and performance measurement approaches (p. 26);
- The establishment of the High Commission for Regional Development and the Regional Development Committee at the central level for the coordination and monitoring of regional development policies and plans (p. 27, p. 139);
- The reorganization of the Law of Foundations (p. 41);
- The preparation of the Regional Development National Strategy as a framework and reference point for regional development plans (p. 142);
- The strengthening of the coordinating role of RDAs between the national and local levels (p. 144);
- The management and coordination of IPA funds according to the needs and priorities of regions, in a manner that complements national resources (p. 144);

- The appointment of the Ministry of Environment and Urbanism as the authority to set basic principles, strategies and standards in the preparation of spatial plans at all scales (p. 145); and
- The use of EU financial assistance in accordance with national priorities (p. 166).

Concerning EU candidacy and conditionality, the 10th Development Plan adopts a low profile (TBMM, 2013, pp. 34-38). Although EU membership is mentioned as one of the main targets of the forthcoming planning period (p. 10, p. 164, p. 166), a critical approach towards the EU exists, where it is argued that the EU failed to actionably mediate the global economic crisis and experienced an institutional crisis stemming from structural vulnerabilities, thereby calling attention to the need for internal reform of its own (pp. 9-10). Consequently, detractors have argued that Turkey should develop alternative regarding EU membership (p. 10). Also, the role of Turkey in other global and regional alliances should be reconsidered in order to give these partnerships a higher priority (p. 10, p. 168, p. 220). The role of the Customs Union Agreement with the EU is considered as a hindering factor in this respect (p. 10, p. 166), although no particular measure has been taken to address this issue. Particular importance is given to increasing the institutional capacity of public organization towards better absorption of IPA funds as well as other international funds (p. 141, p. 144) and capacitating border regions to handle CBC (p. 143) in accordance with the structural rescaling of the state.

As the examination of the development plans demonstrates, Turkey has experienced a clear transformation of policies from the Keynesian welfare state model towards neoliberal policies based on competition and integration into the global capitalist system. The orientation of public administration trends towards a performance measurement-based model has resulted in the development of three main pillars of the structural rescaling of Turkey. These include: (1) technical and institutional capacitation, where the number of public sector employees is significantly reduced and replaced by private sector actors through outsourcing; (2) the application of strategic planning and performance measurement criteria to local governments; and (3) the strengthening of central state power over local bodies through coordinating and provisioning of central institutions.

3.3 Regions in Turkey: A Scale in the Making

Although several definitions of "region" such as geographical regions, functional regions, planning regions and water basin regions exist, the regional scale in Turkey has never been identified as an administrative scale. The modern Turkish Republic has ignored regions as administrative and political units for several reasons. First the establishment of the Republic after the Independence War in 1923 was based on the roots of the modernism and nationalism, the zeitgeist of the early 20th century in the Western part of the world. In this sense, an indivisible and homogenous nation has been viewed as a way of survival and also as a response to the massive loss of land endured by the Ottoman Empire in the preceding period. The solution adopted by national elites of the newly born republic included the invention and imposition of a national identity throughout the country in order to eliminate any possibility of separatism emanating from local, regional or ethnic identities (Dulupçu, 2005; Şengül, 2009). Second, during the Cold War, Turkey was fortified as the final frontier against the Soviet Bloc through its alliance with the West and NATO, which also entrenched the power of the unitary nation state. Anti- communist propaganda was used by central authorities to eliminate any regional identity that could have nourished a nascent separatist movement (Dulupçu, 2005). The civil war between the Turkish Republic and the then-separatist Kurdish movement also contributed to the solidification of the central state in opposition to local sources of power, which was predicated on the argument that any power delivered to local actors would be manipulated by Kurds living in the eastern and south-eastern provinces. Third, the economic structure inherited from the Ottoman Empire contributed to the centralization of the state. During the establishment of the Republic, an already established industrial infrastructure and strong capitalist class capable of undergirding a national economy were absent. So, the nation state had to intervene and re-orient the economy, as well as support the rise of a particular group of society and become the new capitalist class of the country. As a result, the business elites of Turkey developed in a state-oriented way, ignoring their respective local and regional ties. A second result was the development of a central state bureaucracy and a consequent dependency on it, growing in expense of local politicians and politics (Dulupçu, 2005).

After the 1980s, the strength of municipalities, particularly metropolitan municipalities, has increased as a part of the state-rescaling process within Turkey. This implies an increase in their financial capacity but not necessarily in their financial autonomy. During this time, the strength of the mayors vis-á-vis municipal councils also increased as part of an intentional neoliberal strategy that positioned mayors as urban entrepreneurs who would help accumulate financial capital in urban areas (Bayırbağ, 2013). Indeed, beginning with the planned period of the 1960s, the local scale, in the form of municipalities, played an important role in reshaping the state structure of modern Turkey. The main reason for this was their ability to represent those who were excluded from the mechanisms of sharing wealth (Bayırbağ, 2013). As a result, the rise of particular political parties during the history in modern Turkey has first found its roots in their success in the local elections and relatively successful experience of municipal government.

Consequently it can be argued that although the central state is very powerful in Turkey, structurally the roots of its power lie in political influence at the local scale. Hence, party politics and success in municipal governance are not only keys to influence at the local level, but are important at the national scale as well. The nature of centre-local relations in Turkey is also important to the local scale. Turkish local authorities prefer to rely on high politics and their connections in Ankara instead of mobilizing local resources to solve issues that arise (Dulupçu, 2005). Moreover, Bayırbağ (2013) argues that the rise of a charity-based, social policy approach led by political parties with Islamic tendencies has resulted in successes in local elections. In turn, this trend was rescaled upwards and evolved into a national policy by the AKP, a descendent of this vein of political thought. Another important sign of the importance of municipalities at the local scale is observable in the provinces of eastern and south-eastern Turkey, which are inhabited by a sizable Kurdish population. Because representation in parliament requires a 10% electoral threshold, political parties representing the Kurdish population have gained only limited access to the parliament. This has turned local elections and municipalities into an arena of political representation for the Kurdish population. In this respect, Kurds have begun to reverse political oppression through the acquisition of control over municipalities (Özsökmenler, 2014).

The strength of the local scale has been placed under the control of the central state by way of two means. First, is through control over financial resources. The fiscal autonomy of municipalities is restricted and a large share of their income comes from the central government. In recent years, the share of the national budget transferred to municipalities has increased significantly (Bayırbağ, 2013). However, this was accompanied by the centralization of the policymaking process, leaving room to municipalities for policy implementation alone, as is evident in the centralization of charity-based, social support mechanisms. Second, the mayors are not the sole authorities responsible for their cities or districts. The local government is shared by mayors and governors alike. While the first is an elected body representing local interests, the latter is an appointed official representing state interests at the local level.

Under these conditions, Turkey's administrative structure remains central state-dominant, giving little autonomy and authority to sub-national governments. In this respect, it has a de-concentrated structure, where local governments are obliged to perform their defined duties under state surveillance and with extensive, financial dependency on the central state. The limited decentralization of the Turkish state resembles the "decentralization of administration", where some of the functions of the central state are transferred to local and regional institutions and accompanied by a certain amount of financial resources meant to ensure the implantation of central government policies in a more efficient way instead of "decentralization of choice", where policies are determined at the local level (MacLeod, 1999).

Turkish regional policies are strongly related to the restructuring of the nation state and rescaling of state power. According to Dulupçu (2005) the driving force of this restructuring originates at the supranational scale, especially where the EU is involved. Indeed, regional policies entered the Turkish political agenda as a part of EU conditionality requirements; and the regional scale has been imposed on Turkey artificially by the EU. Dulupçu (2005) argues that this can be explained by the symbiotic relationship between the EU and the regional level: "… as 'hollowing out' implies, the upwards power shift could not be effective unless accompanied by a downward shift" (p. 104).

Engaged with 'Europe' over a long period of time and having adopted Europeanization as the leitmotif behind its modernization and development project,

Turkey has accepted almost as natural the existence of the EU as a supranational power that has the right to intervene in the political domain of the country. Therefore the delivery of power from the national to the supranational scale has been realized with limited resistance at the central-state level (Dulupçu, 2005). Unlikely however, downward rescaling met significant resistance; and delivering of state power towards provincial or regional level remained very limited. Any development that has happened occurred only because of the pressures of the EU towards decentralization (Dulupçu, 2005).

According to Dulupçu (2005), a transfer of state power in Turkey to the supranational scale is relatively easy because of the "coherent, predictable and manageable structure of such scales" (Dulupçu, 2005, p. 104), whereas the transfer of power to the sub-national level remains a challenge, the results of which are unpredictable. However, an upward shift of state power cannot be effective without being accompanied by a simultaneous downward shift. In this sense, the Turkish Republic is experiencing a restructuring process where only one component (rescaling upwards) has been pursued voluntarily while the other component (rescaling downwards) has been enforced by the EU. For Mengi (2007), who also argues in the same vein the main EU policies that directly affect the regional scale include issues such as spatial planning, environmental protection, election and transportation. The EU is also influential on the regional scale via the structural funds and the financial resources allocated to it. In addition, the EU structure gives the opportunity to regions to be influential on the EU. Through advisory bodies such as the Committee of Regions, the Association of European Regions and the Association of Border Regions, regions are able to have their voices heard at the EU level. Bayırbağ (2013), without rejecting the top-down approach, contributes to the debate by asserting that the reconstruction of the Turkish state should not only be perceived using top-down or bottom-up perspectives, and that a structural transformation is also taking place, which is a part of the rescaling process at the national scale.

The introduction of the NUTS system in Turkey is one of the most significant examples of the transformative effects of EU conditionality on the Turkish state structure. The NUTS division of the EU , although with statistical purposes, imposes a top-down decided regional hierarchy. The direct allocation of structural funds to

NUTS regions instead of the locally established administrative divisions requires the transformation of nation states in order to comply with EU funding stipulations.

The criteria of grouping of provinces in NUTS regions are defined as being neighbouring provinces bearing economic, social and geographic similarities, populations and pre-existing regional development plans (Council of Ministers, 2002). In the case of Turkey, the decisive criteria, the current grouping of provinces and the role of RDAs have been criticized by many voices. Öztürk (2009), for example, argues that decisive criteria used to define the regions were selected in a pragmatic way, where some provinces are grouped according to their socio-economic similarities and some others according to pure geographic criteria. Such an inconsistent approach has caused the establishment of artificial regions that, consequently, are difficult to integrate.

The establishment of RDAs at the NUTS2 level in Turkey reflects the consistency of EU and Turkish regional policies. Both of these scales adopt the same regional development approach based on reducing regional disparities through the mobilization of endogenous resources. On the other hand, as observed through analysis of the European Charter for Local Self-Government, their conceptualisation of the region as a political scale does not overlap. While the EU has stressed the need for more autonomy in the regions and recognizes their representation within the EU institutional structure, Turkey has resisted decentralizing state power. Within this dichotomy, the regional scale becomes the subject of national and supranational politics, but it also asserts its own historical and social conditions in the newly establishing institutional structure.

3.4 Border Regions and Cross Border Cooperation as a Field of Politics of Scale

> The creation of a border sets the scene for new power relations in the borderland, based on new local definitions of social and territorial boundaries, and new confrontation between social groups. (Baud and Van Schendel, 1997, p.220).

Although national boundaries in the European continent are by large established and border redrawing is limited, within the context of European enlargement and integration the change in the meaning of existing boundaries and the construction of new bordering practices -- such as the fortification of the EU with a mechanism like

FRONTEX -- open the doors for reconsidering the above paragraph within that new context. While the meaning of boundaries is in flux, the "scene for new power relations" is being reconfigured. New local definitions include varying types of cross-border interactions triggered by internal and external dynamics. On the one hand, the retreat of the Keynesian welfare state and the rise of the Schumpeterian competitive state (Moisio and Paasi, 2013) have pushed sub-national regions in a state of competition at the global scale to attract more capital and investment and transform it into infrastructure investment development and improvement in quality of life. To gain a competitive advantage, regions should pursue opportunities and leverage their comparative advantages, as suggested by new regionalism. In the case of border regions, an important internal advantage emerges in their externalities (i.e. in the international interactions in which they participate as a result of geographic proximity to a nation-state boundary). Traditionally border regions have always used their geographic location as an economic resource (Martinez, 1994; O'Dowd, 2003) either within a national, legal framework where this is allowed or through illegal means in case of strong alienation. However, global dynamics and the need to compete have formed a "new scene", despite unchanging methods of interaction. Now, cross-border interactions do not simply mean an economic resource added to centre state investments in border regions, but they constitute an internal competitive factor, the use of which is considered to be a legitimate right.

Meanwhile, border regions are pushed into a state of competition, and able to utilize specific tools that result from national and supranational dynamics and political decisions. CBC and cross-border regionalism, in the case of the EU, are among such tools. They can be viewed as a result of supranational-level politics, as they reflect a wider commitment to European integration and European regionalism. They can also be considered to be a result of national politics as being granted as a part of negotiations between a particular nation- state and the EU. The introduction of new tools such as these contributes to the re-setting of the scene. Again, national boundaries remain at their original geographical coordinates, but also manage to impose new meanings and symbology. Particularly in Europe, as Ricq (2006) argues, border regions build a new level of transfrontier awareness, culture and identity which blend -- but do not ignore -- regional, national and even European identities.

The scholarly interest in border regions and CBC reflects these transformations within state structure and global politics. The 'border' in contemporary studies has been the subject of investigation with ever-increasing intensity over the past 20 years. The main point of the interest in border studies is 'change' that is strongly related to globalization and its impact on the nation state. The end of the Cold War, the intensified movement of people, capital and services -- in sum, the components of 'globalization' – have become the subjects of different research fields ranging from political geography to economics and sociology. During the 1990s, the mainstream interest in borders was associated with the newly emerging "borderless world", which was seen as emerging from globalization and the decreasing significance of nation states (Johnson et al., 2011). The motto "from barriers to bridges", also extensively used by the EU, symbolized the changing role of borders and border regions in this context. Accordingly, the barrier effect of borders was declining and the border regions were becoming the experimental zones of the integration of societies and the EU. To give an example, Niebuhr (2006) studies the relationship between market access and development in border regions (see also Brülhart et al., 2002). According to her, in economic terms, border regions are situated in areas with limited market access, since half of their market potential is blocked by political borders. This factor discourages firms for locating in these areas and leads to a decrease in border regions' density of economic activities (i.e. they remain in the periphery of national economies) (Niebuhr, 2006; Eskelinen and Snickars, 1995). However, after their integration with a single European market, these regions' peripherality shifts towards a more central position in economic terms.

However, that approach has been criticised by studies focusing on another functional shift of borders and border regions. The counterproposal suggests that the barrier function of borders has diminished for some types of economic flows, but still remains intact for others. It is a "selective porosity process" that, unless it does not intent to allow completely closed to any kind of flow, decreases its porosity, starting from the centre instead of the periphery. Accordingly, barriers have been reconstructed at supranational and national levels with the imposition of immigration raids and custom tariffs (Johnson et al., 2011). Borders did not evaporate but instead, extended to everywhere at once (Balibar, 1998). The motto of the US Department of Homeland Security: "Secure Borders, Open Doors" (Johnson et al., 2011)

symbolizes this emergent gatekeeping role of nation states, which functions to limit threats such as illegal immigrants, but almost nullifies itself in the face of continuously flowing capital. The construction of 28 border walls throughout the world by 2009 is evidence of the increasing, rather than decreasing, porosity of borders (Johnson et al., 2011).

In the case of the EU, this process is more complicated. Agreements, such as the Schengen Agreement, legally diminish the boundaries within the EU and allow free flows of all kinds. However, this is not what is happening in practice. First of all, it is the case that new member country residents, which currently include Bulgaria and Romania, are allowed to move around the European Union, but not allowed to live and work in non-native countries. The prohibition against working was also in place for some Southeast European (SEE) countries for the period after their accession to the Schengen area. The basic motivation for this segregation lies in the wage differences between countries, and the potential causes of unemployment in local markets of high-income member countries. Accordingly, at the nation state and supranational levels, borders are not diminishing for everyone, but only for those kinds of movements that serve for endurance of capital accumulation.

The porosity of borders has also been questioned at the local level. The case of European integration shows remarkable examples of a multi-character social structure that seeks to adapt to the changing conditions within border regions. Dürschmidt's (2002, 2006) research on bordering narratives highlights that demolishing borders are not solely enough to generate integration and change every day bordering practices. What is commonly seen in the milieu is the increasing use of the other side of the border as a resource, which can be viewed as a form of border management. This does not only apply in economic terms, where individuals trade or offer their services to make a profit from factor motilities, but also in cultural terms as status production, which results in the satisfaction of low and middle classes of relatively wealthy countries.

The "social construction of borders" argument, of which Dürschmit's (2006) research constitutes an example, suggests that everyday practices in borderlands, together with historical, ethnic discourses and/or geographic constraints, give not only symbolic, but also practical meaning to borders and border regions (Paasi, 1999). Hence, borders should not be understood as simple lines on a map, but pools

of collective emotions such as fears and memories that can be mobilized either for regressive or aggressive purposes. Johnson et al. (2011) argue that private actors, such as the media, businesses and citizens, are involved in the process of making borders, and borders are now seen as processes, practices, discourses, symbols, institutions and/or networks through which power works. Within an actor-oriented approach, individuals do not only constitute a scale among others, but they also are agents that construct borders in different scales such as 'local phenomena, [the] nation state edge or [the] transnational staging post'. Citizens, entrepreneurs and NGO members are among these agents who 'are active in constructing, shifting or even erasing borders' (Johnson et al., 2011, p. 7).

While the location and meaning of borders is undergoing transformation, cross-border interactions in borderlands also have become part of the overall process. These interactions, ranging from trade and smuggling to kinship relations, take an institutionalized shape with the CBC programmes of the EU to be used for regional development and integration purposes. Involving multiple scales, CBC in the EU has spread to several sectors and policy fields. The Trans-European Networks-Transportation (TEN-T) projects, for example, mainly serve to improve transportation infrastructure in order to realize the overarching goal of European competitiveness, job creation and cohesion (Trans European Transport Network Executive Agency, 2013). These targets are synchronized by the Commission Policies, which call for the completion of the European internal market, development of an agenda for innovation, construction of the EU's core trans-European infrastructure network and defence of EU political and industrial interests on the world stage, within international organizations and with strategic partnerships (EC Mobility and Transport Directorate General, 2013). In the science and technology policy some CBC initiatives, such as researcher mobility projects or setting digital agendas for cross-border public services have been addressed. Under the Justice and Citizens' Rights Policy judicial cooperation on security and crime prevention are the main areas of cooperation at the national scale. Also the abolishment of internal borders with the Schengen Visa Regime and the introduction of common visa procedures at the external borders of the EU are among the policies and procedures that have had indirect effects on CBC. Trans-national cooperation has also been achieved in the field of energy under the Trans European Energy Networks (TEN-E).

CBC projects in the energy policy area cover feasibility studies on gas interconnections, infrastructure investments on storage and interconnection and social and environmental impact assessment studies (EC, 2013a). CBC is also used to improve relations between non-EU, neighbouring countries and the EU under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Sixteen countries that geographically are in the vicinity of the EU, including Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine, are subject to this policy and are involved in cooperation with the EU under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). ENP also supports cooperation between these countries. Further cooperation has been generated through regional initiatives of the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean and Black Sea Synergy programmes. The institutional structure of CBC is embedded in existing institutional cooperation bodies such as the Council of Europe, the Baltic Sea Council, the Central European Initiative, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and Euroregions, and it is argued that no further institutions are needed for CBC (EC, 2013b). CBC with neighbouring countries covers themes such as political dialogue and reform, trade and economic reform, equitable social and economic development, justice and home affairs, energy, transportation, information society, environment, research and innovation, the development of civil society and people-to-people contact (Regulation (Ec) No 1638/2006, 2006).

CBC generates external effects that enable border regions to establish cross-border linkages, which connects them to the wider European network of growth poles (Van der Veen and Boot, 2009). Together with other additional effects, such as shorter distances and faster movements, these externalities generate a competitive framework created with the help of CBC that increase the competitiveness of border regions.

However, CBC and the "borderless Europe" rhetoric is argued to be employed by European nation state leaders to demonstrate official devotedness to the EU ideals and at the same time to cover "hidden" agendas mainly in economic nature and in harmony with the nation state policies (Haller, 2005). The case studies of Haller (2005) on Gibraltar, where Spain and the United Kingdom come side by side and of Gkintidis (2013) on Greek-Turkish border regions give considerable weight to

arguments related to these aspects of CBC from a state-centric point of view. In both cases the involved states make use of CBC and transnational interactions in border regions to promote national politics. Klatt's (2006) study on the Danish-German border regions suggests that the "hidden agenda" argument is not the sole property of national and international politics, but is a phenomena employed and socially constructed at the local level as well. In this case, an attempt to establish a cross-border region by local authorities is faced with resistance by local people, who blame the other side of having a hidden agenda with expansive purposes. Klatt (2006) argues that the resistance is not to CBC, but to cross-border regionalism, which diminishes the importance of the border and endangers socially constructed national unities. For Perkmann, CBC is a policy field that should be considered as a state action. However, he also admits that although it is not possible to speak about a challenge to the sovereignty of the nation state, "it points to the changing nature of the statehood" (1999, p. 665).

4. INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICS OF SCALE

4.1 How to Understand Institutionalization?

4.1.1 Institutionalization of regions

Paasi, in his study on the Finnish- Russian border region (1996, p. 233), indicates that the phenomenon called "local life" is not simply local as far as social and political consequences and contexts are concerned. Rather local life tends to exceed the defined borders of a region. In this sense, Paasi cites Thrift's argument that "a region is lived through, not in" (Paasi, 1986, p.108); indeed, people live and experience their region in very different locales than each other. This is the source of the main question Paasi attempts to answer in his study on the institutionalization of regions: if the borders of a region are not fixed and eternal, how then should regions be defined?

Institutionalization of regions is a concept developed by Paasi (1986 and 1996) for understanding both the emergence and transformation of regions as sub-national spatial units and their establishment as a part of a wider regional structure. Here, institutionalization is perceived as a process in which "specific territorial units – on various spatial scales – emerge and become established as parts of the regional system in question and the socio- spatial consciousness prevailing in society" (Paasi, 1996, p. 32). Since socio-spatial consciousness is also a process subject to continuous change, which depends on the "social practices and inherent power relations that are derived from simultaneous interaction between different levels of social processes" (p. 33), the institutionalization of regions is not conceptualized as a process with an end, but as an unending and dynamic process. During this process, social practices in economics, politics and administration are "produced and reproduced consciously and unconsciously by the people [in a way that reflects the] spatial divisions of labour and power relations that are embedded within it" (p. 34).

The institutionalization of regions, as conceptualized by Paasi (1986, 1996) defines the process in four simultaneous stages:

(1) The constitution of territorial shape: The territorial shape of a region is defined through its borders and is manifested through identification within the wider regional structure. This is the stage where the region is established through the "localization of social practices [and is] identified as a distinct unit on some scale of spatial structure" (Paasi, 1996, p. 34). This is a process that is highly affected by the power structure in the society in general and that power structure's manifestation in political, economic and administrative institutions. The definition of physical and mental boundaries of the region is also necessary for providing "a basis of social classification" (Paasi, 1986, p. 124).

(2) The constitution of symbolic shape: The symbols for "expressing and demarcating the territory" (Paasi, 1996, p. 34) are established in this stage. These symbols are "abstract expressions of supposed group solidarity, embodying the actions of political, economic administrative and cultural institutions in the continual reproduction and legitimation of the system of practices that constitute and demarcate the territorial unit concerned" (Paasi, 1996, p. 34). The symbolic shape of the territory provides a framework for the formation of the structure of expectations within a given region (see below). Although symbolic shape is an integral part of the institutionalization of a region, it is not fully produced within the internal dynamics of a region. Instead, the wider social structure, including institutions from different scales or other regions, is also influential in the formation of the symbolic shape.

(3) The constitution of institutions: The emergence of institutions and institutionalized practices in the social consciousness through the continuous use of symbols and day-to-day activities is the third stage of the institutionalization process. Institutions, according to Paasi, are means for the socialization of individuals and groups, which leads to the production and reproduction of social structures via membership and identity. This stage, as well as the others, is part of a continuum that creates new institutions as well as interrupts and transforms the working processes of older ones. Institutions simultaneously provide the material basis for the solidification of territorial symbols and identities (the symbolic shape) and serve to reproduce power relations that are influential on the institutionalization of regions. In this respect, the formal education system, the mass media and the regional literature are institutions of particular importance for the institutionalization of regions, since

they are institutions that "shape and control the content of the symbolic environment" (Paasi, 1986, p. 128) of the regions.

(4) The establishment of territorial unit in the regional structure and social consciousness: Finally, the establishment of a region occurs as a product of previous phases, but does not necessarily take the form of an administrative sub-national unit. Rather, for Paasi, the establishment of the region is an abstraction of the whole institutionalization process within the social consciousness, which is perpetually reproduced through social interactions and power relations. Paasi (1986) considers the social consciousness analogous with regional identity (see below).

Figure 4.1 briefly conceptualizes the process, where territorial shape, symbolic shape, institutional shape and the established role of regions constitute the four pillars of the institutionalization of regions.



Figure 4.1 : A conceptualization of the process of the institutionalization of regions (Paasi, 1996, p.34).

Four features of the process of institutionalization of regions are of particular importance to this study. First is the role of particular social groups within identity formation and institutionalization processes. The institutionalization of regions, described as resting on a continuum, is at most reproduced through the identity of the region. The identity of a region is another abstraction that, according to Paasi, differs from regional identity (i.e. the regional consciousness of the people living in it). Regional identity is a part of the identity of the region, together with the "images of the region in the inhabitants and other people living outside the region, and material and symbolic features of the region as parts of the ongoing process of social reproduction" (Paasi, 1996, p. 36). In other terms, if regional identity is the history of daily life, then the identity of a region would be the long-term history of institutions

within the region. In the process of institutionalization, the identity of the region and the way in which it is reproduced in society play an important role. Paasi (1996) evaluates the role of society in the process of reproduction in two respects. First, there is an 'ideal' community arising from the division of labour in society. Politicians, journalists, business elites and representatives of tourism within this division of labour are defined as the idealized social groups that reproduce the identity of the region in a way that allows it to "maintain the hegemonic structures of society" (Paasi, 1996, p. 37). The perception of a particular region by different parts of society is also shaped by the actions of these social groups. Second, 'factual' society maintains already-established social structures through day-to-day practices, and contributes to the institutionalization of regions in real life. The first group are the elites of the society, who take part not only in the local practices of the institutionalization of the region, but also establish links between the upper administrative tiers and their politics. As the state remains the "central apparatus" in the process of the institutionalization of regions (Paasi, 1996, p. 37) the role the elites undertake appears as a state rescaling practice in which the mentality of another scale inserts itself to the regional scale and vice versa.

The second feature is the role of institutions in the process of institutionalization. Individuals -- whether elites or not -- have limited power and influence on the transformative processes of social structure. Moreover their interest in these processes is also limited, as their day-to-day practices rarely include action against changing the social structure or a conscious tendency towards reproducing it. For Paasi (1986, p. 109), the reproduction of the social structure is a process that takes place within the interactions between institutions and individuals: "[institutions] form dynamic, hierarchically organized structures around the human beings, in spite of the fact that these institutions are constituted and reproduced in human practice". Institutions in this process perform a mediatory role wherein they do not necessarily possess power, but reflect the existing power structure of the society. Regions, according to Paasi (1986), emerge from the interplay between institutions and individuals. The next chapter of this study is going to assess how institutions produce and reproduce the institutional structure of CBC within this framework.

A third feature of the study of Paasi (1986) focuses on the conceptualization of the "structure of expectations". The structure of expectations for Paasi reflects

commonly recognized social practices that generate a particular social experience, a specific lifestyle and a space-bound feeling of community that "refers to the physical and the cultural character of a region". The structure of expectations: (1) "facilitates an understanding of the special character of regions"; (2) is essential for the agency of institutions in the transformation of regions; (3) provides legitimacy for individual and institutional actions; (4) "provides a conceptual basis for the historical analysis of the formation of images of the region"; and (5) requires the prior formation of institutions for reproducing and maintaining them (Paasi, 1986, p. 123). These properties of the structure of expectations provide a basis for the conceptualization of CBC as a structure of expectations. The immediately emerging question is whether CBC is able to become a structure of expectations that provides a local community a unanimous, legitimate way of living that has a transformative influence over institutions and the social structure of the region in general.

Fourth, during the stage of formation of the institutional shape, Paasi (1986, p. 129) highlights the transformation of nature "from a basis for material production, exchange and consumption, to a more abstract manifestation in the form of a landscape with a symbolic (aesthetic) role". The transformation of nature to produce and reproduce regional consciousness as well as a structure of expectations is considered part and parcel of the institutional shape of the region, since it allows the manifestation and visualization of the symbolic meaning of the region over space. Visualization is an important part of CBC as well. Through signs such as flags and shields, the construction of infrastructure and leisure facilities, each project contributes to the visualization of CBC and its symbolic manifestation over space.

Within the CBC literature, perhaps Blatter's (2003 and 2004) study on cross-border governance institutions comes the closest to the institutionalization of regions approach, although it does not specifically refer to Paasi. Blatter (2004) argues that regionalization/decentralization tendencies within nation states are strongly related to the opposite dynamic towards regional integration at the continental level. In the case of the EU, this rescaling process increases the importance of governance, which includes political actors from different backgrounds together with local and national administrative authorities in the governing processes. In border regions, cross-border political cooperation increases the importance of governance. However, Blatter (2004) argues that governance literature usually instrumentalizes institutions by

neglecting their constitutional role in social relations, which according to his observations is pivotal in the reconstruction of regional identities and politics:

> Most importantly, the governance literature implies a purely instrumental view of political institutions and neglects the constitutional role of institutions for political actors and communities. … [R]egional institution-building across national boundaries cannot only be seen as a pragmatic and instrumental approach to solving common problems. …. Therefore, the conceptual template used to describe and compare political cooperation across national boundaries has to be broader than the government versus governance dichotomy and at the same time it has to be more precise in respect to the modes of interaction.. (Blatter, 2004, p.531)

Blatter (2004) grasps the diversity of CBC institutions and the characteristics of cross-border governance using five analytical topics, after comparing cross-border governance institutions in Europe and North America. First he makes a differentiation according to the sectors involved in the governance process in terms of being either public-, private- or non-profit-oriented. The second differentiation is in the territorial demarcation (Blatter, 2003) or geographical scale (Blatter, 2004) of cross-border governance, both of which serve to delineate the territorial type of governance in terms of either using clear-cut, defined boundaries and a function-centric, hierarchical type of organization or involve actors from various sectors, scales and places in a networked type of governance. Thirdly, Blatter (2004) looks at the functional scope of governance by trying to differentiate between the governance types along the lines of universal goals and specific tasks. The fourth field is temporal stability, where the longevity of cross-border governance institutions (i.e. their ability to exchange past experience for future cooperation) is examined. Finally, Blatter (2003, 2004) looks at the leitmotifs underpinning cross-border governance, making a distinction between spaces of place and spaces of flows.

Despite the technical language within Blatter's study, it offers clues to the institutional dynamics that operate behind the social structure. In that sense he does not directly examine the effects of cross-border governance on the process of institutionalization of regions, but his study helps to uncover the role of institutions in the process of establishing cross-border regions within the social consciousness, regional identity and international territorial structure. It also provides a basis for an analytic investigation of the structure of institutions and its impact on the nature of governance, including the interventions of multiple scales and rescaling practices.

4.1.2 New institutional theory

The organization of social life is done through institutions. The development of a social order and the evolution of societies, ranging from everyday practices to the highest levels of organization -- such as the state -- are born of various institutional arrangements; and the evolution of societies is shaped by institutions and their transformation over time. As North (1990, p. 22) argues, 90% of "daily life" activities are made possible by being routinized and regularized by institutions. The formation of formal explanations and regulations of social acts; the perpetual repetition of these acts, which then become norms and traditions of social behaviour; and the legitimation of particular forms of social acts in the social consciousness – these are all different aspects of the same phenomenon, institutional practice. In this respect, Paasi's (1986, 1996) institutionalization of regions approach grasps correctly the multidimensional structure of institutional practice by rendering the establishment of institutions as merely one of many stages comprising the entire institutionalization process.

First, the distinction between institutions and organizations is important to note. Organizations are institutionalized bodies established by "groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives". They can be political bodies, such as a parliament or political parties; economic bodies, such as firms or trade unions; social bodies, such as clubs or associations; and educational bodies, such as schools and universities (North, 1990, p. 5). Institutions refer to the broader framework in which organizations as well as individuals act and are constrained with it. Institutions can be formal organizations like firms, municipalities, NGOs and the state, as well as abstractions of these concepts referring not to a particular firm, state or region but identifying and legitimizing the general idea that they represent (North, 1990; Arabacı, 2008). Weber's proposition that the state is the entity that "claims to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order" (cited in Pierson, 2004, p. 6) is just such an abstraction that describes a part of the institutional context of the state without pointing to a single form of state, whether it be socialist or capitalist in orientation. However, institutions are not only abstractions of organizations. Traditions, moral values, social networks, gender roles, formal arrangements (e.g. bilateral agreements, laws and constitutions, etc.) and informal arrangements, partnerships and organizations between individuals -- in short, every

element that is a part of the regulation, mediation and continuation of social organization -- is an example of an institution. Institutions are the "rules of the game" that "reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life" (North, 1990, p. 4).

Institutions are seen as both results of historical processes and powerful subjects capable of influencing the evolution of human society at the same time. As Putnam (1993, p. 7) argues, institutions are shaped by history and yet work to shape politics. This duality has been problematized under the structure and agency dichotomy. From the first point of view, the historical evolution of societies with its various aspects - including norms, practices and power struggles – determines the formation of institutions, since they have emerged as a result of this evolution in order to give a shape to it in a way that reflects these social dynamics. In this respect, the emergence of social security systems, for example, are seen as a result of the Keynesian welfare state, which itself is a result of the dynamics of capital accumulation that have evolved significantly in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. This is the path dependency approach that assumes that institutions are bounded by social processes and historical conditions, which determine their form and function. It is also a structuralist point of view, since, although recognizing that institutions take on important roles in the organization of society, it leaves almost no room for autonomous decision-making for institutions. The contrasting approach pays most credit to individuals motivated by rational choice, who use and transform institutions (or create new ones) in order to achieve desired ends. In this respect, institutions are considered to be aggregated outcomes of individual behaviour that serve to reduce uncertainty and limit the choices of individuals in order to enable them to calculate accurately their goals and actions. Contrary to the structuralist approach, this point of view partially neglects the constraining role of structure on the choices of individuals and assumes that any rational behaviour would be repeated in the same way in any kind of structural context.

New Institutionalism emerges as a third option in this context, which ascribes a more autonomous power to institutions in contrast to both the structure and agency perspectives (March and Olsen, 1984). Without neglecting both aspects of social life, new institutionalists recognize that institutions move in both directions by imposing structural constraints on the preferences of individual actors on the one hand, and

giving access to particular actors and collective actions to transform the social structure on the other (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). The political and social problems in a given setting can be viewed as part of the social structure that also influences institutions themselves. However, the perception of these problems by political actors and the methods chosen to solve problems (i.e. the preferences of institutional actors) affect the future of the public realm and its institutional structure (March and Olsen, 1994). Lowndes and Roberts (2013, p. 28) argue that the distinctive characteristic of New Institutionalism is to avoid the superficial and taken for granted understanding of institutions (as well as structure and agency), and to critically look "at the way in which they embody values and power relationships".

Although the key role of institutions in forming social practices is commonly accepted, New Institutionalism cannot be accepted as a stand-alone theory capable of conceptualizing institutions. Using the basic points of the structure and agency dichotomy, new institutionalists have developed several strands of institutionalism, three of which have grasped the three most common positions regarding the roles of agency, structure and society in institutional contexts. These are not mutually exclusive aspects, separately conceptualizing their own institutional realities; rather, they complementarily square the circle of the agency-institutions-structure dialectic that allows one to fully grasp the origins of social interactions, their role in the formation of institutions and the emergence of the social structure as something more than the sum of actors', individual and institutional practices. The study of institutions also enables the adoption of a multidimensional perspective while investigating the institutionalization of a particular policy field.

4.1.2.1 Rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism

The three dominant schools New Institutionalism are commonly referred to as rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Immergut, 1998). These three strands represent the three main streams of institutionalisms, but also are complemented by various other approaches such as normative, empirical, international, network, discursive and feminist institutionalisms (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013).

Rational Choice Institutionalism has emerged from behaviourism and rests on the basic premise that humans are rational beings who act with the aim of maximizing their self-interest through careful cost-benefit analysis. From this perspective institutions are accepted to reflect the desires and habits of the individuals who establish them. Informal relations, political leaders and their followers, interest groups, and ideologies (instead of formal modes of organizations) are among the interest areas of this type of institutionalism (Bolat and Seymen, 2006).

The role of institutions according to rational choice institutionalists is to reduce transaction costs in social and economic interactions by avoiding uncertainty and reducing risks in social relations, especially those arising from trust problems (North, 1990, Ostrom 2005). As Lowndes and Roberts (2013, p. 23) explain, from the rational choice point of view, the existence of institutions is a result of cost-benefit analysis. An institution can only exist when the costs of maintaining it do not exceed the benefits gained with it. So, larger institutions, such as the state, represent a more complicated form of social organization that has emerged from the continuous efforts to reduce transaction costs in social interactions. As North (1990) argues, by regulating the exchange relationship between two parties, institutions provide the basis of political/economic systems.

Although rational choice institutionalists consider rules that set a wider framework as well, these rules are usually either accepted as given or elaborated at a micro-level only to include those that are set by individuals or groups for the regulation of a particular situation (see for example Ostrom, 2011). From this perspective North (1990, pp. 59, 69, 101) argues that institutions are not independent from the political structure in which they exist, and the difference between developed countries and third world countries can be explained by their institutional structures. According to him, institutions in developed countries reduce transaction costs, whereas in third world countries, economic relations mainly rely on trust, and have higher transaction costs.

Implications of rational choice institutionalism are most easily observed at the local and regional levels, from which Elinor Ostrom (2005) developed the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, which was based on a large number of local case studies across the world. Through these case studies, Ostrom and her colleagues extensively elaborate how local actors organize around institutions and use

institutional practices to overcome trust problems. With a similar perspective, in studying inter-local cooperation, Delabbio and Zeemering (2013) argue that institutional context is a determining factor for collective action. In addition, local officials prefer to take part in collective action when a cost-benefit analysis reveals different aspects of the institutional structure, such as career risks, public resistance, expected outcomes of collaboration and transaction costs. Hilvert and Swindell (2013) also argue that inter-local cooperation becomes satisfactory for decision-makers only when transaction costs arising from cooperation are exceeded by the benefits of collaboration.

Hilvert and Swindell (2013) argue that local governors and decision-makers face collective action dilemmas (see also Ostrom, 2005; Feiock 2013) originating from institutional elements like political culture, lack of consensus, mutual trust and the risk of free riding. Collective action dilemmas constitute an important part of rational choice institutionalism. Theories suggest that institutions emerge as a solution to problems arising from a lack of trust, especially with regard to the use of common-pool resources, such as meadows and fishery areas (Ostrom, 2005), where the excessive use of the resource by one actor not only causes a loss in the share of other actors but also entails the risk of destroying the resource in long-term. Therefore, it is argued that micro-level institutions and institutionalized practices are established between actors to ensure the fair and sustainable use of common pool resources.

A shortfall of rational choice institutionalism is argued to be the neglect of long-term targets and calculations of actors when taking action, and assuming that the short-term interest is the dominant source of motivation in their actions (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 37). Concerning the impacts of the structure, Putnam (1993, p. 166) states that rational choice institutionalism falls short in explaining how and why these transaction cost-reducing institutions have emerged, since individual actors are not capable of establishing them in the absence of a more powerful authority, such as the Leviathan state.

Sociological institutionalism, which is almost opposed to rational choice institutionalism, presumes that behaviours of actors are context-driven; in other words, social structures (e.g. cultural conventions, norms and cognitive frames of reference) determine not only the options and choices of actors, but also actors' ways of thinking and perceiving the world. Hence individuals' actions are not shaped by

their own decisions taken independently to reach their desired ends, but are dependent on the prevailing social context (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Therefore, an actor's choices related to the same subject will vary greatly under different circumstances, which depend on the social structure in play (Immergut, 1998). Institutions constitute an "infrastructure" for society, providing the reference points for actions of actors (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). From this perspective, individual choices are socially determined by institutions, which are also bound by practices emerging from the wider social structure. Actors, whether individuals or firms, are "embedded" in the social structure (Amin and Thrift, 1994, p. 12) which provides a "frame of meaning" that guides their actions (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 947). According to March and Olsen (1984, p. 741), sociological institutionalism differs from rational choice institutionalism by conceptualizing actions of individuals as the "fulfilment of duties and obligations" instead of "individual values and expectations". For them, "what is appropriate for a particular person in a particular situation is defined by the political and social system and transmitted through socialization". As DiMaggio and Powell (1991, p. 28) argue, "cultural frames establish approved means and define desired outcomes, leading business people to pursue profits, bureaucrats to seek budgetary growth, and scholars to strive for publication". While examining global capitalism, Jackson and Deeg (2012) adopt a similar perspective and argue that external forces, such as international relations, national politics and state policies, also affect institutional structures at the micro-level.

Putnam's (1993) longitudinal and extensive study of Italian regional governance institutions reaches the conclusion that mirrors sociological institutionalism, though it also includes elements from historical institutionalism. Putnam (1993) investigates the establishment of local governments in Italy with a longitudinal survey. Within a period of 14 years after their establishment, regional governments in Italy displayed a diversified path of governance, which resulted in success for some and failure for others. Focusing on the reasons of that diversification and by conducting two surveys with a 10 years interval, Putnam argues that democratic traditions are among the most significant factors in determining institutional success. According to him, "the practical performance of institutions … is shaped by the social context within which they operate" (p. 8).

Amin and Thrift's (1994) concept of institutional thickness is among other well-known sociological institutionalism approaches in regional science (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 164). Institutional thickness refers to a dense institutional environment in a region or agglomeration economy that provides a base for development. According to Amin and Thrift (1994, p. 14) social and cultural factors in which institutions are embedded "live at the heart of economic success". The institutional thickness of a region, agglomeration economy or policy field is described using at least four variables. Firstly, institutional diversity is required in terms of complementarity and competition. In the case of Amin and Thrift (1994), the presence of firms, financial institutions, local chambers of commerce, training agencies, innovation centres, local authorities, development agencies and so forth are described as complementary components of a "thick" institutional structure oriented to economic growth. Institutional diversity, in a biological sense, provides a "large genetic pool of institutions" that in the long-term will lead to the evolution of regions in terms of economic success (Amin and Thrift, 1994b, p. 258). The second variable is the level of interaction between institutions. Interaction, according to Amin and Thrift, is expressed through "shared rules, conventions, and knowledge, which serve to constitute the social atmosphere of a region". Third, the individual actions of institutions, when accumulated, should be able to generate development. And fourth, institutions in a particular setting should recognize that they are "involved in a common enterprise" and share a common faith. Institutional thickness, defined by these four characteristics, embeds institutions within the social structure, and provides an analytical framework for tracing the effects of particular institutions and types of institutional relations on the wider institutional structure.

Historical institutionalism is related to the long-term evolution of institutions in a wider context. Instead of focusing on individuals or organizations as rational choice and sociological institutionalisms do, the historical institutionalist approach investigates the wider institutional structure (i.e. the nation state or the world system) and its long term, historical dynamics (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). Immergut (1998, p. 16) points to the difference between sociological and historical institutionalism by arguing that while the former is interested in "the ways in which organizational rules and procedures coordinate the action of independent individuals", the latter focuses on themes related to power and interest. Hall and

Taylor (1996, p. 941) stress that historical institutionalism is interested in the uneven distribution of power, and argues that "institutions give some groups or interests disproportionate access to the decision-making process". Bruff's (2011, p. 491) Gramscian argument that social forces lie behind the establishment of institutions provides an example for the historical approach: "…capitalist institutions are a historical force through the historical accumulations of common sense sediments that are embodied in the formalised rules, practices and conventions which are skewed towards capital's dependence on the market".

The term "path dependence" takes a key role in explaining the historical institutionalist approach. Path dependence argument presumes that when policymakers choose a particular path; the aggregate impact of actions taken in the aftermath produces a snowball effect, which is difficult to roll back or alter in terms of direction. Consequently, a "powerful cycle of self-reinforcing activity" is created that strongly influences the decisions of actors within institutions (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 39). A part of Putnam's (1993) work, as noted above, includes elements of historical institutionalism referring to such a path dependency. According to him, the context that shapes institutions is path dependent, and

> …what comes first (even if it was in some sense "accidental") conditions what comes later. Individuals may "choose" their institutions, but they do not choose them under circumstances of their own making, and their choices in turn influence the rules within which their successors choose. (Putnam, 1993, p.7).

However, the intentional change or transformation of institutions and institutional structure is not accepted as totally impossible. Institutional change can and does occur throughout revolutionary moments of history, in which the "periods of continuity [are] punctuated by 'critical junctures', i.e., moments when substantial institutional change takes place thereby creating a 'branching point' from which historical development moves onto a new path" (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.942).

Immergut (1998) stresses that, from a historical institutionalist point of view, particular events during the course of history originate from the free choice of powerful individuals; these choices, however, always bear the burden of individual and social histories. The establishment of particular institutions in a specific moment of time, such as recognizing the right to private property during monarchical rule, is

a result of other social and historical processes that motivate the transformation of the whole institutional structure.

4.1.2.2 Connections

Despite their diversified departure points, these three strands intersect in some common points in their approach to institutions. These intersections consolidate and establish a common ground of new institutionalism that, according to Lowndes and Roberts (2013), represents the "third phase" of New Institutionalism Theory. Lowndes and Roberts (2013) summarize this consolidation under five main topics: (1) a dialectic understanding of structure and agency, (2) operation through rules, practices and narratives, (3) institutional change, (4) institutional diversity and (5) institutional design. These five topics do not only form the common ground of the three strands, but also offer an exclusive conceptualization of the role of institutions in social life from a new institutionalist perspective.

The first of these intersections is summarized under the multi-dimensional approach to institutions, in relation to **structure and agency**. To understand institutions, it is necessary to locate them in the wider institutional setting and evaluate them without neglecting the impact of social and historical forces on the establishment and functioning of particular institutions. However, actors also have "reflexive and strategic capacities" that enable them to escape from the path dependency trap and insert their own transformative power in the institutional structure (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 16). Indeed, the structure and agency dichotomy is strongly related to power, having at its centre the question of whether agents, individual or institutional, have the power and capacity to transform the structure. A structuralist approach presumes that the hegemonic mode of regulation, which includes economic production, political organization and social practices, has a determinative effect on human behaviour and a given set of choices to act. So is argued to be the institutional structure of capitalism shaped by Fordist production, Keynesian welfare state and mass consumption of 20th century (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 87). Determination, in this sense, refers to constraining actors behaviours through institutional settings in a way that ensures the reproduction of social structures.

The constraining effect of the existing structure is widely recognized by the new institutionalism theory. The classic division of powers in a parliamentary democracy,

for example, constitutes an institutional setting that constrains even the most powerful actors of society by limiting or determining their actions. However, it is also recognized that agents possess various means through which they can interrupt the given institutional structure within their respective political systems (Colomy, 1998). The role of powerful economic, social and political elites – referred to as rule makers -- is of particular importance to this process. First, elites take active roles in the reproduction and legitimization of the existing institutional structure. Hence, even the structure is deterministic; it has to rely on particular agents for operating. Second, the rest of the society, -- the rule takers -- is considered of being both "passive implementers" of rules and also "creative agents who interpret rules, assign cases to rules, and adapt or even resist rules" (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 105). In this sense, civil society is perceived as the institutional domain that enables the mobilization of ordinary people through institutions to assert their specific requests and desires in a given institutional setting. Third, powerful political elites (also known as principal agents) act either on behalf of the hegemonic structure they represent or join oppositional forces to form coalitions that may result in institutional change (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 6). Hence, the diffusion of hegemonic structure in society is understood as a playing field, where rather than the structure itself, the power struggles within actors determines the institutional context. Through bargaining, coalition formation and power struggles, institutional structure is shaped by actors as much as it shapes the field of political action (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013).

Second, it is commonly accepted that institutions shape human behaviour through three operational modes: **rules, practices and narratives**. Rules are written legal tools, such as laws or constitutions, which constrain human behaviour (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). Bilateral agreements and contracts constitute a part of the operational field of institutions. Depending on the point of view, rules define the scene of action through actors themselves (Ostrom, 2011), or as constraining factors that, together with defining the scene, also limit the actions and choices of actors. Whatever their role and influence, the rules' feature is the clear-cut definition of limits of action and restrictions of expectations under particular circumstances. However, rules are not accepted as self-evident entities; they are products of human actions and results of political struggles in society (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991); in other words, rules are

subject to contestation and change. Practices, on the other hand, are informal institutions that transmit limits and expectations in society through day-to-day interactions, traditions, established norms of behaviour and moral values. Although practices do not have the force to impose a particular type of action in the way that rules do, they operate through demonstration within the social structure. People observe common types of actions and seek social legitimacy by reproducing them through their own actions (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 57). Finally, narratives create symbolic meaning that justifies both rules and practices within social consciousness. Narratives "provide an account not just of how we do things around here, but also why we do things the way we do" (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 64). They are stories articulated by society that establish awareness within society about the recognized ways of actions, but they are also found in the discourses of political elites, who implant governmental policies in social consciousness through these narratives.

Third, although institutions are stable reflections of social interactions that enable the transmission of the established social structure from one generation to another through rules, practices and narratives, this stability is only relative, and institutions are both the subject and object of **change**. Institutions' positions can be destabilized with changing social dynamics, and institutional change can trigger a change in society as well. In Putnam's terms, they are both shaped by history and also capable of shaping politics and the social structure (Putnam, 1993, p. 7), hence they are not necessarily path dependent and can create their "own momentum" (p. 22). However, institutional change is not perceived in revolutionary terms. Institutions do not change suddenly, but rather a gradual change is proposed that transforms both institutions and the structure in an evolutionary perspective.

Concerning institutional change, the formal rules as a product of political organizations can more easily be changed in a particular moment of history, depending on the power struggles involved. However, informal institutions, such as customs, traditions and codes of conduct, resist these momentary changes and evolve more slowly (North, 1990; Bolat and Seymen, 2006). North (1990, p. 47), from a rational choice point of view, argues that established norms and traditions can lose efficiency and cause an increase in transaction costs through time, which necessitates an institutional change. In any case, if a given institutional setting does not reduce

transaction costs, then a tendency to replace it by either formal or informal ways emerges (North, 1990, p. 47).

The third phase new institutionalism argues that the institutional change occurs through many small steps taken over time, contributing to the "making and braking of path dependency" (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 127). In this sense, change is understood as a gradual process that is stimulated by both endogenous and external forces; change is the result of power struggles between and among these forces. According to Lowndes and Roberts (2013), institutional change should be understood as having two basic premises. First institutional change should be analysed not in terms of how actors respond to institutional changes, but in terms of how power struggles between them leads to intended or unintended changes in the institutional process (p. 140). Second, institutional change is not a process separate from institutional stability; rather, these two dynamics should be understood as simultaneous processes that are products of human agency (p. 130).

The longitudinal approach of Putnam's study makes an example for such an institutional change analysis in the transformation of political administrative structure in Italy in a 14 years period as the basis of an institutional change, but also takes into account the civic tradition of Italy that has been shaped over centuries. In Putnam's (1993) study, institutional reform was initiated by the central government, but was made possible only by way of a gradual process, which resulted in transformations in both regional and central governance structures. At first, a conflict between central government and regional institutions arose due the strict control of the central government over regional authorities, seen in actions such as the delay of local legislation by the central government. Over time, the central government's outlook shifted with regard to regional authorities. According to Putnam (1993), public support of regional governments, a shift in the political affiliation of the central government and changing bureaucracy were among the main reasons stimulating this change. During the period of the study, agents appointed from the centre to work at the local level, regional, elected politicians and bureaucrats appointed to central institutions all played crucial roles in creating a mutual understanding between the two levels of government, which made institutional transformation possible (Putnam, 1993, p. 23).

Fourth, the **design of institutions** is closely related to institutional change. From a new institutionalist perspective, institutional design -- referring to the creation of new institutions or the intentional transformation of existing ones -- is not independent from power relations and agencies of different actors. In this respect, it is a process difficult to control, which depends on power struggles between the actors involved and often results in unintended or unexpected consequences. Referring to Kathleen Telen, Lowndes and Roberts (2013, p. 176) argue that institutional design has three main properties. First institutional design can never be fully controlled by its designers; second, there will always be gaps between ideal and emerging institutions because institutions are made possible only with compromises resulting from bargaining processes; and third, institutions are always contested by related actors, hence institutional design is a never-ending process in which winners and losers frequently change positions and impose their conditions on designed institutions. Therefore, Lowndes and Roberts (2013) propose that institutional design is a normative project, heavily dependent on the perceptions of agents' of what is good for society, how things should function and so on. However, since there is no single perception of good in society, institutions are subject to the continuous contestation of various actors. This is better described as an "institutional redesign" process that uses indirect, rather than tailor made, direct institution-designing mechanisms (Lowndes and Taylor, 2013, p. 186).

Fifth, **institutional diversity** is widely recognized to exist among institutions, even when they are labelled under the same categories. Diversity results from diversified social, geographic and historical conditions, resources and power relations among institutions. Institutional diversity is recognized among new institutionalists, again as containing a dichotomy. On the one hand, globalization theories argue that global capitalism generates similar institutions across the globe with the purpose of regulating the increasingly homogenized processes of production, consumption and accumulation. From this perspective, an institutional isomorphism, a tendency of institutions to resemble each other either by imitating, through coercion or as an effect of interactions (Bolat and Seymen, 2006, p. 243), takes place, where dominant capitalist institutions become influential examples in the design of similar institutions in different states. On the other hand, it is also argued that there are varieties of capitalism that create their own institutional setting shaped by historical and

geographic dynamics and power struggles between actors in particular localities. The basic argument of the second approach is that institutions (even informal ones) are shaped by competing social dynamics, usually with the aim of generating efficiency, predictability and reducing transaction costs. Hence, they are spatially and temporally contingent, which means that dynamics specific to particular localities and historical conditions influence institutions, even though they cannot be observed immediately (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 151, 153, 157). As a result, Lowndes and Roberts (203, p. 168) argue that institutions are, at the same time, reproductive and regenerative. They are reproductive because they function in a wider social structure with numerous interactions and interdependencies. But they are also generative because they are a product of social relations where, as discussed above, related actors -- both rule makers and rule takers -- engage with institutions to protect their interests and reach desired ends. Because of this, institutions are strongly context dependent.

4.2 A New Institutionalist Perspective for Institutionalization of Regions

The institutionalization process of a region embodies strong involvement of several institutions as well as various institutional practices that include the use of narratives, practices and rule making. Considering that the nation state is the hegemonic institutional context and the main geo-political unit of decision-making, this process is also strongly dependent on the politics of scale, where national and supranational politics are influential on the regional politics.

Amin and Thrift (1994b, p. 257) argue that the institutionalization processes of a territory reflect a dialectical relationship between globalization and localization. While institutions embedded in local settings develop responses to globalization, at the same time they become a part of globalization as well. In a similar vein, Paasi (1986, 1996) conceptualizes the institutionalization of regions as a local process taking place under the influence of a wider context where the national (Finnish) politics of industrialization; the international politics of war and peace between two countries (Finland and USSR); and global politics (the cold war and the Western alliance) are a part of it. In this conceptualization, an intuitive discussion of politics of scale from a sociological institutionalist perspective enters. Here, the region is constructed through various multi-scalar practices that do not allow a particular scale

to decide on the boundaries and role of the region. Neither national nor local actors can take a dominant decisive role in the region's development through time, but instead, these actors continuously attempt to construct and deconstruct the region through political and economic decisions and practices. In the middle of the second decade of the 21st century, and especially in Europe, where perhaps the most complex supranational institution, the EU, increasingly intervenes in national and global politics, the institutionalization process of a region is much more contested than during the times Paasi (1996) conducted his analysis.

The politics of scale approach in the institutionalization of regions, especially in the EU context, involves the use of rules, practices and narratives as the new institutionalism literature suggest. Institutionalization is based on rules set by nation states that are increasingly contested by EU legislation. The regional policies of the EU, whether neoliberal or neo- Keynesian in orientation, directly intervene in national contexts and provide new places of engagement (Cox, 1998) for regional actors that unavoidably result in new practices affecting the institutionalization continuum (Swyngedouw, 1997, p. 147). Discourses of political elites also contribute to this process by reproducing the established hegemony or by creating the conditions for transformation of a given institutional structure.

Helena Ekelund (2014) demonstrates the applicability of the new institutional theory in the EU context by discussing the establishment of Frontex, the border patrol agency of the Union. According to her, the "the timing of establishment; the decision on the agency's tasks, role and mission; [and] the decision on a specific institutional design and management" (Ekelund, 2014, p. 110) can be explained by using different new institutionalist strands. From a rational choice perspective, the coordination of border-related activities of member states and the use of expert knowledge can be viewed as transaction cost-reducing activities. On the other hand, the emergence of Frontex cannot be understood solely as a cost-cutting solution. The social and historical contexts are highly influential in the institutional design process. This context is the enlargement of the EU, which requires its own institutional structure to manage the extensive functional areas of the Union. For Ekelund (2014), the enlargement waves that included southern and eastern European states are critical junctures in which crucial decisions were taken to pave the way for the establishment of Frontex.

Ekelund's (2014) research focuses on the EU level, supranational politics and the processes of institution building without paying particular attention to the inter-scalar dynamics and politics of scale in the field of border management. In another study, Detlef Sack (2012) investigates the impact of the European Court of Justice on national and sub-national politics. He suggests that although these decisions are binding for member states, their effect is not a strictly and immediately applied norm among the member and candidate countries. In contrast, and as Sack (2012) demonstrates, the implementation of the EU decisions is rather a struggle and modification process having varying results among regions depending on their socio-economic structure, the tendencies of ruling political parties and coalitions, and the tripartite relations between business, governing authorities and local society at the same time. During this process, EU- based norms and regulations are interpreted in different ways in accordance to political tendencies and the benefits of the abovementioned parties, hence resulting in different institutional practices that favour the established hegemonic bloc of political and business elites (Sack, 2012, p. 243). Therefore, it is argued, EU-led institutional change does not result in the homogenization of related institutional practices among the member states, but, on the contrary, results in institutional practices that intermingle with the rules and create a unique, place-specific institutional structure. However, it is also argued that the Court's decisions provide "general principles and fundamental rights" through EU citizenship (Brack and Costa, 2012, p. 102), hence contributing to the institutionalization of the EU.

National-local relations imply similar dynamics, where top-down institutional design attempts end with different results depending on the local context. North (1990, p. 101) observes that similar institutional design practices, such as adopting a constitution or a trade law from another state, usually results in completely different ends and institutional structures. This leads North to accept that a pure transaction cost-reducing behaviour cannot completely explain institutions' role in the economy, and to conclude that it is necessary to look at "culturally derived norms of behaviour and how they interact with formal rules to get better answers to such issues" (p. 140). Putnam (1993), while investigating the institutional performance of regional governance institutions in Italy, makes observations of the transformation of the regional administrative and political system. According to him, over the course of 20

years and even after regional governance institutions had been established, relations between the central government and regional authorities remained tense. Even though these institutions were established by the central government, legislative changes needed to balance power and authority between the regional and central layers of government were avoided for years. However, the regional front established by some of these regional institutions sought recognition of their autonomy along with a transfer of power. The result observed by Putnam resembles a multi-level governance structure that fits the concept of the politics of scale:

> Instead of a simple contest over central and regional jurisdiction, most issues now evoke a multi-cornered struggle, including local governments, party officials at various levels, and even private agencies. Rather than a clear division of responsibilities allocated to one and only one level, many programs in such fields as agriculture, housing, and health services are in effect shared among the national, regional, and local levels. Politicians and administrators from all three levels consult informally and negotiate with one another, often rancorously, even when one level has primary legal authority for decision-making. By the early 1980s nearly one hundred joint committees had been established to coordinate regional and national policies in particular sectors. (Putnam, 1993, p.46)

The regional policies of the EU emerge as one of the policy fields in which politics of scale become visible through institutional change and design. The importance given to the regions by the EU has been perceived as "promulgating an ontological fate in the regional scale", where through various institutions such as Eurocities and Association of European Regions, EU is argued to provide the regions the opportunity to "challenge the dominance of the national governments in both internal and global affairs" (MacLeod, 1999, p.238).

The claim for more autonomy for sub-national regions is most strongly reflected in the European Charter for Local Self Government; the goal of reducing regional disparities and achieving EU-wide cohesion between regions provides a framework for institutional change. It is hard to identify a single, bold characteristic of this change, but Keynesian redistributive policies and neoliberal policies based on urban and regional entrepreneurialism can be simultaneously observed within the context of institutional transformation. As nation states and sub-national regions are also affected by this contextual transformation, the structure and role of new institutions, and the new governance structures that form around them, become inevitably dependent on inter-scalar politics and power struggles. While policy formation and

binding legislative documents create the legal part of the institutional transformation of regional policies in the EU, the allocation of financial resources, mainly through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), serve to institutionalize these policies through practices. Again, the politics of scale are influential in this process. Although the allocation of structural funds is mostly under the control of respective nation states, EU policies attempt to establish more direct relationships with the regions. The rapid increase of lobbying offices representing regional organizations in Brussels is also argued to be a regional response to the bypassing of the nation state scale (Van der Veen and Boot, 1995).

During this process the emergence of network and multilevel governance structures with the involvement of public and private actors contributes to the transformation of the administrative structure dominated by the nation states. This is also an institutional transformation that makes room for new institutional analysis.

From a rational choice point of view, Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom, 2005; Gümüşcan, 2010) pays attention to the local institutional settings that help to organize and manage common pool resources in a particular locality in the most efficient way and without major intervention by the state. Extending this debate to the regional scale, Rodriguez-Pose (2013, p. 1037) argues that local institutional arrangements prove to be more effective in generating economic development than nation state governments, since "the national scale can be too distant, remote and detached in order to be effective in mobilizing organizations". Rodriguez- Pose's (2013, p. 1042) conclusion is that regional development strategies should be "specifically tailored to the potential of place- bounded institutions" in order to make significant interventions for development. However, as a result of the rational choice institutionalist thinking, Rodriguez-Pose's focus on institutions from a regional development perspective suggests looking away from the institutional characteristics of a region, focusing instead on "institutional arrangements, which represent barriers for the efficiency of other factors influencing economic development" (p. 1043).

Amin (1999) agrees that top-down economic policies do not lead to the reduction of regional disparities. However, he indicates that an atomistic view of individual firms and markets that are self-organizing can have similar results, since the coordination and regulation of economic activities is becoming increasingly dependent on the decisions made on various scales. In a globally interdependent economy, it is

impossible to reduce regional disparities by relying only on endogenous resources and ignoring the regulative role of national and supranational institutions. From an economic perspective, Amin (1999) points to the explanations of sociological and historical institutionalists. For Amin (1999), the respective arguments that markets are socially constructed and path dependent provide explanations of the necessity of the involvement of different inter-scalar institutional mechanisms in regional policy formation and regional governance.

These institutional dynamics necessitate a complex understanding of regional policies that, first, does not ignore the role of multiple scales at the regional level, but also admits that in the local context, institutions and institutionalized practices play a crucial role. And second, acknowledges that regional development is only one component of these policies. The role that institutions and institutionalized practices play cannot be limited to a narrow regional development perspective but must be analysed within a broader socio-political framework that, as Paasi (1996) has suggested, is reflected in regional institutions, territorial and symbolic shapes and social consciousness. Therefore, a balance between agency and structure has to be established, in which regional policies as well as regional identity and politics are socially constructed and articulated through political scales and institutions. Gordon MacLeod argues that such an approach

> …would get us away from focusing synchronically on hollowing out and associated institutional reconfigurations, and to begin to establish a diachronic historical, geographic and sociological reading of institutional formation. All this is also of vital importance in helping to seriously explore the ideology of place and region in the structuration of regional governance. (MacLeod, 1999, p.248)

4.3 Institutionalization of Cross Border Cooperation

So far, three theoretical approaches, namely state-rescaling, the institutionalization of regions and new institutionalism, have been discussed, all in relation to the spatial organization of human societies. Summarized in one sentence, the essential argument underlying these three approaches is: any socio-political organization, no matter how large it is (a supranational organization, the nation state or a single policy field), is socially constructed through power relations and institutionalized practices in society, and is constantly reproduced over space. Derived from this

conceptualization, it is argued that in the contemporary global political order, actors from a particular political scale or policy field do not act independently in an anarchic condition, but act in ways that are contested by other scales, policy fields and social dynamics. Hence, a social practice which takes place in a specific locality cannot be explained without considering the wider dynamics affecting it. Nonetheless, a local practice can have wider implications, transcending the boundaries of the particular locality and, perhaps, even reaching a global scale, especially if that practice is institutionalized in various localities.

From the perspective of this study, cross-border cooperation in the EU represents such a local practice and policy field that has been institutionalized with the influence of actors from local, nation state and supranational scales. The institutionalization process of CBC is an example of the politics of scale, however, its conceptualization would be too abstract without being translated in spatial terms and analysed over institutions. Therefore, the "reading" that is the purpose of this study, seeks to investigate analytically the role of political scales and institutions in the process of the social construction of CBC over space.

In this order, first, state-rescaling theory, with its focus on the politics of scale and social construction of scales around specific policy fields was introduced. The argument is that as a socio-spatial organization, the territorial organization of the nation state has transformed under the pressure of globalization dynamics and neoliberalism. Accordingly, CBC has emerged as one of the policy fields in which actors from local and supranational scales contest the sovereignty of the nation state. CBC in Europe, according to Perkmann (1999), was initially a domain of regions or local level administration such as municipalities. However, with the involvement of the EU in the process, CBC has transformed into a multi-level governance structure consisting of local, national and supranational scales that "are three relatively separate institutional realms" (Perkmann, 1999, p. 659). Moreover, although the local scale is still the most efficient tier within CBC, political decision-making processes are now dominantly held at the EU level with the involvement of states, reducing the importance of local actors to "a project" of the wider CBC setting of the EU (Perkmann, 1999).

While discussing the emergence of cross-border regionalism under nine particular topics, Jessop (2003, p. 190) points to the role of national, supranational and local

scales under the fifth, sixth and seventh topics respectively. Accordingly, cross-border regionalism (or, CBC) can emerge as a part of national policies for "restabilizing the national scale and enabling national economies to compete more effectively" in an age of globalization. This is a hierarchical rescaling strategy through which the sub-national scale is promoted as a new hub of competition for attracting various processes of capital accumulation. Cross-border regionalism can also emerge as a result of the efforts of supranational bodies to "undermine" the national scale, as in the case of the Europe of Regions. Finally, the reactions of border regions to uneven development and competition within internal regions can also be a source of cross-border regionalism. These three perspectives often coexist and give the characteristic of CBC in border regions. The nation state, however, is still able to sustain its hegemonic power over sub-national regions, and control the form and contents of CBC between two neighbouring regions:

> As for sub-national governments, it seems that they had not been fully empowered by the central authority to play operative roles, nor had they been able to assume key roles in policy networks. The dependence of the regional authorities on central government resourcing has been too strong, making them unable to serve as the engines of supra-national region building… [One] of the most crucial reasons for this is linked to the different perceptions held by regional authorities. Since their dependence on central government approval and resourcing is too strong, the sub-national regions have not been able to act as driving forces in the institutionalization process. This has evidently had much to do with the foreign policies of the nation-states as well, as it is still controlled by the state, and regionalization can only be achieved if the regions are seen to be fully implementing the policies of the central government. (Zimmerbauer, 2013, p.95 and p.100)

However, at the national level, and especially in the EU context, policy decisions increasingly become dependent on supranational dynamics that unavoidably intervene on decisions affecting local politics. These decisions create complex institutional dynamics, which can result in the transformation of the socio-spatial structure, but also provide challenges in terms of facing resistance of the path dependent historical conditions that have made place in the social consciousness. In the Polish- German context Dürshimidt (2006) observes this situation as following:

> It is therefore not surprising that cross-border contacts are kept to a necessary minimum by this segment of Polish border society. Those who also work for local or regional government are of course obliged to confirm with the official discourse of European integration at a local level, for it is a money-spinning (EU funding) discourse. But as private people they are not

> necessarily pioneers of a border-crossing culture rooted in everyday life. (Dürshimidt, 2006, p.256).

These inter-scalar politics cannot be abstracted from the daily practices of the particular localities affected by them. Through these practices, local societies transpose top-down institutional change onto daily life and also transform societies to fit within the local social context. From this perspective, the second theoretical approach, new institutionalism theory, provides explanations on how institutions forge an institutional structure for CBC through laws, practices and narratives.

One of the scholars who first interpreted CBC using a new institutionalist approach is Markus Perkmann. He argues that

> … CBC has to be seen as an aggregate outcome of various relatively decentralized processes of institution building with strong involvement by non-local actors. Cross-border initiatives cannot be assumed to have single and coherent objectives. Rather, a multiplicity of actors operates in an institutional context of opportunities and constraints that is not predominantly of their own making. As a consequence of their actions, the institutional setting itself undergoes continuous changes resulting in irreversible and historically specific trajectories. Such ideas about the building and evolution of institutions can be extrapolated from a more sociologically inflected `new institutionalism' recently emerging as a supra-disciplinary paradigm in a range of fields. (Perkmann, 1999, p. 660)

Perkmann departs from rational choice institutionalism and aligns his arguments with a historical institutionalist approach that links institutional change with "strategic action (path shaping) and evolution (path dependence)". Perkmann (1999, p. 660), rejects the argument of the neutrality of institutions and argues that "they privilege certain actors, certain time and space horizons, and certain strategic agendas over others". Institutional structure is also influential over the behaviours of CBC actors and since it is predominantly formed within the nation state framework, it remains inefficient in supplying actors with the necessary tools for cross-border governance. Looking through a new institutionalist lens, Perkmann (1999) argues that CBC institutions first transform the given institutional structure in order to perform more efficiently within the networked, multi-level governance system and then enable local actors to take part in the processes of production and reproduction of CBC. In a later study, Perkmann (2002) evaluates this issue in more detail by arguing that CBC actors (not only local, but also supranational, such as the AEBR) also perform an entrepreneurial agency role to influence the regional and CBC policies of the EU; in

other words, they become part of the institutionalization of CBC. This later study is also an attempt to dissociate CBC from state rescaling debates by adopting a new institutionalist perspective. Nevertheless, Perkmann's (2002) arguments provide significant input for understanding the institutionalization processes of CBC and its relation to wider social and political dynamics. First, according to Perkmann (2002, p. 121), CBC, within the context of European integration, "changes the opportunity structures" of regions. This argument provides an interpretation of CBC as a new endogenous resource from a new regionalist perspective and as a networked governance mechanism to take part in the shaping of multi-scalar, policy formation dynamics. And second, despite changing opportunity structures, cross-border regionalism remains a technocratic phenomenon, which is only complementary to the existing agenda. Hence the given institutional structure, including central-local relations, prevails to influence CBC. Looking at the institutional dynamics of cross-border governance, Perkmann (1999) observes at least three characteristics: first, institutional dynamics operate within a networked structure, rather than being attached to a hierarchical order; second, institutional dynamics represent a multi-level governance structure that is not dominated by a particular actor or scale; and third, the three main effects of this governance structure are that they are a medium for the delivery of the EU policies to the regional level, they work over "unstable and spatially nested inter-territorial coalitions" and provide a strategic space for the emergence of new cross-border actors (Perkmann, 1999, p.663).

In tandem with Perkmann (1999), Church and Reid (1999) attempt to conceptualize the institutional framework of CBC between England and France using the new institutional theory. Rather than focusing on the relationship between institutions and CBC in general, they focus on two specific aspects of the institutional structure: its thickness and territorial embeddedness. Their findings suggest that although intensifying CBC activities contributes to increasing institutional thickness, the lack of genuine cooperation results in more intervention on behalf of the EU and national governments in the facilitation and supervision of CBC. With regard to territorial embeddedness, Church and Reid (1999) make two distinct observations. First, cross-border spaces mostly remain imaginary spaces, as wishful thoughts of politicians, perhaps as an impact of external influence without being supported by "economic and cultural transfrontier links". Second, spaces of CBC usually have a "flexible

territorial characteristic" that releases the boundedness of administrative divisions and scales and constitutes its own spatial framework.

These two studies align with sociological and historical institutionalisms and evaluate CBC processes as context-bounded phenomena emerging from the historical conditions that both necessitate and constrain it. From this perspective, the role of EU regional and CBC policies and the structural funds is of undeniable importance to the institutionalization of CBC. In addition, the model of CBC established by the EU (funding and Euroregions) has spread across the continent, overarching the external borders of the EU and creating a source for isomorphism to other regions (Perkmann, 2002).

The game-theoretic approach of rational choice institutionalism can also be evaluated from the CBC perspective, although it is not as relevant as sociological and historical institutionalisms. The management of common-pool resources and transaction cost-reducing roles of institutions provides considerable explanation for the role of institutions during the institutionalization process of CBC. Although in the context of inter-municipal cooperation, which does not include a cross-border aspect, Hilvert and Swindell (2013), Carr and Hawkins (2013), and Delabbio and Zeemering (2013) conceptualize cooperation as common-pool resource management. According to them, cooperation activities emerge from the need to reduce transaction costs, especially in urban management, by sharing and coordinating the joint use of resources, collaborating in infrastructure construction and creating joint institutions for providing services. This is also the case in cross-border regionalism, where grass roots, cross-border initiatives emerge to mobilize common endogenous resources to solve problems and generate regional development. Although CBC between Bulgaria and Turkey can hardly be translated in terms of collective action decisions and dilemmas, it includes elements that can be explained by employing the terms of rational choice institutionalism.

It is possible to conceptualize CBC as a common-pool resource where actors compete and cooperate to use and manage EU funds for CBC as an imaginary common-pool resource. From this perspective, participation in CBC is a profit-maximizing behaviour, which aims to expand the resources necessary for the efficient functioning of a particular institution. Following North (1990), the emergence of new institutions to reduce transaction costs emerging from

participation in CBC can be explained from a similar perspective. However, mainly because of two basic features, CBC projects under the IPA-CBC programme do not completely fit the rational choice-based, new institutionalist explanations. First, the number of actors that cooperate on a single project is limited and hardly exceeds four participants in a project. Hence, the collective management of a common-pool resource is not the case. This situation paves the way for the second argument that the distribution of the common-pool resource is strictly controlled with multiple sets of rules originating from the nation states and the EU. Therefore, since the rules of the game are externally defined, the common management of CBC cannot be argued to exist.

Especially the coordination costs are typically experienced in IPA- CBC Bulgaria-Turkey programme, which, mainly due the border effect, usually exceed the expected benefits of the projects. They arise as visa costs, travel costs and project-writing costs. The visa argument in particular is among the top flaws of the programme, referred by the interlocutors as a constraint that draws people away from participating in more projects. Moreover, the tendency towards participating in infrastructure-related CBC projects can also be (partially) explained by the same argument, since these projects are argued to be more cost effective than soft projects, which according to some interlocutors, were considered a "waste of time and money".

Both the new institutional theory and state rescaling theory overlap in the involvement of various institutions from multiple scales in a process of institution building through the politics of scale. Both admit that this is not only a formal process, but also contains informal dynamics such as discourses and daily practices. The politics of scale approach focuses on power struggles and structural dynamics that can be observed around a policy field; and new institutional theory explains the institutional dynamics of this policy field through the dialectical relationship between structure and agency. In this way the complexity of CBC as a policy field can be extensively theorised. However the internal, place specific dynamics of the locality in which CBC takes place, i.e. the dynamics that transforms that policy field into a social process remain uncovered, or simply embedded in the geographical/ political assumptions of these two theories.

In this study, the institutionalization of regions theory is conceptualized as a theoretical tool that allows focusing to the policy field of CBC and reconstructing it as a social process emerging from spatial and social dynamics.

The "border" context is of particular importance in the case of CBC as it defines one of the most dominant characteristics of the region. The border as a geographical marker and bordering as a social practice are the two constitutive aspects of CBC. Although each border region holds its own characteristics shaped by national and international contexts, they still hold some common properties associated with the existence of the border. These properties are listed as being subject to foreign influence, hence being familiar with other cultures, lifestyles and state-society experiences (Martinez, 1994). To identify this unique characteristic of all "borderlanders", Martinez (1994) uses the term "border experience" (p. xviii). The border experience is then generalized by Martinez (1994) to define the concept of "borderland milieu" (p. 10), a state of being of border regions shaped by their unique characteristics. These characteristics include: (1) transnational interaction (i.e. the interactions across the borders in the fields of trade, consumerism, tourism, migration, information flow, cultural and educational exchange and personal relationships). These interactions expose borderlanders to foreign values, ideas, customs, traditions, tastes and behaviour and the opportunity to compare their lives with those on the other side of the border. (2) International conflict and accommodation in terms of rivalries between two neighbouring states. Borderlands are affected by international conflicts in terms of migration policies, where people from central regions are placed in the border regions to balance the existence of minorities in the border regions; strict economic and criminal controls where the spread of economic and social effects is reduced by restricting the flows of imported or smuggled goods to the interior parts of the country; and finally, in terms of war in the extreme cases, where border regions are 'natural' battlefields. (3) Ethnic conflict and accommodation, again by the influence of nationalist, centre-state policies, since they imply more or less enmity towards the 'other' who is typically located on the other side of the border. Although these policies target the nation as a whole, they are amplified in border regions due to their close contact with the 'other' and their heterogeneous social structure. Economic disparities between two countries also contribute to ethnic conflicts, when cheap labour coming from the other side of the

border impacts the job market of the border region. (4) Separateness is the final property of the borderland milieu, since due to their characteristics, borderlanders are 'different' than those living in the internal regions, mainly because of their heterogeneous structure and exposure to international dynamics. Moreover, in some cases, they are perceived as 'different' by the people of interior regions, depending on how borders are constructed in social imagery (Martinez, 1994). In the EU context, O'Dowd defines the characteristics of a border region as

> …the natural history of the state border, its ethno-national composition, the legal and administrative characteristics of the states involved, the extent to which the state border marks economic and demographic disparities, the accessibility of the border regions to the physical and communications infrastructure of the EU and the socio-economic profile and settlement structure of the region. (O'Dowd, 2003, p.31).

CBC is also a part of the border experience. This is a technical necessity as the definition of CBC implies the involvement of two or more regions from neighbouring states. However, it is also a part of the borderland milieu, since it represents the institutionalization of the socio-spatial characteristics of a border region. Therefore, its institutionalization should be understood as part of the institutionalization of the region. The politics of scale, socio-spatial dynamics and institutionalized practices come together in the institutionalization of a region and are reflected in CBC.

The conceptual map of institutionalization of CBC is presented in Figure 4.2. Here the politics of scale approach of state rescaling theory is illustrated with the "spaces of dependence" and "spaces of engagement". These "spaces" represent respectively the institutional structure that defines the rules of the game and the medium where actors representing their scalar interests are interacting. The overlapping position of these two spaces points to the interdependencies and interactions emerging from the politics of scale (see pp. 68-72).



Figure 4.2: Institutionalization of CBC.

The duality between structure and agency, which new institutionalism aims to resolve in a dialectical way (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013) also reflects the interactions between spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement. While the former represents the structure that constrains actors' behaviours, the latter points to the transformative actions of determined actors. Hence the duality of structure and agency develops into the duality of continuity and change. However it would be wrong to associate structure with continuity and agency with change. Rather it is the dialectical relationship of different actors whose interests are either in the continuity of the existing structure or in its change that is resolved through politics of scale. It is suggested that spaces of dependence enable the reproduction of existing structure by the use of constraining laws and rules; and spaces of engagement enable actors to make changes on the structure through institutionalized practices. As new institutionalism theory suggests, institutions play crucial roles on both sides of these dualities. Operating through laws, rules and practices they transpose politics of scale into daily practices and vice versa.

From this perspective, CBC as a policy field is constituted by spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement. These spaces enable institutional actors operating through laws, rules and practices simultaneously to reproduce and transform CBC.

Finally the policy field of CBC is conceptualized as a social practice by decoding its spatial aspect (the borderland milieu), its emergence in the social consciousness as a part of the regional identity and the establishment of CBC institutions.

5. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CROSS BORDER COOPERATION IN THE EDIRNE- KIRKLARELI BORDER REGION

5.1 The Role of Laws and Rules in CBC

CBC has a long tradition in Europe, dating back to at least 1965 when the first cross-border region, Euregio, was established on the border between the Netherlands and Germany (Church and Reid, 1999). Since then, various bilateral and multilateral agreements have contributed to the establishment of a CBC institutional structure in the EU. The European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (also known as the Madrid Convention) which concluded in 1980 and entered into force in 1981 (Council of Europe, 2014), is the result of this tradition and the mark of the institutionalization of CBC within the European Community. This very short convention (12 articles) defines a common ground for territorial cooperation among signatory states and recognizes the role of local actors in CBC. Cross-border cooperation since then has become institutionalized and flourished in the EU. Today CBC programmes operate under the structural funds of the EU and fund CBC projects between member, candidate and neighbouring states of the EU. For the purposes of this study, the legal framework of CBC is limited to the IPA- CBC programme and related EU and Turkish national laws and regulations.

IPA-CBC exists within the IPA programme of the EU. IPA is the general name of the instruments – covered by the ERDF -- designed to assist EU candidate countries in gaining membership. The IPA programme's aim is to "support them [candidate countries] in their efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law; reform public administration; carry out economic reforms; respect human rights; promote gender equality; support the development of civil society; advance regional cooperation; and contribute to sustainable development in these countries" (IPA, 2014, p. 4). CBC is one of the five pillars (together with Transition Assistance and Institution Building, Regional Development, Human Resources Development, and Rural Development) of IPA. The goals, objectives and priority axes of the

programme are defined in collaboration with national authorities of both states and cover a large spectrum of actions (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 : Objectives, strategic objectives, priority axes and measures of the IPA-CBC Bulgaria- Turkey Programme (IPA, 2014, p.5 and pp. 31-34).

Objectives			**Priority Axes and Measures**	
O1	Development of cross-border economic, social and environmental activities in border areas		PA 1	Sustainable social and economic development
O2	Address common challenges in the field of environment, public health, prevention and fight against organized crime		Measure 1.1	Improvement of the social development and social cohesion links
O3	Ensure efficient and secure borders		Measure 1.2	Economy Competitiveness increasing
O4	Promote legal and administrative cooperation		Measure 1.3	Infrastructural support for the improvement of the economic potential of the co-operation area
O5	Promote local "people to people" type of actions		PA2	Improvement of the quality of life
Strategic Objectives			Measure 2.1	Protection of environment, nature and historical and cultural heritage
SO1	Boost sustainable economic development in co-operation area build on the comparative advantages		Measure 2.2	Capacity building for sustainable use of natural resources, cultural and historical heritage
SO2	Improve the overall social development and promote social cohesion among people and communities		PA3	Technical assistance
SO3	Improve the quality of life by efficiently use of common natural resources as well as protection of natural, cultural and historical heritage values		Measure 3.1	Overall administration and evaluation of the Programme
			Measure 3.2	Publicity and communication

Although these objectives, axes and measures cover a broad area of action, their cross-border context is clear: the primary goal of the programme is to increase cross-border interaction of all kinds in the region, which would help the candidate country in the accession process by increasing interactions with an EU member state in the economic, social and administrative fields. However, although it is not clearly mentioned, also a regional development goal with a new regionalism perspective can be observed. The SO1 in Table 5.5, for instance, mentions using "comparative advantages" for economic development. SO3 stresses the use of "common natural resources" for improving quality of life; PA1 stresses "sustainability"; and Measure 1.2 references the importance of "economic competitiveness". As discussed previously, these concepts are the signifiers of a new regionalist approach, which relies on endogenous resources to achieve competitiveness. Hence, the broader

institutional framework for CBC between Bulgaria and Turkey is shaped by new regionalist ideas that are promoted by the EU and, to some extent, also by involved nation states.

The target group of these objectives and priority axes covers a variety of local and national actors including local and regional authorities, their associations, regional offices of central governments and institutions established by them, business support institutions, education and training institutions, NGO's and other community organizations (IPA, 2014, pp. 32-35). The involvement of these organizations also extends the field of CBC to local actors to create a governance structure. However the process of decision making, hence the authority to decide on the regional priorities is kept at the supranational and national levels. Interviewed officials from the Ministry of the EU Affairs and Ministry of Development have argued that the regional concerns were taken under consideration during the programme preparation process. The involvement of the regional level was established by the use of the regional development plan of the Thrace RDA and by the meetings with the Agency's staff. It is also stated that extended meetings with local committees are prepared for the next CBC programming period. Nevertheless, the final decision, hence the control of the allocation of resources is still left to the national and supranational authorities.

The established institutional structure for coordination, control and management of CBC (Figure 5.4) is divided between two countries and managed using the shared management approach. The Joint Monitoring Committee is the highest decision-making authority responsible for addressing priorities and monitoring programme successes. This committee was established by representatives appointed by member nation states along with the European Commission. The Managing Authority is the Directorate General Territorial Cooperation Management at the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works of the Republic of Bulgaria. It is responsible for managing and implementing the programme in partnership with the National Authority (The Ministry of EU Affairs in Turkey). The Joint Technical Secretariat is the regional level within the institutional hierarchy, located in Haskovo, Bulgaria. It has an "antennae" organization located in Edirne, Turkey. These organizations are responsible for assisting the Managing Authority and Joint Technical Secretariat in their daily work and carrying out the duties of a secretariat. They are also the points

of contact for project beneficiaries. They consist of an equal number of employees contracted by the Managing Authority.



Figure 5.1 : Management, Monitoring, Control and Implementation Structures (Adopted from IPA, 2014, p.50).

In this structure, the established hierarchy again reflects a vertical structure that is under the control of the EU and central state authorities. Even at the regional level, the Joint Technical Secretariat and its antennae consist of central state-appointed employees that do not necessarily understand the needs and interests of local societies.

The Managing Authority and the Joint Technical Secretariat, both established in Bulgaria, play critical roles in the selection process of projects and the distribution of funds. Although they are staffed by Bulgarian and Turkish members, Turkish perceptions at the local level regard the location of these offices as a sign of Bulgarian control of the programme. This, in turn -- and perhaps because of the non-participatory approach of the programme – underscores the belief that project selection and the allocation of funds is biased towards Bulgarian interests.

The organizational structure of CBC can be identified as a limited multi- level governance system. As Figure 5.1 indicates the European Commission, the Joint Monitoring Committee, the Audit Authority and the Joint Technical Secretariat are

hierarchically nested under each other, establishing a supranational institutional structure for CBC. Bulgarian and Turkish national governments, identified as the Managing Authority and National Authority respectively, also take decisive roles on CBC at policy and implementation level. However this structure, as becomes evident, is far from adopting a participatory approach by leaving beneficiaries passive receivers of policies and funds at the bottom end of the institutional structure, and by establishing the Joint Technical Secretariat as an EU and central state organization at the regional level without local and regional involvement.

The Procurement and Grants for European Union External Actions tendering procedure (PRAG) is another EU-originated law, which affects CBC processes in the Edirne- Kırklareli border region. This law is a set of rules that define grant and procurement mechanisms of EU funds (EC, 2014). The contents of these rules are outside the scope of this study. Rather, particular importance is given to the contradictory, dual structure that has emerged over the course of the project implementation process. Grants are allocated according to PRAG rules and the use of these grants is also subject to tendering procedures put in place by the same rules. More concretely, spending money within a CBC project can only be done in accordance with PRAG procedures. However, local actors, particularly from the public sector, are also obliged to obey the national procurement law. In the event that PRAG rules and the national procurement law contradict each other, it is not clear how project beneficiaries should act.

During the field study, it was observed that across the board, all public project beneficiaries were under stress during the tendering process because of this contradiction. On the one hand, complying with PRAG procedures is necessary to ensure project payment, as project spending is done in advance and reimbursement of funds is completed only after inspection by independent controllers. On the other hand, public organizations can be audited anytime by national authorities, looking to ensure that expenditures are in compliance with the relevant public procurement law despite the fact that some items of which contradict PRAG tendering procedures. As a temporary solution, the Ministry of EU Affairs authorities have written official letters to the Ministry of the Interior explaining the situation and asking for the necessary understanding for project beneficiaries (Personal Interview, 2013). Despite

informal efforts at the central state level, the absence of legal clarity for some interlocutors is one of the most discouraging factors in terms of participation in CBC.

Procurement law, in the case of Turkish-Bulgarian CBC, emerges as a field for politics of scale that has transformative effects on the institutional structure of both national and local scales. It is expected that during the EU integration process, a candidate country will transform its domestic laws and regulations to comply with EU standards. The allocation of EU funding according to EU laws, from this perspective constitutes a part of EU conditionality. This is not an easy-going process, however, since transformation of procurement law requires more complex institutional transformations; and interlocutors believe that the central government is reluctant to take these necessary steps. While one of the explanations for this reluctance is the complexity of the transformation required, there is also a second argument, which asserts that stalling on making changes to the procurement law reflects a more general reluctance towards EU accession. Indeed, civil servants and civil society members argue that this is one of the indicators of the sincerity of the central government's desire to join the EU (Personal Interview, 2013).

Independent from the legal transformation aspect, tendering procedures have complied with PRAG criteria without a significant problem until now, and have had transformative effects at the local scale, even if not always in a positive way. Various interlocutors have described their way of doing business, the "Turkish style", as focusing on the things that have to be done instead of the procedures themselves. They rely on informal networks and trust to accomplish their missions, and rate legal procedures as being of secondary importance. Therefore, for the sake of efficiency, even in the public sector, they are used to completing the practical work first and setting out to "filling out the necessary paperwork" later. This is an informal relationship based on personal relations and trust in which local public and private actors openly credit each other and believe that they will act in a way that will not cause any problem in the future. Yet the procedures of CBC do not leave room for the Turkish style of doing business, which, according to most of the project beneficiaries, leads to inefficiency and an increase in the costs of projects. Tendering procedures, according to two mayors interviewed, cause more than a 40% increase in the "real" costs of the projects. Moreover, many basic costs cannot be easily reimbursed from the program budget; instead a complicated procedure is required

that significantly increases transaction costs. An illustrative example of transaction costs would be the fuel needed to complete a project using one's own vehicle. Such spending cannot be drawn from the project budget; instead it is recommended that a beneficiary rent a car, the costs of which can be covered by the budget. The result is that a large sum of project budgets has to be spent on purposes not directly related to the project.

EU procedures also require the use of the English language in procurement and tendering documents, which again neglects local conditions. This is considered another sign of the weak link between the supranational and local scales, and described as a "comedy" by more than one of the interlocutors. A remarkable example was given by one interlocutor, who needed to contract a painter who has never applied for a tendering process, let alone spoken and written in English. "At the end of the day," the interlocutor explains, "everything turned into a one-man show, in which I prepared the announcement for tendering, the bid of the painter and the contract" (Personal Interview, 2013).

Despite the legal difficulties described above, theoretically, the process of applying for CBC funding is open to any institution located in the border region. However, the laws and regulations defined by both the EU and the Turkish government constrain a large number of organizations that would otherwise participate in CBC. The constraints can be summarized by four main categories.

First, IPA procedures allocate 20% of the project budget as an advance and the remaining sum is paid after tenders are completed by the beneficiaries. So the beneficiaries are supposed to have a sufficient budget to pay in advance for project costs and to be able to wait for periods extending to 8 months for reimbursement by the EU. These criteria in practice eliminate small-scale organizations, especially NGOs at first hand because in some cases, the total annual budget of an NGO comes nowhere near an average proposed project budget.

Second, national regulations restrict organizations seeking CBC funding that owe tax and social insurance debts to the state. These regulations affect primarily the municipalities, especially small-sized ones, since most of them suffer from such indebtedness. In addition, larger municipalities, such as the central municipality of

Edirne Province, are restricted from participating in CBC due to debts owed to the state.

Third, for many public organizations, such as schools, legally it is impossible to apply for CBC funding, since their annual budget is centrally planned to cover only substantial costs such as salaries and maintenance. However, CBC procedures necessitate the allocation of internal resources, even if only temporarily.

Fourth, the visa requirements and the hard visa procedures of Bulgaria are also mentioned as a transaction costs increasing and constraining factor that discourages potential Turkish applicants from participating in CBC.

5.2 CBC Institutions in the Edirne- Kırklareli Border Region

The constitution of institutions is one of the four stages of the institutionalization of regions in Paasi's (1986, 1996) conceptualization. This stage refers to the establishment of institutions (in its literal meaning, an institution refers to "an organization founded for a religious, educational, professional, or social purpose", Oxford Online Dictionary) necessary to reproduce and articulate social dynamics that constitute a region in the social consciousness and political structure. Institutions from this perspective are perceived as the social agents that consolidate social dynamics and crystallise inter-scalar power relations in society. In the case of CBC, together with newly established institutions, the transformation of existing institutions is also a part of the institutionalization process. From this point of view, Amin and Thrift's (1994) "institutional thickness" plays an explanatory role. Institutional thickness is a sum of institutional diversity, the level of interactions between institutions, and recognition of the institutional structure in which institutions are involved. CBC institutions in Edirne-Kırklareli, analysed from this perspective, are categorised in four main groups, namely the Joint Technical Secretariat antennae institution in Edirne (ABEM), central state institutions, municipalities and civil society institutions.

5.2.1 The EU- CBC coordination centre

The EU Coordination Centre (ABEM, or Avrupa Birliği Eşgüdüm Merkezi) was established to coordinate the activities of the Joint Technical Secretariat in the

Edirne-Kırklareli border region. Within the EU hierarchy, the centre falls under the National Authority, the Ministry of EU Affairs in the current Turkish context.

The short history of this institution provides clues on EU conditional transformation. It was established in 2003, eight years before the establishment of the Ministry of EU Affairs. During that time, the centre was under the General Secretariat of the EU (ABGS), a Prime Ministry organization. As a Prime Ministry organization, ABGS had the opportunities of the central state in terms of using staff and resources. However it also meant being under strict hierarchical control and dependency in decision making processes. Beginning with its establishment, the responsibility of the ABEM was given to the provincial governorship of Edirne and was managed by a public servant appointed by the provincial governor as a result of this institutional setting. The official name of the office is still The Edirne Province Governorship-EU Coordination Office (ABEM, 2014).

After the establishment of the Ministry of EU affairs in 2011 and having been declared the National Authority, the ABGS was abolished, and ABEM became a part of the new ministry. However, the newly established ministry was lacking technical and financial resources to accomplish its country-wide organization with provincial and regional branches. The establishment of EU offices within provincial governorships is a solution for the lack of human resources within the new ministry. In Edirne, the already established EU office then served as both Joint Technical Secretariat antennae and the EU office of the Edirne governorship.

At the time this field study was conducted, the responsible officer was a high school teacher who used to work in a public school prior to his appointment by the provincial governor. Before him, a clerk of the provincial governorship performed his duty. Being a staff member within the governorships means conducting numerous official and unofficial duties in addition to work related to the Joint Technical Secretariat and the EU office. These duties include serving as the EU information desk of the governorship; preparing projects in the name of the governorship, making first level control of ongoing CBC projects and performing other duties as required by the governor. During the interview, the interlocutor argued that the Joint Technical Secretariat and CBC-related work comprise no more than 20% of his regular workload (Personal Interview, 2013).

The interviewed official from the Financial Cooperation Directorate of the Ministry of EU Affairs responded that not having their own staff in this office is a human resources problem that they are trying to overcome. According to her the properties required for this office are having knowledge of the region and programme, fluency in English and project management experience. In response the salary paid for the position remains moderate due programme constraints. Consequently it becomes almost impossible to find a local applicant with required properties and those applying outside the region are not willing to relocate for such a limited salary.

This brief description of the ABEM reflects the transformation of the Turkish administrative structure towards the EU accession. On the one hand, EU accession-related bureaucratic institutions have been inserted into local and national administrative structures, but on the other hand, the lack of human resources, especially at the local level, necessitates the use of existing staff in these new organizations. Consequently, the use of existing staff for newly established EU bureaucracy has melded with the transposition of existing hierarchies onto the new EU field, sometimes resulting in contradictions and conflicts of interest. The Edirne province governorship, for example, is both a potential project beneficiary and the authority responsible for coordinating CBC-related secretary duties.

5.2.2 Central government institutions

5.2.2.1 Governorships

Provinces are the highest local administrative levels within the administrative structure of Turkey. The second-tier administrative level is the district. The highest-ranking authority representing the central state in a province is the provincial governor. Below her/him are the district governors of the province. The duties of the governorships range from management and administration of central state institutions at the local level to providing services to rural areas in non-metropolitan cities.

In the case of CBC, the provincial governorships and their EU offices officially have the main duty of promoting CBC, announcing the calls for projects, providing necessary information to applicants, assisting organizations interested in CBC and educating interested parties on project preparation and management. They are also described as potential project beneficiaries, eligible for applying for funding. In other

words, governorships also compete with municipalities and civil society organizations for financial resources.

In each province of Turkey, one of the vice governors is appointed as the EU point of contact, responsible for supervising the EU-related duties of her/his staff as well as the EU projects conducted in the province and within the institution. As one of the interlocutors argued, the governors and EU offices attached to them are routinely informed on project applications for EU funding. Although governors do not have the formal authority to influence projects, they establish a tacit consensus on project applicants through surveillance, which in turn results in self-constraining behaviour in terms of protecting "national interests". This can be seen as one of the gatekeeping activities of the central state in terms of CBC. Without formally being involved in CBC monitoring and project selection mechanisms, central state authorities formally and informally remind applicants of their existence, interests and authority.

However, governorships do not only constrain project candidates; in fact, they also encourage potential candidates. Having access to a broad range of information resources, provincial and district governorships regularly monitor numerous funding programmes, distribute their calls for applications to a wide range of actors in their jurisdictions and in cases where they realize that a call for an application fits perfectly with a particular organization in their district or province, they call personally the responsible party of the institution to inform her/him about the project opportunities.

District governors have the same duties as provincial governors at the second-tier administrative level: the districts. However, as they operate in smaller areas than the provinces, they have closer contact with local institutions and society and are more interested in local development issues, which makes them as much a part of the local governance structure as the central state bureaucracy. Their role in CBC has two sides. First, they promote CBC in their localities, which means that by performing the basic duties described above they encourage local society to participate in CBC as a state policy. However, depending on the governor him- or herself, their role can either end with these basic duties and remain a bureaucratic activity, or it can reach to further points. Indeed, as the highest state authority, their interest in CBC determines the overall interest of civil society in the district.

The case of the Uzunköprü district of Edirne Province is illustrative from this perspective. In the first Call for Projects (CFP), with five approved projects, the district was one of the most successful districts in the border region. The project beneficiaries were the Uzunköprü Chamber of Trade and Industry (CTI), a public high school, the Uzunköprü Union of Milk Producers, Kırcasalih Municipality (a small town within the Uzunköprü district) and the Uzunköprü Commodity Exchange. While the preliminary data suggested a diversity of CBC institutions in the district, the field study revealed that this first impression is illusive. While the Uzunköprü Commodity Exchange and the CTI had prepared stand-alone projects, the remaining three projects were prepared under the influence of the district governor.

During the interview with the governor, he explained the process of project preparation and application as follows: first, the governor himself conducted internet research for possible CBC ideas and prepared a long list. Then he summoned the heads of the local public and civil society organizations to discuss potential beneficiaries. After shortlisting the projects in this way, he outsourced project writing to a private consultancy firm. Partners from the Bulgarian side were also identified by the governor during a partner finding event in Bulgaria. Finally, all project proposals were submitted by the governor as the highest authority of the district. Consequently the project beneficiaries were informed about their projects only during the implementation phase. The governor explained his facilitating role as a necessity emerging from the lack of human resources in the district. Without his knowledge of English and the networks within which he is involved, according to him, these projects could never have been realized (Personal Interview, 2013).

Furthermore, for the coordination of the projects, the governor established an "EU Projects and Coordination Centre". The director of the centre was appointed by the governor, and also served as the project coordinator of two projects and provided technical support to other beneficiaries during the project implementation process. The EU office remained silent after the projects finished.

The result of the governor's efforts stoked interest in the process and in the 2nd CFP, 18 institutions from the district applied for CBC funding. However, none of them succeeded in securing funding, perhaps because of the low attention paid to building capacity for project preparation and implementation.

The second role of the district governorships is to prepare their own projects for CBC. A district governorship is an administrative organization with a limited and well-defined budget, which means that it doesn't have the financial resources temporarily necessary for the implementation of a project. The solution that has been found for this problem identifies one of the institutional characteristics of CBC in Edirne- Kırklareli border region. Several organizations controlled by the district governorships and established to provide services participate in CBC on behalf of the governorships. The District Special Administrations, Unions for Service Delivery to the Villages and Foundations for Social Help and Solidarity are the main organizations used for this purpose. CBC projects realized through these organizations take a considerable share in the region and become a financial resource for these organizations.

5.2.2.2 Provincial branches of Ministry of Education and public schools

Public schools and the provincial branches of the Ministry of Education (MEB, or Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı) are among the most active organizations in the region. They not only prepare CBC projects with high levels of acceptance but also undertake key roles in the proliferation of CBC in the region. Their role has multiple dimensions. First, schools have a long history of EU collaboration beginning with student and staff exchange programmes, which have made teachers and directors familiar with project preparation and common implementation procedures.

Second, the primary goal of CBC projects within the schools is related primarily to students and education. This in turn pushes the students to be familiar with both cross-cultural contacts, project management and implementation processes. From a sociological institutionalist perspective this represents a structural effect that, in the long term, ensures the stability of CBC as an EU- and state-promoted practice.

Finally, the role of English teachers is of particular importance, as they constitute a large part of the human capital in the region with the necessary skills (culture, education and knowledge of English) to accomplish projects. Because of this, English teachers are used as guides and advisors by other institutions willing to participate in CBC, and also are appointed as project managers within various public organizations by governors. It is no coincidence that the ABEM responsible -- as well as many other project coordinators -- was a teacher. Consequently they

encountered CBC not as voluntary participants but as civil servants appointed by their superiors. Interviewed teachers working in high schools, MEB local branches and other public institutions unanimously agree that CBC is an unpaid extra job for them, which causes a loss of income (i.e. additional course payments are not given to them) and additional responsibility and risks. Many interlocutors stated that they would not have been involved in this kind of project at all if they had not been ordered to do so. They also agreed that the programme lacks incentives that may compensate the extra risks and responsibilities they take. This reveals another central state-led institutional setting affecting CBC. Unlike their Bulgarian counterparts, Turkish civil servants are not allowed to receive payment from project budgets as project coordinators. CBC projects are a part of their day-to-day duties for which they are already paid. In addition, they bear the burden of tender risks, which can cause considerable financial damage to their institution in the event of failure. Moreover, during project preparation they mention enduring many sleepless nights during the project-writing phase. Turkish officials compare themselves to their Bulgarian counterparts and realize that they are the most "undervalued" persons within the projects. In turn, they tend to invest minimum effort in their projects, choosing instead to satisfy only the required expectations.

5.2.2.3 The Thrace Regional Development Agency

The Thrace Regional Development Agency (Thrace RDA) is a member of the Joint Technical Secretariat and an observer of CBC in the Edirne- Kırklareli border region. Its role is a passive one, with the exception of the Kırklareli Investment Support Office. The Kırklareli office is active in terms of establishing contacts with potential Bulgarian partners and providing technical support to those willing to prepare CBC projects. The Office has become a reference point for many local organizations ranging from small municipalities to NGOs. For those who referred to the Office as their main supporter, they have two main reasons, both of them related to the individuals employed at the Office. First, the interlocutors have argued that they get quick and relevant support from staff there. Second, Agency coordinators in Kırklareli are Bulgarian immigrants, and have knowledge of Bulgaria and can speak Bulgarian. Moreover they exhibited deep project consultancy experience prior to the start of their employment in the RDA, which allows them to use their networks to help project candidates. However, this is the situation only in Kırklareli and is done

with personal efforts as an unofficial help. The Edirne Investment Support Office, for example, is not connected to CBC activities at all (Personal Interview, 2013). The interviewed staff of Kırklareli Office argued that Kırklareli lacks technical resources and human capital compared to Edirne. ABEM, for example, is established in Edirne and it is easier for Edirne citizens to get help for CBC. Therefore, the Kırklareli Office has to support these types of regional development activities as a part of their duty. The staff has also agreed that supporting regional development activities is not part of their job descriptions, and is therefore attended to on a voluntary basis.

Despite the current passive position of the Thrace RDA in terms of CBC, one Ministry of Development official interviewed argued that RDAs in general have been prepared to undertake EU funding-related duties in near future. As a part of this preparation period, it is expected that the Thrace RDA will take a more active role in CBC. As a result of this transition process, the RDAs prefer to remain passive and wait to determine which role will be more appropriate for achieving their goals through EU accession. The assigned role could be either supportive, as currently seen in the Kırklareli Investment Support Office, or decision-making, integrating the Agency to the national and the EU bureaucracies. The interlocutor has also argued that the Ministry of Development has adopted a post-EU accession perspective and aims to build an EU-consistent structure of RDAs (Personal Interview, 2013).

5.2.3 Municipalities

Mayors and municipality officials interviewed agree that 2007, the beginning of transition from the PHARE-CBC programme to IPA-CBC, marks a major turning point, or a critical juncture in their approach to CBC. The critical factor here is the funding newly made available for infrastructure projects. Before 2007, the scope of CBC was limited to "soft" projects that included only cultural interactions. One of the mayors interviewed described them as "invisible" projects, since they took place as bilateral events that went unnoticed by most community members. Infrastructure projects, on the other hand, are an attractive opportunity for mayors, since they hit many birds with one stone. First, by virtue of CBC, they include cross-border interactions and have already a "soft" project embedded within. Second, the budget allocated for them can extend to €500,000, which is usually split into halves between project partners. This is a considerable mass of financial resources for small

municipalities, which operate with limited budgets and would not have had an opportunity to provide a particular service without the benefit of funding. Third, an infrastructure project, which in practice means the pavement of a road; the renovation of a historical building for the use of social purposes; or constructing a sports centre is considered as an achievement of the municipality, which can turn as more votes in the next elections. Fourth, municipalities' international reputation and recognition are increasing as they receive greater financial awards for CBC, which creates a virtuous circle of international and national financing.

There is a general agreement that CBC funding, particularly in terms of infrastructure projects, provides opportunities for municipalities. However, not all of them can be involved in CBC and use EU funding. As mentioned above, any institution that would like to participate in CBC must not owe taxes or social insurance debts to the state. This precondition reduces the number of municipalities participating in CBC. Some of them have no choice but to abstain from CBC, since it is impossible for them to pay their debts. For the others, they face the dilemma of locating enough capital to pay their debts in order to participate in CBC (and also other programmes, such as those of RDAs) or opt out of CBC altogether. Usually officials perform a cost and benefit analysis prior to making a final decision if they see that the benefit from participating in a project exceeds their debts they chose the first option. No matter what their preference is, they all agree that the central government should change its policies, since they prevent a considerable amount of funding from being used for local development.

5.2.4 Civil society

This field study revealed that civil society in the Edirne-Kırklareli border region is divided into two blocs regarding CBC. On one side, there are the business support organizations (such as chambers of trade and industry, chambers of agriculture, stock exchanges, etc.) and businessmen associations (such as the Association for Young Businessmen in Edirne) that have a considerable number of members and financial resources. For them CBC represents an investment that can result in benefits to their members, an increase in reputation, the multiplying of new business contracts and/or assistance in financing social responsibility projects. These organizations are among the leading CBC institutions in the region.

On the other side, public benefit NGOs, the number of which is very limited in the list of beneficiaries because of debts to the state or an absence of human and financial resource have low access to CBC funding. The interviewed NGOs participating in CBC mostly rely on other public organizations such as the Thrace RDA Kırklareli Investment Support Office, municipalities, district governorships or ABEM for the preparation and documentation of their projects. They usually perceive CBC as an opportunity that can improve their conditions and services, and these organizations appreciate the support of other, public organizations. However, more independent NGOs that have the resources to prepare projects perceive central state institutions, especially governorships, as ignorant and discouraging. For them, public institutions are an extra source of bureaucracy that yields ever-higher mounts of project-related paperwork. Separately, unpleasant experiences with governorships were mentioned, illustrating the unwillingness of official authorities to support these NGOs in their activities.

The best possible explanation for this duality rests in the individual behaviour of officials and their vested interest in the improvement of civil society and CBC. However, as one of the interlocutors from a public benefit NGO argued, the situation becomes complicated with the involvement of the EU: "The state perceives itself above NGOs. But the EU wants to work with us, not with them. That's their dilemma" (Personal Interview, 2013).

5.3 Institutionalized Practices of CBC

It has to be recognized that practices related to CBC have not spread within society in the region, but remain within a small group consisting of project beneficiaries, bureaucrats and public officials. Therefore, the institutionalized practices of CBC in this section refer to the formal or informal relations between and within these groups or organizations that have contributed to the establishment of a particular way of doing business related to CBC.

Indeed, the isolation of CBC from a large part of society is a starting point for reading the CBC practices. During this field study, it was observed that most project beneficiaries have participated in more than one project and regularly apply for CBC funding. These organizations also constitute a considerable share of institutions with sufficient financial and human resources to both prepare and implement projects.

Consequently, CBC remains in the hands of a limited number of people and it is difficult for a newcomer to enter the club. Organizations in the region are constrained by laws, regulations and the level of socio- economic development of the region, and only the forerunners in terms of financial and human resources manage to benefit from CBC funding.

A similar limitation was also observed in partner selection processes. A group of organizations have established close links with their partners in Bulgaria and usually do not rotate or replace their partners. This is explained by having trust-based relationships with their partners that minimize the risks of project implementation. But it also reflects another condition of CBC that was identified by some of the interlocutors as "being a partner". Being a partner means staying absent from project preparation processes and leaving the preparatory work and budgeting to the leading partner in Bulgaria. Indeed "partners" in this case only participate in jointly held events and benefit from the projects without bearing any responsibility for the preparation component. This can be described as a win- win situation, since CBC requires joint action on both sides of the border. While the Bulgarian side takes on the responsibility of project preparation and the larger share of CBC funding, the Turkish side gets the opportunity to use EU funding without having exhibited any effort. Although this is not a desirable situation for many interlocutors, for those who are involved in such a relationship, it represents an opportunity to participate in CBC, even though they do not possess sufficient resources on their own (especially in terms of human capital) to accomplish the necessary tasks.

For many organizations, CBC in practice is identified with finding ways to bypass particular constraints. The abovementioned case is an example of bypassing the reality of insufficient resources. But it is not just constraints that must be bypassed; many organizations have legal constraints that prevent them from participating in CBC. As mentioned previously, they consist of debt to the state for municipalities, and having no temporary budget to be allocated for CBC for public organizations. Despite these legal constraints municipalities and public organizations are among the leading project beneficiaries in the region, thanks to an informal strategy used for bypassing these hurdles: intermediary organizations. These organizations are used either to transfer the necessary budget for tendering to public organizations or to replace the municipalities that are in debt to the state and apply for projects in their

name. Unions for Delivering Services to Villages, Foundations for Social Solidarity, Provincial Special Administrations, Schools' Families Unions, and Municipal Unions are among these types of intermediaries. They appear as the beneficiary name of the project, but in fact the project is developed by a shadow institution, one that is technically not allowed to participate.

These law bypassing practices come with their consequences. These law-bypassing practices come with their consequences. In the case of municipalities, municipal unions can apply in the name of two municipalities at most, since this is the limit of projects that a single organization can be granted. Municipal unions usually stay in the control of the municipality that is having the presidency of the union for a particular period; hence preferences tend to favour those municipalities. In the case of public organizations, there are no constraints limiting participation, but a temporary budget for project funding has to be found within a supportive organization. Although informal solutions make it possible for public institutions such as schools to participate in CBC, they also bind them to the personal decisions and connections of the governors as the top authorities who issue these permissions. Again, personal connections with governors are in practice, which can be used as a source of power over these institutions.

Finally, CBC practices in public organizations become a part of the bureaucracy instead of voluntary actions. Usually, top managers of public institutions order their staff to prepare CBC projects. These managers are also ordered by their managers and so forth, onto the highest level. The main reason for such pressure stems from competition between Edirne and Kırklareli in terms of having the largest number of project contracts. Consequently the number of the projects, not their social value, is more important, resulting in low attention paid by the employees to the projects themselves. However, it also identifies the strong commitment of central state institutions to CBC. The attention paid by the highest officials of provinces, the governors, makes CBC a part of central state policies.

5.4 Defining the Border Region, or the Establishment of the Territorial Shape of CBC

The area of this field study and the administrative regions of Bulgaria and Turkey that take part in CBC fall within the borders of a larger historical and geographical

region, namely Thrace (Figure 5.2). Geographically, the Thracian Region is located within and between the modern borders of Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey. The Turkish part of the region covers the whole of north western Turkey, surrounded by the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara and the Aegean Sea. This is a geographical and historical region named after the ancient society inhabiting the region around the 4th century BC.

Figure 5.2: The Thrace Region (Url-1).

Historically, under the rule of Ottoman Empire for four centuries Thrace was inhabited by a heterogeneous society of Muslims, Christians and Jews. The division of geographical units into administrative territories was conducted very vaguely along religious lines, also a major source of identity among inhabitants of the region. Nonetheless, cultural interaction, population movement and economic interaction were also considered a general characteristic of the region (Manos, 2005; Mazover, 2001).

The Greek and Bulgarian revolutions resulting in independence in 1832 and 1909 respectively were the roots of the tripartite hostility between these two nation-states and the Ottoman Empire. Modern Turkey, established in 1923, inherited its part of that enmity from the Ottoman Empire, although no war has been fought since the establishment of these nation states. A part of that enmity lies in the self-perception of the Turkish nation state as the heir of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Turks were identified with Islam, which was the source of religious enmity and accompanied political disputes that have made Turkey a "negative point of reference for [the] symbolic construction of the local political community" (Gkintidis, 2013). The refugee exchanges between Turkey and Greece and Greece and Bulgaria have caused the homogenization of the previously heterogeneous region (Karakasidou, 1997). After the establishment of new nation states in Thrace, the long standing hostilities between them and the exchange of minorities between Turkey and Greece, the basic characteristic of the border regions in the Thrace region during the 20th century could be described as alienation, since the dominant narrative of the respective nation states was nationalism accompanied by strong political and administrative dependence on the centre in combination with military fortification along the borders (Gkintidis, 2013; Mazower, 2001). With the involvement of the EU, and after all the three states became members or candidates of the EU, national politics changed significantly and bilateral contacts were strengthened. However, these historical conditions still prevail in the identity of border people and continue to define a characteristic of border regions.

In the Turkish context, the broader geographical definition of Thrace does not allow a suitable context for examining CBC. Looking to the parts of Thrace remaining within the Turkish administrative territories, only a limited part of them are actually border regions. Therefore, although these border regions are an integral part of Thrace, the border region typology defined by Baud and Van Schendel (1997) offers a more specific lens through which to study the area. This typology divides border regions into three zones: border heartlands, intermediate borderlands and outer borderlands. Border heartlands are those areas where the existence of national borders is a dominant factor in the social and political lives of the locality. The influence of borders gradually decreases, varying from moderate to weak in the intermediate borderlands and becomes weak in the outer borderlands, where the

effects of borders are felt only under specific circumstances (Baud and Van Schendel, 1997, p. 221- 222).

Adopting this approach to the area of the study's field research, Istanbul, a part of which is located within the boundaries of historically and geographically-defined Thrace, remains at the outer borderland of Thrace. Indeed, as a long-time cosmopolitan city and now among the major global cities of the world, Istanbul is influential on Thrace, rather than being influenced by the region- specific characteristics of Thrace. Çanakkale, again only a part of which remains in the Thrace region, can also be placed in the outer borderland category. However it should be noted that Çanakkale is a border region, through the sharing of maritime borders with Greece. Therefore it would be better to describe it a different border heartland with its own bordering dynamics. What remains are three provinces, namely Tekirdağ, Edirne and Kırklareli, which also constitute the NUTS2 level region, TR21, and host the Thrace Regional Development Agency. Tekirdağ Province is an internal province, neither adjacent to any international boundary nor eligible for CBC funding. These properties make Tekirdağ an intermediate borderland with weak influence on/from the border. However as the centre of the NUTS2 level region and hosting municipal unions such as TRAKYAKENT that cover municipalities eligible for CBC funding, Tekirdağ is familiar with CBC practices and the effects of bordering in general. Finally, Edirne and Kırklareli Provinces, located along the Turkish-Greek and Turkish-Bulgarian borders, are border heartlands, where the effects of borders have consolidated over time.

Under these circumstances, the territorial shape of the western border region of Turkey is historically defined first by the strong influence of nationalism during the 20th century and increasing EU influence over the last decade. Population exchanges between Greece and Turkey and Bulgaria and Greece, and the mass migration of Turkish minority groups from Bulgaria to Turkey have diminished the ethnic diversity in the region of Thrace. With the strong impact of the Cold War and remnants of historical enmities, communities homogenized and impacted by nationalist ideologies have become alienated, with very limited sustained inter-communal contact and a lack of interest towards each other. Under these conditions, the Edirne-Kırklareli border region was defined by its relations with the central state in Ankara in terms of administration and public investment, and Istanbul, the closest

and the most dominant city in their vicinity, in terms of trade and population flows. This inward-oriented perspective reduced the radius of the heartland border region to the closest districts and even to the neighbourhoods and villages, which were directly affected by the existence of the border in terms of military investment, buffer zones, custom gates and smuggling. The rest of the provinces have largely ignored the other side of the border and established connections with inner parts of the country.

With the end of the Cold War the border milieu started to change slowly but significantly. First, trade liberalization in Bulgaria has increased the volume of trade as well as the cultural contacts between the two countries and bordering provinces. Second, with the official EU candidacy of two countries and Bulgaria's membership in 2007, the EU has become an important facilitator of bilateral relations. The EU's external, enlargement, integration and regional policies, programmes and funds have reshaped the context in which the border region is defined. The pre-accession instrument in general and CBC in particular have contributed to this change significantly. Regional policies of the EU and the new regionalist turn in national politics provided new opportunities and perspectives for regional development, and also forced the regions to rely less and less on decreasing central state investments and look more toward utilizing endogenous resources. The CBC programmes of the EU emerged as one of these opportunities that encouraged border regions to turn toward the other side of the border instead to their capital cities.

At this point, the top-down introduction of the NUTS system by the EU and the definition of NUTS regions at the central state level are important points within the broader definition of the border region. IPA rules state that eligible regions for CBC funding should be defined at the NUTS3 level (IPA, 2014, p. 7). NUTS3 level regions are provinces in Turkey, which makes the provinces of Edirne and Kırklareli eligible for CBC. Consequently the opportunity to take part in CBC funds spreads the border impact from the closest villages, neighbourhoods and districts of the border to the whole provincial area, including those districts that administratively have no contact with Bulgarian border. It is interesting to see that even those districts bordering Greece have established closer contacts with Bulgaria, due to the effect of CBC funding, a fact which is not applicable to Greece and Turkey. In the same vain, municipalities from Tekirdağ, the inner NUTS3 region, neighbouring Edirne and Kırklareli and ineligible for CBC funding have attempted to take a share from CBC

funding by using municipal unions established by the municipalities from these three provinces. Therefore, although global dynamics, such as the end of the Cold War and the expansion of capitalism in former socialist states, have contributed to the de-alienation of the borderlands; in terms of this analysis, the constitution of the territorial shape of the Edirne-Kırklareli border region is a result of EU and national dynamics, or the politics of scale between these two. CBC in this context becomes a tool in the definition of the border region through eligibility criteria, again defined by the politics of scale.

5.5 The Establishment of CBC in the Social Consciousness

The establishment of CBC in the social consciousness refers to its recognition as a way of doing business in the region that contributes to regional development and social well-being. Also legitimizing CBC as an integral part of the border society and the acceptance of CBC as a resource for organizations in the region are critical elements of the social consciousness. It is argued that the institutionalization of CBC requires social legitimacy and acceptance to become part of daily practices in the region.

It is beyond the scope of this study to measure the impacts of CBC on the border society as a whole. The focus is rather on CBC-related institutions and project beneficiaries. Therefore the establishment of CBC in the social consciousness is analysed from the perspectives of these actors, instead of the society as a whole.

The factors contributing to the legitimization of CBC in the Edirne-Kırklareli border region are related to its visibility, the good and bad examples available to potential beneficiaries and national and local politics of European integration.

The visibility of CBC has been achieved by infrastructure projects such as renewed historical buildings or a newly-constructed sports centre bearing an EU flag or sign. Infrastructure projects visualize CBC and distribute its impact on societal level, which contributes more than soft projects in the establishment of CBC within the social consciousness. While soft projects remain at the beneficiary level, social events like fairs and festivals, even for a short time period, make a large part of locality in which they are organized a part of CBC as well. However, the impact of infrastructure projects lays not only in their visibility as physical constructions but in

their contribution toward the improvement of the quality of life in the region (Personal Interview, 2013). The more these projects embed themselves in the social consciousness and the visual landscape (Paasi, 1996) of the region, the more the involved society benefits from project offerings. Therefore, municipalities' and governorships' preference for infrastructure over soft projects contributes to the legitimization of CBC within the social consciousness.

The visualization of CBC projects in some cases also faces opposition from society. Some interlocutors have argued that the requirement to display EU flags and shields have stirred up nationalist feelings and are emblematic of a loss of national sovereignty within some parts of society. Although rare, these events demonstrate that the historical conditions that have played constitutive roles in the establishment of a social consciousness continue to challenge the institutionalization of CBC.

Good examples of successful projects provide enthusiasm for participation in CBC, and bad examples achieve the opposite effect (Personal Interview, 2013). The construction of a sports hall by a school with CBC funding, for instance, immediately motivated other schools to prepare a similar CBC project. On the other hand, a cancelled payment due to inappropriate tendering has caused frustration in other institutions, which results in reluctance to participate in CBC. In the case of Uzunköprü described above, the more CBC events achieve visibility, the more interest the IPA-CBC programme accrues. Perhaps because of the lack of good examples in the region, most of the interlocutors have argued that more time is needed for the development (institutionalization) of CBC in the region. According to them, the effects of actualized CBC projects can be better seen in the mid- and long-term, and the more they are seen, the more attention will be paid by other organization in the border region.

Good and bad examples are not only found in the CBC projects realized in the region. Project beneficiaries also look to the Bulgarian side of the border for comparison. Turkish civil servants usually compare their positions in CBC projects with their Bulgarian counterparts. This comparison is two-fold. First, their Bulgarian counterparts are seen as project specialists having well-defined duties in the project preparation and implementation processes. Conversely, Turkish civil servants perform CBC duties as part of a workload added to their main tasks within their respective organization. Thus, while the single duty of a Bulgarian partner is

managing projects, Turkish civil servants first have to accomplish their primary duties (e.g. teaching, completing paperwork, or performing worksite duties), and then in their remaining time they are supposed to work for CBC projects, which in practice often means unpaid overtime work. Second, while Bulgarian civil servants are legally allowed to receive extra pay from the project budget as project coordinators, Turkish civil servants are not. Although the amount of the payment is not substantial, the extra pay provides enough motivation for civil servants to get involved in CBC projects. In this respect, CBC is perceived as a source of employment within Bulgarian public institutions, whereas it represents only a burden for Turkish ones (Personal Interview, 2013). Such a comparison leads project beneficiaries to perceive the Bulgarian experience as the professional way of CBC and to recognize the deficits in the Turkish institutional setting. These deficits are a result of the Turkish state structure that is highly centralized, far from recognizing local needs and not in the spirit of sharing the enthusiasm of local people for CBC.

The establishment of CBC in the social consciousness is directly related to the process of European Union candidacy and integration. For many interlocutors, the Edirne-Kırklareli border region is already a westernized region that socially and culturally is recognized as integrated with the EU. Therefore CBC hardly contributes to this process. However, the central state's attitude towards CBC according to them reflects the general tendency of the government towards the EU accession. Hence, the legitimization and spread of CBC in the region is intensified or slowed down in accordance with the central state policies. As one of the interlocutors has argued, "CBC depends on the politicians. They blow the wind towards the direction they want. And currently, it is not blowing towards the EU" (Personal Interview, 2013). This is an argument, or perhaps a narrative, that has to be questioned. On the one hand, the unwillingness to change national legislation to give the Turkish civil servants the same rights as their Bulgarian counterparts supports the negative perception of central state in the border region. On the other hand, as previously argued, the gubernatorial pressure to participate in more CBC projects; the promotion of CBC by the Ministry of EU Affairs; and the organization of the Ministry of Development with a post-EU accession perspective indicate an opposite tendency. Leaving the possible explanations of this dilemma to be discussed in the next chapter, it can be argued that among the interlocutors, CBC is established within

the social consciousness as a newly emerging phenomenon that is clearly associated with local, national and supranational dynamics.

On the local scale, CBC is associated with regional development dynamics in terms of increasing well-being and establishing international cultural and trade links with Bulgaria. The perception of the involvement of national and supranational scales in CBC, however, is not clear among interlocutors. Basically, CBC is understood as a policy field between the Turkish state and the EU, but usually the latter is limited to Bulgaria when CBC is considered.

Almost all participants agree that the CBC experience of the region contributed to overcoming the prejudices toward the other side of the border and encouraging participants to be more open towards the culture and life of their counterparts. In this way, CBC conditioned the region for future integration with the EU. But it is also noted that the region was already Europeanised before the addition of CBC, and it is not Edirne and Kırklareli but the rest of Turkey that has to prepare itself for integration. A common narrative that is articulated by interlocutors is the realization that they are doing better than Bulgarians in terms of economic prosperity and enjoying free market organizations such as stock exchanges. The self-confidence emerging from this comparison is usually generalized to a comparison with the EU-wide experiences with prosperity, ignoring the fact that the southern border regions of Bulgaria are among the least developed regions in the EU, and thus not reflective of the EU as an entity.

Another common narrative articulated by officials and project applicants is that IPA-CBC funds are established by and large with the financial contribution of the central governments, including Turkey. Consequently, both beneficiaries and officials have set their motivation for participating in CBC as part of a wider strategy to take “our” money back via these projects. Despite the fact that the contribution of the Turkish state to the programme remains at 7.5% of the amount allocated, this narrative has been used as justification for participation in CBC. In this case, CBC is legitimized as a patriotic movement that “defends” the national scale against encroachment of the supranational scale.

5.6 The Institutional Characteristics of CBC in the Edirne- Kırklareli Border Region

Looking at the institutional dynamics of CBC in the Edirne-Kırklareli border region, the institutional structure they have formed exhibits three main characteristics, namely, a high dependence on individuals, the strong influence of the central state institutions and their reflections of the transformation of the nation state. These characteristics reflect both the inter-scalar context of the institutionalization of CBC and the new institutional dynamics that point to the individual, sociological and historical factors of institutionalization, and stress the dialectic relationship between agency and structure.

5.6.1 The influence of individuals: political elites and institutional entrepreneurs

CBC in the Edirne-Kırklareli border region depends on personal interests and performances of regional elites. This is most obvious in the case of district governors and mayors of municipalities having accomplished a large number of projects. In general, the interviewed staff members of these organizations agree that in the event that mayors and governors are not re-elected or if appointed to somewhere else, CBC is not guaranteed at current levels. Regarding the interests of district governors it is argued that, each governor has her/his special field of interests ranging from economic development to strategic planning, environmentalism and/or project preparation. These personal interests and the cultivation of a "project culture" determine the governors' – and consequently, the districts' -- interest in CBC (Personal Interview, 2013).

However, it is the intensity of CBC, rather than its presence, that varies according to top managers. There is consensus that even though CBC can be substantially reduced in the absence of interest, it will never be nullified, since it is already recognized as a resource for service provision by the political elites. Lowndes and Roberts (2013, p. 148) argue that politicians usually tend to increase the budget in their control, which can be turned into a resource for either augmenting their political status or maximizing their votes. From this perspective, the recognition of CBC as a resource corresponds to the efforts of public officials aimed at increasing their financial opportunities and reputation. However, their behaviour is not accepted only as

opportunistic, but also as having showing strong preferences in their choices (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). For Paasi (1996), these preferences are shaped by social dynamics and power relationships but are skewed towards nation state policies, since local political elites are part of the social groups that reproduce the established social structure and attendant hegemonic power relations.

Allen and Cochrane (2007, p. 1163) argue that political elites represent an example of multi-level governance as they "broker [inter- scalar] connections, transfer policies and, more generally, mobilize interdependencies" between various scales. This definition describes correctly the role of district governors as the mediators of inter-scalar politics. On the one hand, they act as local actors who are committed to local development and try to mobilize resources for this purpose. They also have the local knowledge to identify problems and find appropriate solutions. On the other hand, they are representatives and the highest authorities of the central state in their districts, bound by hierarchical ties to the state. Their actions cannot be considered independent from these policies. Therefore, the strong commitment of district governors to CBC is a result of the balance they have found between local and national interests. CBC, from this perspective, emerges as part of the state policies that serve to reproduce state hegemony, which is part of the local dynamics of the institutionalization of regions.

Political elites are among the most influential actors in CBC because of the political power and the resources they hold. However, they are not the only actors that affect the institutionalization of CBC. A considerable number of civil servants, municipality officials and NGO workers are highly influential within CBC practices at the regional level. They are the individuals whose names come immediately to the minds of local people when they seek help or advice for CBC due to their experience, position and willingness to help. They have contributed to the preparation of several projects and the promotion of CBC within the region. Although they are not as necessary as the political elites for its proliferation, without their efforts CBC would not achieve its current level of recognition in the region. The literature refers to them as "institutional entrepreneurs".

Institutional entrepreneurs are those individuals or groups that take on leadership roles in the process of institutional transformation (Colomy, 1998; Perkmann, 2002). Although their expectations from and interests in institutional transformation are of

particular importance to their mobilization, they do not necessarily have to gain a direct profit from their entrepreneurial activity. Lowndes and Roberts (2013, p. 174) argue that in a highly contested and unreliable environment, the design or redesign of institutions emerges as an intentional activity of institutional entrepreneurs who foresee ongoing transformation and prepare/propose reforms through building coalitions and managing conflicts between opposing actors. Although they never manage to fully satisfy interested parties, they facilitate a transformation of the existing institutional structure by focusing on the common interests of conflicting parties. For Colomy (1998), institutional entrepreneurs represent the form of human agency that is the most capable of transforming institutional structures.

Institutional change is contingent on the orientation and agency of institutional entrepreneurs, since they "crystallize broad symbolic orientations in new ways, articulate specific goals, and construct novel normative, cognitive and organizational frameworks to achieve them". This is, indeed, an innovative activity that challenges the "existing arrangements, rules of thought and standardized practices" (Colomy, 1998, p. 271). According to Colomy (1998, pp. 271-272) the transformative acts of institutional entrepreneurs are perceived as a "project", which emerges from "a vital problem or societal need [that] is either unduly neglected or is currently being addressed through inefficient or ineffective methods". This implies that entrepreneurs cognitively capture the necessity of transformation and formulate it as a problem-solving process based on the current conditions of a specific situation, the desired or ideal shape that is wanted to be reached and the necessary steps that have to be taken for that purpose. The notion of the "project" also binds institutional entrepreneurs to wider social dynamics and allows them to be understood not as "selfless agents of systemic exigencies" but as actors who, through their projects, intentionally modify the institutional structure (Colomy, 1998, p.293).

The main role of institutional entrepreneurs in the process of institutional transformation is mediatory in nature, as they seek to mobilize other actors and establish coalitions for change that will serve "their or their allies' interests in the future" (Perkmann, 2002, p. 112). In this respect, institutional entrepreneurs use existing institutions and institutional practices in different and innovative ways to generate transformation.

During the course of this field study, institutional entrepreneurs were identified first as emerging reference points among other interlocutors. They were referred by interlocutors as the individuals who helped enthusiastically them, although assistance is not part of their established job description. These individuals were reached either through personal connections or through a contact point that knew them. During the interviews with the "institutional entrepreneurs", they identified their relationship with CBC as a personal interest or "hobby". They see it is as an opportunity to do something good and make a difference in society, and also have argued that they "see a future" in CBC (Personal Interview, 2013). In most cases, they became involved in CBC projects by accident, but then realized CBC's potential to impact local development, and sought to contribute to CBC efforts more actively.

Colomy (1998) argues that the "project" initiated by the institutional entrepreneur should propose a break from an existing situation that is not functioning properly, and find an alternative solution regarding the problem at stake. The definition of the problem in the case of CBC in Edirne-Kırklareli border region could simply be stated as not having the capacity to manage a financial resource that is externally provided to the region. Although the institutional entrepreneurs can barely contribute to the lack of financial resources, by offering their service they help to overcome the dearth of human resources. In this way, they solve at least one of the problems towards realization of their projects.

Institutional entrepreneurs also approach critically the current condition of CBC in the region, especially in terms of central-local relations and the top-down style of project writing. One of them has argued, "they are doing amateur work that has become a professional business" (Personal Interview, 2013). Therefore, CBC, from the perspective of institutional entrepreneurs is associated with national political contexts and their local implications.

5.6.2 Gate keeping role of the state

The support of CBC by the central state, and at the same time its reluctance to make necessary legal changes and institutional transformation, was described as one of the dilemmas of the institutionalization of CBC in Chapter 5.3. It was argued that even though civil society interlocutors felt that "in these days the winds are not blowing towards the EU", this view does not reflect the whole situation. Instead, the discourse

of ministry officials interviewed and the considerable efforts district governors have paid to CBC demonstrate a tendency in the opposite direction, towards the internalization of CBC as a part of routine business practices.

Looking at the facts, it is hard to reject any one of these arguments and align with the other. Even without the illuminative comments of the interlocutors, the existence of opposite poles in the approach of the nation state towards CBC is obvious in looking at laws, newly established institutions (RDAs, ABEM, etc.) and the ways in which they function. Therefore, instead of looking for a simple and single solution to the dilemma, a more careful reading of narratives and practices can provide an explanation for both of these dimensions.

Two factors that can explain central state's support relate to historical dynamics (path dependency) and the sub-national impacts of the transformation of the nation state (new regionalism). First, as Keleş (1995) argues, a strong commitment to the ideal of Westernization is among the constitutive elements of the modern Turkish republic. Indeed, since the establishment of the republic, the country has turned towards Europe and Western society, and has completed institutional reforms -- such as replacing the Arabic alphabet with the Latin alphabet -- that have transformed the whole social structure. Turkey's application for accession to the European Community, dating back to 1963, can also be considered evidence of commitment to Westernization. Since then, bilateral relations between the European Community (later the EU) have intensified, reaching their zenith with Turkey's accession to the customs union in 1996 and gaining official candidacy status in 2005. From a historical institutionalist lens, this commitment to Westernization explains the support of the central state as a result of path dependency in state politics and also as a result of its institutionalized dynamics that are articulated through education among society, including political elites.

The second explanatory factor is related to the neoliberal transformation of the state. Starting with the 8th Development Plan (2000), Turkey's regional policies have adopted a new regionalist perspective, which affected the methods of distribution of central state resources. Rather than relying on a centrally orchestrated development perspective, provincial and regional governance institutions were required to prepare their strategic development plans and use central state investments, together with other financial resources, to achieve their goals. Under these conditions, not using

CBC funds is considered irrational by many political elites. The situation was explained metaphorically by a mayor with the following sentences: “There is a soup boiling out there. And we should take a spoonful from it. Otherwise we’ll starve!”

If CBC is supported by the central state and its local representatives, then what explains the reluctance to make necessary institutional changes? In the case of procurement law and PRAG criteria, one of the interlocutors argued that the transformation of the institutional structure was easier for Bulgaria, since their condition after the fall of socialism in the country was like a tabula rasa waiting to be filled with a new institutional structure. Turkey, instead, has an institutional structure with deep historical roots that cannot easily be transformed (Personal Interview, 2013). “Institutional change takes time” is one of the explanatory idioms used to describe the reluctance of the central state to embrace institutional transformation. However, reading the institutionalized practices of CBC in the region provides another explanation for the central state’s attitudes, which transforms this “dilemma” into one where intentionally managed politics of scale takes place.

Three examples can illustrate this point. First, as explained previously in the case of Uzunköprü district, locally elected politicians are not as influential as central government officials in CBC. District governors usually take the initiative in the promotion of CBC and are capable of mobilizing other institutions to participate in CBC. In Uzunköprü (even though it can be considered an extreme example) it was the governor who formed ideas for the projects and who distributed them to future beneficiaries in a meeting. Thus, the decision over whom to invite and to whom to give a project depends on the governor him/herself.

Second, it was argued that one of the most significant institutionalised practices of CBC was finding ways to bypass legal constraints. The common method identified was to use intermediary institutions that act in the name of the constrained organization. A consequence of this practice is the dependency of the organization on personal relationships with high-ranking officials who control these intermediary institutions.

Third, although it is not officially forbidden, it is common knowledge among interlocutors that CBC partnerships with the Burgas municipality in Bulgaria are not allowed. This is an informal central policy that uses the ban as a response to the

Burgas municipal council's recognition of the Armenian Genocide, a term that is officially rejected by the Turkish state. Although it depends to the local actors to establish a partnership with the Burgas municipality, they tacitly acknowledge that they will not be supported in, or may be even prevented from, engaging with this project by the central state (Personal Interviews, 2013).

These three examples point to a selective porosity process that is the second institutional characteristic of CBC in the Edirne-Kırklareli border region: the gate-keeping role of the central state. Although support for CBC from central state institutions is undeniable, through institutionalized practices such as those mentioned above, central state institutions involve themselves in the politics of scale to sustain exert control over local actors by using CBC as a source for reproducing their hegemonic stronghold.

Consequently, two contradictory parts of this dilemma melt in the same pot to constitute two faces of the same coin. The institutionalized practices of CBC support the argument of Dulupçu (2004), who argued that the rescaling process of the Turkish state tends to be unidirectional towards the supranational scale, where decentralization is avoided in order to maintain control over the local scale. From this point of view, CBC can be understood as the continuation of the same politics which on the one hand approach towards the EU and on the other keep the regional scale under control through laws and informal practices.

5.6.3 Welfare state substitution

Last but not least, a topic discussed in the chapters above must be underlined as an emerging characteristic of the institutionalization of CBC. With the new regionalist turn in Turkish regional policies, CBC, together with other regional development programmes, is increasingly recognized as an endogenous resource to be used for regional development. The increasing interest of municipalities and governorships in CBC following the inclusion of infrastructure investment projects to the programme is one of the most obvious examples of this transformation.

Municipalities increasingly rely on these projects for the provision of basic services and infrastructure instead of central government investments. One of the mayors interviewed, whose next project proposal is focused on changing the current street lighting system to one that relies on solar energy, has justified the value of his project

by referring to this transformation. He predicted that the central government would not pay the municipality electricity bills in the near future and, therefore, he felt it important to address the problem earlier rather than later (Personal Interview, 2013).

The welfare state substituting, new regionalist approach is also reflected in a second type of project that does not focus on infrastructure investment or service provision, but rather on new regional development perspectives. Projects focusing on tourism development or the modernization of agricultural production methods increasingly appear on the lists of granted projects. These projects are proposed not only by municipalities and governorships but also by public benefit and business-oriented NGOs. CBC projects provide a new tool for non-governmental organizations to stay involved in regional governance and efficiently promote their vision for the development of the region.

5.7 Institutionalization of Cross Border Cooperation in Edirne- Kırklareli Border Region

To recall, the central argument of the present study is that the sovereignty of the nation state has been challenged by various other scales, claiming share of its power. This is a process necessitated by various dynamics such as globalization or current phase of global capitalism. The challenge implies a transformation of the political structure dominantly defined by the nation states. This transformation can be observed by looking to the institutions in a specific policy field, where actors claiming share of state power and represent the interests of their scales are engaged in the politics of scale. Within this context institutions are defined as the agents, who depending on their interests can either stand against the transformation or accelerate it. The major characteristics of the institutional structure of CBC in the Edirne-Kırklareli border region can be interpreted in this predefined theoretical framework by looking at the dualities between structure and agency on the one hand, and continuity and change on the other. While the first points to the structural transformation, the latter points to the role of institutions regarding the transformation.

Figure 5.3 provides a brief explanation of the institutionalization of CBC in the Edirne- Kırklareli border region. The plane presents abovementioned dualities: structure- agency is on the horizontal and change- continuity is on the vertical axes.

This allows positioning not only CBC organizations but also the remaining components of the institutionalization process, as well as the basic characteristics of the institutional structure. At the same time, this conceptualization provides a visual background for state rescaling discussions over spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement.



Figure 5.3: Map of the institutional structure of CBC in Edirne- Kırklareli border region.

The structure end of the horizontal axis in Figure 5.3 points to the path dependent understanding of the social structure in which actors' behaviours are constrained by historical factors established by the wider social dynamics such as class struggles. Whereas the agency end of the axis points to the entrepreneurial activities of institutions that are determined to reach their goals despite the constraining factors. Institutions and institutional dynamics on the "structure" side of the diagram are a result of wider social dynamics and those on the "agency" side function relatively independent from these structural dynamics or hold the potential to impose their conditions for a possible structural change.

The vertical axis, where the upper arrow ends with continuity and the lower with change points to the nature of institutional actions. It is assumed that continuity results either from actions that reproduce the social structure or from the social factors that force actors to act in a particular way. Change, on the other hand, occurs

through agency or the critical junctures in history. Hence institutional factors positioned in the "continuity" side of the diagram point to those institutional actors or actions that aim to protect the established structure, while those on the "change" side point to the structural or entrepreneurial dynamics which either impose or demand change.

As it can be observed from Figure 5.3, the continuity part of the diagram remains almost unpopulated. This is a result of the transformation that is taking place in the region and CBC is only a part of it. Part of the central state policies and institutions that are designed to keep central state' control over the local are the only place holders in the "continuity" part. National laws and rules are among the major institutional components that are used for the preservation of the existing central state policies and related control mechanisms. All the remaining factors are on the change side, since institutions in the region try to cope with the ongoing structural transformation, and adapting to the changing conditions.

Looking at the structure- agency divide, it can be noted that CBC related organizations, coloured in red, are separated into two major groups. The first group, located on the change- structure part of the plane indicates the organizations that either represent the central state in the region or are under strong control of central state authorities. They consist of ABEM, public schools, the RDA and other central state organizations such as provincial or district directorates of various ministries. The position of these organizations again indicates the ongoing structural transformation and these organizations transpose the structural dynamics to the local scale. Welfare state substitution is one of these structural transformations that is a result of wider social, political and economic dynamics previously discussed under capitalism, neoliberalism and globalization topics. Being bound to central states' decisions necessitates the adaptation of these organizations to the changing conditions.

The establishment of the territorial shape in the region also demonstrates the existence of structural dynamics pushing forward for transformation. Together with the EU related laws and legislations, the establishment of NUTS regions are among these structural dynamics that require a structural change and function even behind nation state's dynamics of continuity. In this respect, using the sociological

institutionalist jargon, a critical juncture is taking place, where the structure is transforming itself in a way that is going to affect all the involved parties.

The second group, municipalities and NGO's are positioned on the agency- change side of the plane. This group of organizations shows three common characteristics. First being relatively independent from the central state policies, they are able to set their own agenda and act accordingly. Second, they represent the local interests in the region, which can contradict with central state policies from time to time. And third, they are vulnerable to the ongoing structural transformations and usually use CBC and other funding opportunities as a reaction to their changing conditions.

These reactions become visible through the institutionalized practices. Both groups of organizations have developed their practices, which by large target to by-pass the structural constrains and make use of CBC. In this way the practices highlight the transformative role of institutions over the structural constrains. At the same time social consciousness, mostly observed in the discourse of politicians, project participants and institutional entrepreneurs is positioned at the agency side of the plane, however without any clear tendency towards continuity or change. This is a result of the local nature of the establishment of CBC in the social consciousness in the region. The discourse on CBC is created by large at the local scale by local actors involved in CBC. The negative or positive perception of CBC among society varies according to the experience of political elites and project participants. Depending on the experience, the discourse of CBC can be positive or negative, which in turn can imply either pressure for change in order to spread the positive perception of CBC in the region or depict it as a useless, time consuming activity. It should be noted that continuity in this case also reflects the EU- sceptic view point of the actors.

The transformation of the nation state at the regional level becomes observable through the new regionalist policies accompanied with the retreat of the Keynesian welfare state and the shift towards Schumpeterian workfare state. One of the major implications of that shift is the claim of state power by sub- national and supranational actors. On the one hand regions forced to rely on their indigenous resources for development and compete with other regions nationally and globally, claim more political and economic power to achieve their goals. On the other hand, a common ground on which regions can compete becomes necessary, which means establishment of new regulatory bodies and mechanisms for cooperation and

competition. This is what the EU provides to the regions through policy programmes and funds, such as CBC. In the case of the Edirne- Kırklareli border region, the IPA-CBC programme provides a case for observing the impacts of this transformation.

Welfare state substitution is defined as a structural dynamic that signifies abovementioned transformation, therefore is positioned on the structure- change part of the diagram. It is "structural" since it emerges as a result of wider dynamics that put into question the functionality of the welfare state; and it imposes "change" as the traditional ways of doing business within state administrative structure are transforming. In Figure 5.4 all of the institutional actors are positioned in relation to this dynamic.



Figure 5.4: Welfare state substitution and institutional actors.

In general, the institutional actors act in two major ways. First, the actors being part of the central state institutions transpose the ongoing structural change to the regional and local levels. The strong support and even pressure of provincial and district governors on public organizations for increasing the number of fund winning projects is a result of such a transposition, where central government policies tend to decrease the share of budget allocated to local administrations. The interviews conducted with the public officials from various organizations revealed that such a transformation is well recognized, and also accepted without significant resistance among those interlocutors. Accompanied with the rhetoric on increasing efficiency,

standards, competition, transparency; and decreasing costs and bureaucracy, this transformation is even welcomed among some of them.

The second response of institutional actors is reactionary in character and includes the adaptation practices of local institutions. Concerning municipalities, the use of CBC as well as RDA's and other possible funding opportunities for service provision and infrastructure construction holds traces of this adaptation process. Municipalities that are not only obliged to provide services but are also made to brand their cities for national and international competition increasingly rely on these funding opportunities to finance their newly defined duties. Concerning NGO's that unlike municipalities rarely have had the opportunities to be financially supported by the central state; the adaptation process has two main aspects. First, once their capacity is improved they will have the opportunity to reach to various financial resources. Hence improving their institutional capacity and defining their scope to include the potential funding areas constitute the challenges NGO's try to cope in the changing context. The second aspect of the adaptation of NGO's is related to the redefined governance structure with the influence of the EU. In this changing context, NGO's find the opportunity to enter the scene as recognized governance actors. With the increasing opportunity to reach financial resources and the ability to mobilize local communities to defend their common interests, more and more they become influential on local politics. In addition, their recognition by the EU as stakeholders in local governance strengthens their hand in front of the central state institutions and policies.

The retreat of the welfare state; the EU candidacy of Turkey and accordingly re-defined regional policies have determinative effects on the use of CBC. These structural factors provide the context for spaces of dependence in the Edirne-Kırklareli border region. Within this context spaces of dependence are defined as i) the structural dynamics that force local actors to search and compete for resources and ii) the EU and national legislation that provides the rules of CBC and identifies the actors eligible to participate in CBC. The general framework or the context of CBC, predominantly defined by the neoliberal transformation of state power and structure, also constitutes a space of dependence for CBC actors. In other words the rules of the game are pre-defined by the wider socio- political dynamics. However depicting the dynamics that define the rules of the game is only one part of the story.

If we continue to use the game analogy, the other part is constituted by the players and how do they interpret the rules, i.e. the practices that make CBC happen.

The actors represent their scalar interests. For example a governor does not only transpose the changing national political context into the local level, but is also obliged to protect central government's interests vis a vis other involved actors such as the EU institutions, municipalities or NGO's that, as it was argued previously, gain power during this structural transformation. In the present case the policy field of CBC provides the ground for these actors to act according to their interests by engaging in politics of scale. Hence it constitutes a space of engagement for CBC actors. At this stage of inquiry, the role agency plays in reproduction or transformation through interpretation of the socio- political structure necessitates particular attention.

This study argues that a solely structuralist perspective will not be enough to explain the institutional structure of CBC in the Edirne- Kırklareli border region. Within the politics of scale approach and in the context of CBC it is argued that agency, through interpretation of legislation and by developing its own practices plays a crucial role in the institutionalization process by both initiating transformation and by reproducing the given structural context. The case study in the Edirne- Kırklareli border region revealed that the two major components in this process are the dependence on individuals and the institutionalized practices of bypassing.

Three particular personas were identified as the groups of individuals on which CBC in Edirne- Kırklareli border region depends: English teachers, institutional entrepreneurs and district governors. While the first two are considered as the protagonists of CBC enhancing the overall capacity of local actors to participate in CBC, the latter play much more important roles in the establishment of the institutional structure of CBC in the region. Therefore further elaborating the role district governors are playing in institutionalization of CBC can shed light on the agency part of the story in a way that establishes links with the wider social and political context, i.e. the "structure".

District governors hold a decisive power on CBC. The source of their power originates from the central state; hence their position in CBC has to overlap, or at least not to contradict with the central state policies. This situation should put them

on the structure side of the diagram (Figure 5.5), as they can be perceived the catalysts of these policies. Indeed their strong support for CBC; the leadership of some of them in initiating CBC in their jurisdictional areas; their attitudes to selectively include some organizations in CBC while not the others; and their approach towards CBC as a tool for local development reflects various aspects of central state policies. Since these policies simultaneously impose change towards neoliberal transformation of state structure and the continuity of the dominancy of the central state power over the local administrative units, the position of district governors reflects the same dichotomy, which does not allow to position them on the change or continuity parts of the diagram.



Figure 5.5: The role of district governors between structure and agency.

Another characteristic of district governors emerging from the organization of the Turkish central state bureaucracy previously was indicated as holding a post that is primarily concerned with local development. District governors, by definition of their duties, act for increasing the welfare and the level of development of their districts. They are the most powerful actors in districts, enhanced with the financial and institutional resources for welfare provision as a result of central state policies that aim to keep control over the local level. Consequently district governors are in a position capable to establish growth coalitions, or influence the existing ones for reaching their desired goals in local development. The intensity of CBC in a particular district is affected from this situation as well. As long as CBC is seen as a

resource for local development by district governors, its use is supported and promoted. Otherwise the spread of CBC relies on the efforts of NGO's and municipalities. However in this latter case, the gate keeping role of the state, which is exercised through district governors, again puts the governors on a central position regarding CBC. In sum, district governors' agency in the institutionalization of CBC becomes crucial, which does not solely reflect the structural- constraining factors, but also stress the powerful agency role these particular individuals play in the institutionalization process.

The responsibility of district governors for local development can be considered as a structural factor that puts them in an agency position that is constrained by the structure, but also that needs to find its way to overcome these constrains in order to reach its goals. At the same time, since the power of this particular agent springs from the structure itself, it is important to note that the way that structure has found to reproduce itself is no other than empowering these people who represent the state power at the bottom of the state structure to act as semi-autonomous agents. Indeed looking at the hierarchical position of district governors within the state bureaucracy, by no means they can be defined as autonomous or semi-autonomous. However, in the case of CBC their actions uncover traces of such an autonomous power.

The formal and informal practices are the major characteristic in the institutionalization of CBC in Edirne- Kırklareli border region. Practically they enable CBC projects to be realized despite the legal constrains and the lack of institutional capacity in the region. But they also enable theoretical conceptualization of CBC in the region, especially by looking through the lens of politics of scale and spaces of engagement. Institutionalization of these practices is strongly related to the institutionalization of CBC in the region.

To start such a conceptualization, first and foremost it should be mentioned once again that all of the organizations involved in CBC, including district governors and central state organizations use such practices to realize their projects. These practices mainly target to bypass several constrains emerging from the EU or national laws.

As discussed by large in the previous parts of this chapter, CBC practices used by the central state organizations target to bypass the EU regulations aiming to strengthen the links between the supranational and local levels, in a way that empowers local

actors in the governance processes. By doing this, it was argued that the central state keeps control over the local, mainly in two ways: first several organizations including foundations and associations attached to various ministries, functioning at the local scale, are supported and mobilized to absorb CBC funds. And second, provincial and district governors are put in a supervising position that performs a gatekeeping role. While the central state is performing this gatekeeping role, it is relying on the EU policies that while aiming establishing direct links with the local, still give to the central states the responsibility to prevent corruption through monitoring processes. Municipalities do use bypassing practices as well, this time for overcoming barriers imposed by the central state, again by establishing intermediary institutions in the form of municipal unions. A third factor of bypassing practices involves the use of financial and institutional resources of other organizations including the RDA branches; organizations in which previously mentioned institutional entrepreneurs are employed; and especially district governorships. NGO's and small municipalities that lack of capacity to prepare and manage a CBC project apply for unofficial financial and institutional support of these organizations. In this way they contribute to the increase of the agency power of these organizations and individuals, on which's resources they rely.

All of these practices suggest that structural constrains defining the spaces of dependence are not independent of politics of scale. Hence they should be interpreted as intentional attempts to insert the respective scalar interests of the actors involved. As it is discussed by large, these contesting scalar interests crystalize in the institutionalization of CBC. Even a superficial look at the structural constrains and the legal structure of CBC gives clues on how these spaces of dependence limit the creation of spaces of engagement. Supranational and national policies and legal instruments by large routinize CBC in a way that reflects the interests of both of these scales.

However it is hard to argue that institutionalization of CBC is done only through the politics of scale between supranational and national actors. Instead institutionalization of CBC in Edirne- Kırklareli border region by large is defined by the institutionalized practices of bypassing. These practices emerge from the loopholes in the structure. On the one hand multiple duties of actors (district governors simultaneously responsible for local development and representing the

central state interests; the RDA that on the one hand monitors CBC and on the other hand helps the local actors; English teachers that while performing their regular duties write and manage CBC projects for their institutions and help other actors) necessitate bypassing the legally defined structure. On the other hand the legal constrains technically make CBC impossible in the absence of these bypassing practices. Hence they become necessary for the realization of CBC. Bypassing practices under these conditions not only create spaces of engagement for the local actors, but also, by defining the actual conditions for realization of CBC, enable the understanding of institutionalization of CBC as a social construction that is shaped by the politics of scale. The institutionalization of CBC then becomes a multidimensional process, which is defined and even imposed by the actors from supranational and national scales, but realized through its re-construction at the local scale in the policy field of CBC by blurring the boundaries between scalar interests and roles of the actors.

6. CONCLUSION

The budget allocated for CBC in 2007-2013 by the IPA programme is €20.6 million. This is less than 0.5% of the total IPA budget (€4,795.2 million) allocated to Turkey for the same programming period. Despite its low budget, CBC constitutes an important policy field for the EU, especially in terms of continued integration and enlargement.

The cross-border contacts established between border regions provide opportunities to prepare candidate countries for EU accession and reveal clues for the future prospects of integration and regional development policies within the EU. CBC funds and programmes in this respect are seen as tools designed specifically to highlight border regions' potential in the EU integration process. From the perspective of EU policies, border regions are seen as "the experimental gardens for continuing integration" in the EU, and the scope of the CBC funds is designed to exceed the traditional limits of structural funds in order to allocate "disposable funding" for these 'experimental' projects (Van de Veen and Boot, 1995, p. 89). These experiments include the establishment of new forms of governance, such as the Euregios where the functionality of nation state borders is substantially reduced and the regional scale is redefined and ascribed increasing importance by the inter-scalar dynamics of these three scales.

Keeping this context in mind, the problematic initiated by this study was the supposed tension between the EU as the supranational scale and the nation-state scale, since rational thinking would lead one to assume that a highly centralised nation state (such as Turkey) should naturally resist and respond to actions that establish direct links between the EU and sub-national regions through attempts to bypass sovereign power. The nature of this study's problematic necessitated paying attention to three particular scales (the supranational scale, nation state scale and the regional scale); to the global dynamics that have transformed their meanings; and to the predefined, mostly hierarchical relationships between them. The research questions and hypotheses were derived from this problematic and aimed to

analytically investigate the role of these scales in the transformation of the nation state.

The transformative dynamics were identified as globalization, the retreat of the Keynesian welfare state and the rise of the Schumpeterian workfare state, neoliberalism, new regionalism and newly emerging types of governance. It was argued that the global system based on nation states possessing impermeable sovereignty within their borders is inconsistent with globalization and the current phase of capitalism, and has undergone a major structural transformation as a result. During this process, new scales have emerged or regained power and new modes of governance have been established as a result of inter-scalar politics and power relations.

At this stage of the inquiry, state-rescaling theory, and in particular, the politics of scale approach were used to understand the transformation of the nation state in relation to other scales. Here, the argument was that state power has not been vertically "hollowed out" (Rhodes, 1994) towards the supranational and regional scales to create a scalar hierarchy of political power. Instead, to avoid such a "territorial trap" (Agnew, 1994) the "politics of scale" approach (Swyngedouw, 1997), which argues that political scales are not defined in a mutually exclusive way but are continuously intermingled in the so-called "places of engagement" (Cox, 1998), has been adopted. Specific policy fields such as CBC constitute these places of engagement, where various actors from several scales are involved in power struggles over them (Lagendijk et al., 2009).

Departing from a hierarchical understanding of scales also necessitates avoiding oversimplified structuralist interpretations that abstracts administrative scales and argues that each scale is a homogenous and solid unit acting for its own good. It is not the scales themselves, but actors representing the interests of these scales who are engaged in politics of scale. These actors can be individuals as well as institutions which represent the collective power of particular groups in society. Thus, the new institutionalism theory emerged as the second theory used to understand the transformation of the state. The argument of new institutionalism is that institutions matter in reproducing or transforming the social and political context. They are simultaneously both the mediums for reproducing the established hegemonic structure and agents of social change (March and Olsen, 1984). Institutions act

through laws, practices and narratives but are also constrained by them (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). Hence the dialectical relationship between agency and structure frames the institutional setting in a society and as well as transformation process it undergoes.

A synthesis of politics of scale and new institutionalism theories suggests that the transformation of the nation state is not a single and independent political dynamic but a process that can be observed in the laws, practices and narratives of any policy field. CBC in the EU is one of these fields, in which politics of scale are most easily observed through analysis of the institutional and territorial characteristics of border regions. These areas are at the edges of national territories, and able to exercise the opportunity to establish formal and informal cross-border contacts capable of questioning the sovereignty of the nation state. With the involvement of the EU, CBC between two or more bordering regions has become a model of inter-scalar contestation of state sovereignty. However, neither politics of scale nor the new institutionalism theories can extensively explain the whole context of the politics of scale in CBC without employing a geographic perspective that establishes links between the particular context of a locality in which CBC is taking place and the wider social and political backgrounds subject to these theories. The territorial context of theory still has to be defined.

Ansi Paasi's (1986, 1996) "institutionalization of regions" provides the theoretical tools to put the politics of scale and new institutionalism in a geographical context. Regions, in this context, are both geographical units reflecting the political and administrative structures and social constructs emerging from social dynamics in the locality. For Paasi (1996), it is the interrelations between global and national structures and the local dynamics that construct a region in the social consciousness-territorially, symbolically and institutionally. Paasi's (1986, 1996) approach provides a perfect opportunity to put CBC in its place as an institutionalized practice resulting from the politics of scale and their social, political and geographical dimensions.

State-rescaling theory with a politics of scale perspective, new institutionalism (especially its third phase, Lowndes and Roberts, 2013) and institutionalization of regions are pieced together to constitute the pillars of the theoretical framework of this study (Figure 6.1). However, what makes them fit together is not their use of common terms and concepts such as "scale"; neither is it the common literature to

which they refer from time to time (e.g. the work of Bob Jessop). Instead, it is the wider theoretical background where they often intersect, one which is also adopted by the author: it is referred to as "social constructionism". The social construction of scale; the social construction of borders; construction of the region in the social consciousness; and the functioning of institutions through laws, practices and narratives are conceptual tools employed by the literature and this study to explain the world from a social constructionist perspective. They all seek to explain the social world in relation to individual and institutional interactions upon which structure and agency are built.



Figure 6.1 : The conceptual model of the study.

To understand the institutionalization of CBC in the Edirne-Kırklareli border region and the politics of scale in this process, CBC institutions in the region were put in focus. Through semi-constructed interviews with institutions representing civil society, local governments and the central government, the approach of these institutions representing local and national scales was investigated. The goal was to explore these institutions' and scales' roles in CBC and to define the institutional structure they have established as a result of the politics of scale.

The institutional structure of CBC in the Edirne-Kırklareli border region is strongly affected by the politics of scale. Along with the influence of EU-related regulations and practices, a tension between national and local actors defines the institutional structure. The characteristics of this tension can be grouped in three main categories. First the role of individuals is of considerable importance in the institutionalization of CBC. As institutional entrepreneurs, these individuals perceive CBC as a "project"

that serves regional development and social well-being. From this perspective, they tend to isolate CBC from its political context and associate it with the local scale. However, the importance they assign to CBC makes them critical about the national and supranational politics that prevent the use of it in the most efficient way.

The role of provincial and district governorships as regional political elites deserves particular attention, since these actors simultaneously, represent the central state at the local level and are local agents that mobilize other actors to participate in CBC. From this point of view, they play an intermediary role that is neither central nor local. This dichotomy also appears in their roles as rule makers and rule takers. As rule makers, they are of no doubt the agents who mediate institutional change in the state structure, from the central scale to the local scale. However, they also take on the position of rule taker as soon as they are engaged in CBC cooperation as project partners. In the case of the Edirne-Kırklareli border region, political elites representing the nation state provide a good case for examining central state institutions placed in the position of rule takers. Since the rule making position has been largely rescaled towards supranational institutions such as the EC, political elites have found themselves in a position where they are trying to adapt to the changing legal structure and related practices.

Second, looking at the wider context, CBC appears as one of the policy fields through which the welfare state is hollowed out at the expense of entrepreneurial, neoliberal policies. The new regionalist/neoliberal agenda dominating the global political climate has caused European regions to see the EU funds as a "treasure chest" to use for achieving regional development (MacLeod, 1999). The intensified use of CBC projects as a substitution of welfare provision reflects another aspect of the politics of scale. In this case, CBC as a policy field is used by supranational and national institutions to establish, reproduce and legitimize the neoliberal hegemonic discourse. It should be recognized, then, that the politics of scale are not always based on struggles between institutions of conflicting scales, but can also imply consent on social and political transformations.

On this second point of this study's conclusion, a discussion on the welfare state substitution aspect of CBC becomes important, which may include prospects for expanding the scope of this study with future research. In its wider context, CBC is one of among many supranational and national programmes that supply funding for

regional development purposes. Programmes of RDAs, the IMF and the WB can be cited among others. Combined, these resources establish a new perspective for regional development that is not sufficiently discussed in the literature. It will be called project based development.

Project-based development is at the centre of the structural transformation of state management concerning regional policies and development. By replacing the traditional resource allocation procedures of the state -- controlled extensively by public authorities with a competitive system that is also open to non-governmental actors and which relies on the mobilization of endogenous resources, in terms of human capital, local expert knowledge and networks for development -- this approach aligns with the new regionalist perspectives on development. Amin (1999, p. 374), referring to the social policies of the EU and to social projects that are run by the third sector and involve socially excluded groups, argues that these projects constitute "an interesting contemporary policy innovation", and "a source of employment and entrepreneurship in markets which are of limited interest to state organizations and private sector firms".

CBC, together with the RDA's grants, Ministerial Funds and loans from development banks, constitutes the framework of project-based development in the Turkish context. Indeed, CBC funds under the PHARE-Turkey Programme were the first institutionalized version of this method in the region when they were introduced in 1999. After the establishment of the RDAs and the introduction of the first regional plans related to them, project-based development has been institutionalized to become one of the major resources for regional development.

Two characteristics of project-based development deserve particular attention in future research. First, the change in regional planning methods requires additional effort to understand. Although the level of participation is questionable, the discourse of "new" planning methods puts participation at the heart of the project. Participation in the case of CBC means the involvement of regional, national and supranational actors in the decision-making processes, including the definition of programme priorities and measures. In case of RDAs, participation is reflected in the structure of agencies where central and local public actors, together with civil society organizations, constitute an administrative board. Moreover, the processes of project preparation and implementation themselves, as discussed previously, can be

interpreted as ways of participating in regional development processes. As a result, project-based development and multi-level governance emerge as two social transformation processes that go hand-in-hand. Second, project-based development emerges as a phenomenon boasting the characteristics of new regionalism. The projects use external funding for the mobilization of endogenous resources for regional development. Since funding is not distributed directly to related administrative organizations for some general purpose, but is subject to competition, local actors have to change their way of thinking and find innovative ways to fulfil even their basic duties.

The field study indicated that the governorships and municipalities in particular are well aware of this transformation and have started to adapt to this new way of doing business. It is also almost unanimously cheered as a more efficient, merit-based system of resource allocation (Personal Interviews, 2013).

As a result of the transformation towards project-based development, the EU offices of municipalities and governorships that are supposed to take care of CBC and EU-related work function informally as project preparation and management divisions of these organizations, and are interested in various programmes such as those of the EU, RDA and other foundations. The staffs of these offices agree that these divisions are 'different' from other divisions within their institutions in various terms, including having advanced communication skills, being in an international working environment and having flexible working hours. Apparently, project-based development is not only changing the way of doing business in public organizations, but it is also affecting how these bodies are internally and institutionally organized. In this context, the governance structure of the project-based development model and its effect on the transformation of state structure deserve additional attention in near future.

Finally, the third characteristic of the institutional structure reflecting the politics of scale was identified as a multi-scalar bypassing process. The EU's regional polices in general and CBC policies in particular imply elements that reduce, and in some cases, bypass, the involvement of national governments in the process. At the same time, by redirecting CBC funds to regional funds and performing a gatekeeping role in this respect, nation states can bypass the EU, and in particular, its principles of subsidiarity and additionality (i.e. that the funds of the EU should be used in addition

to national funds, but not as a replacement), too. Local actors, who are constrained by laws and regulations and legally cannot participate in CBC, also find ways to bypass these laws with the use of intermediary institutions.

Bypassing, as an institutionalized practice of CBC is, by large controlled by central state institutions, as they still maintain the ideological apparatuses to reproduce hegemony, especially over local institutions. The central state, through laws, regulations and governorships, selectively provides an advantage to some institutions while increasing barriers for others. Bypassing methods emerge at this stage as ways to participate in CBC given the existence of these barriers. However, these methods usually rely on personal relationships, which increase the importance of particular individuals who have the power to provide the necessary means to subvert regulations. In the current administrative structure of Turkey, the most powerful group of these individuals are the provincial governors who represent the central state. Hence, it is concluded that the institutionalized practice of CBC basically involves the legal constraints of national and supranational institutions and the bypassing practices controlled largely by central state authorities.

With this last finding, the best way to conclude this study, perhaps, will be to recall Foucault (1991) and ask about the role of CBC in the transformation of state structure. Is CBC another mode of governmentality? The findings of this study suggest reading CBC as a technique of governance, which diffuses project-based development throughout local governance and still provides the means to power holders to keep the gates. Now the task can be redefined to take a closer look at the power mechanisms lying behind the scales.

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